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I. JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102. This action comes to the Utah Supreme Court from the summary 
judgment granted to Defendants Brown's Crew Car of Wyoming, Inc. d/b/a Armadillo 
Express and Union Pacific Railroad Company and the motion to reconsider denied to 
Plaintiff John D. Archer, both by the Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Whether Appellees Armadillo and/or Union Pacific owed a duty to Appellant 
Archer to provide transportation equipped with rear seat head restraints (seat head rests). 
Standard of Review: The Supreme Court reviews the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment for correctness. Davis County Solid Waste Management v. City of 
Bountiful, 52 P.3d 1174, 1176 (Utah 2002). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
the appellate court gives the trial court's legal decisions no deference, reviewing for 
correctness. Kearns-Tribune Corp, v. Salt Lake County Commission, 2001 UT 55, 28 
P.3d 686, 688 (Utah 2001). 
B. Whether a rear seat head restraint is a safety device which, like other safety 
devices, is needed for a reasonably safe workplace. 
Standard of Review: The Supreme Court reviews the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment for correctness. Davis County Solid Waste Management v. City of 
Bountiful, 52 P.3d 1174, 1176 (Utah 2002). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
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the appellate court gives the trial court's legal decisions no deference, reviewing for 
correctness. Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Salt Lake County Commission, 2001 UT 55, 28 
P.3d 686, 688 (Utah 2001). 
C. Whether Appellant's Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 e/ 
seq. claims that Appellees Armadillo and/or Union Pacific should have transported 
Appellant in one of the many Armadillo vans already equipped with rear seat head 
restraints, is preempted by federal regulations for automobile manufacturers which make 
rear seat head restraints optional. 
Standard of Review: The Supreme Court reviews the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment for correctness. Davis County Solid Waste Management v. City of 
Bountiful, 52 P.3d 1174, 1176 (Utah 2002). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
the appellate court gives the trial court's legal decisions no deference, reviewing for 
correctness. Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Salt Lake County Commission, 2001 UT 55, 28 
P.3d 686, 688 (Utah 2001). 
D. Whether orthopedic and spine surgeons have the medical expertise to render 
medical causation opinions regarding the injuries caused by the failure to provide rear 
seat head restraints in the vehicle transporting Appellant which was involved in a rear end 
collision. 
Standard of Review: The Supreme Court reviews the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment for correctness. Davis County Solid Waste Management v. City of 
Bountifuly52 P.3d 1174, 1176 (Utah 2002). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
9 
the appellate court gives the trial court's legal decisions no deference, reviewing for 
correctness. Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Salt Lake County Commission, 2001 UT 55, 28 
P.3d 686, 688 (Utah 2001). 
III. STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56. Summary Judgment. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any 
time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 702. Testimony of Experts. 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness is qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto 
in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Federal Statutes 
The Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELAl 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. 
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any 
of the several states . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering 
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce . . . for such 
injury resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, 
agents, or employees or such carrier, or by reason of .any defect or 
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insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery 
track, road bed, works, boats, wharfs, or other equipment. 
Federal Automobile Manufacturer Regulations 
The Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA), 49 U.S.C. § 30101. Purpose and policy. 
The purpose of this chapter is to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and 
injuries resulting from traffic accidents. Therefore it is necessary -
(1) to prescribe motor vehicle safety standards for motor vehicles and 
motor vehicle equipment in interstate commerce; and 
(2) to carry out needed safety research and development. 
The Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA), 49 U.S.C. § 30103. Relationship to other laws. 
(a) Uniformity of regulations. - The Secretary of Transportation may not 
prescribe a safety regulation related to a motor vehicle subject to subchapter 
I of chapter 135 of this title that differs from a motor vehicle safety 
standard prescribed under this chapter. However, the Secretary may 
prescribe, for a motor vehicle operated by a carrier subject to subchapter I 
of chapter 135, a safety regulation that imposes a higher standard of 
performance after manufacture than that required by an applicable standard 
in effect at the time of manufacture. 
(b) Preemption. - (1) When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect 
under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe 
or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of 
performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the 
standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 
However, the United States Government, a State, or a political subdivision 
of a State may prescribe a standard for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle 
equipment obtained for its own use that imposes a higher performance 
requirement than that required by the otherwise applicable standard under 
this chapter. 
(e) Common law liability. - Compliance with a motor vehicle safety 
standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from 
liability at common law. 
l l 
The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), 49 C.F.R. § 571.202 Standard 
No. 202; Head restraints; Applicable at the manufacturers option until September 1, 2009 
51. Purpose and scope. This standard specifies requirements for head 
restraints to reduce the frequency and severity of neck injury in rear-end 
and other collisions. 
52. Application. This standard applies to passenger cars, and to 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR of 4,536 
kg or less, manufactured before September 1, 2009. Until September 1, 
2009, manufacturers may comply with the standard in this § 571.202, with 
the European regulations referenced in S4.3 of this § 571.202, or with the 
standard in § 571.202a. For vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 
2009 and before September 1, 2010, manufacturers may comply with the 
standard in this § 571.202 or with the European regulations referenced in 
S4.3 of this § 571.202, instead of the standard in § 571.202a, only to the 
extent consistent with the phase-in specified in § 571.202a. 
The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), 49 C.F.R. $ 571.202a Standard 
No. 202a; Head restraints; Mandatory applicability begins on September 1, 2009 
51. Purpose and scope. This standard specifies requirements for head 
restraints to reduce the frequency and severity of neck injury in rear-end 
and other collisions. 
52. Application & incorporation by reference. 
S2.1 Application. This standard applies to passenger cars, and to 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR of 4,536 
kg or less, manufactured on or after September 1, 2009. However, the 
standard's requirements for rear head restraints do not apply to vehicles 
manufactured before September 1, 2010, and, for vehicles manufactured 
between September 1, 2010 and August 31, 2011, the requirements for rear 
head restraints apply only to the extent provided in S7. Until September 1, 
2009, manufacturers may comply with the standard in this § 571.202a, with 
the standard in § 571.202, or with the European regulations referenced in 
S4.3(a) of § 571.202. For vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 
2009 and before September 1, 2010, manufacturers may comply with the 
standard in § 571.202 or with the European regulations referenced in 
S4.3(a) of § 571.202, instead of the standard in this § 571.202a, only to the 
extent consistent with the phase-in specified in this § 571.202a. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Archer commenced this lawsuit against Appellees under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., for neck and shoulder injuries caused by a 
rear-end motor vehicle collision occurring on September 26, 2004, while being 
transported by Armadillo in the course of his employment with UP. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
UP and Armadillo filed a motion for summary judgment on April 3, 2008. Archer 
filed a motion for reconsideration on October 3, 2008. 
C. Disposition in the Court Below. 
On December 11, 2008, the Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton of the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granted Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denied Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. 
D. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
The Motor Vehicle Collision 
1. On September 26, 2004, Archer, in the course and scope of his employment 
with UP, was being transported in a Chevrolet van owned and operated by Brown's Crew 
Car of Wyoming, Inc. (Armadillo), without the protection of a rear seat head restraint. R. 
589. 
2. On September 26, 2004, April Gaultney rear ended the Armadillo van in 
which Archer was a passenger. R. 589 and 615-616. 
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3. On June 8, 2006, Archer commenced this lawsuit against UP under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.9 and negligence claims 
against Armadillo and April Gaultney, for neck and shoulder injuries caused by the rear-
end motor vehicle collision occurring on September 26, 2004. R. 2-12. 
The UP/Armadillo Contract 
4. Effective at the time of the September 26, 2004 incident, Union Pacific 
Railroad Company (UP) contracted with Armadillo to provide on-the-job transportation 
for Archer and other train crew members. R. 203-235. 
5. The contract gave UP the right to specify the safety equipment on 
Armadillo's vehicles. R. 230. UP required the following transportation and safety 
equipment in Armadillo's vans, prior to the September 26, 2004 incident: 
WHEREAS, Company wishes to perform transportation services for Union 
Pacific Railroad Company and affiliated companies, hereinafter referred to 
as Railroad... 
Section 18. VEHICLE CONDITION, EQUIPMENT AND SAFETY 
ITEMS 
Vehicles used to transport Railroad employees must be capable of 
transporting seven (7) passengers and their luggage in an efficient and 
comfortable manner. Vehicles will be required to have a cage or netting 
between the rear seat and the back doors to provide luggage storage space 
during transit. All vehicles used in these services must be no more than 
three years old, in good mechanical condition and must be equipped with 
the following equipment: 
(a) Air conditioner 
(b) Heater 
(c) Operable safety belts for all passengers 
(d) Properly equipped First Aid Kit 
(e) Operable and inspected 2.51b. (ABC) fire extinguisher 
14 
(f) Road flares 
(g) Spare tire 
(h) Jack and tools 
(i) Reflective striping 
(j) All mechanical items on the vehicle in good working order, 
with special attention paid to tires, brakes, and lights 
(k) Back up alarm devices, whether mechanical or electrical, 
where not specifically prohibited by law. 
R. 226 and 230. 
6. UP's list of safety equipment for Armadillo vehicles did not include seat 
head restraints. R. 230. 
Reasonably Safe Workplace 
7. UP admits that it is responsible to provide a reasonably safe workplace and 
that at the time of Archer's injuries on September 26, 2004, the Armadillo van was 
Archer's workplace. R. 892. 
8. UP admits that it is responsible for identifying and reducing reasonably 
foreseeable hazards in the workplace. R. 893. 
9. UP admits that rear-end collisions are reasonably foreseeable hazards in the 
workplace, that it knew before Archer's injury on September 26, 2004, that seat head 
restraints were important safety devices that reduce the risk of neck injuries in rear end 
collisions, and that it was safer to have vehicles with rear seat head restraints. Id. 
10. UP admits that before Archer's September 26, 2004 collision and injuries, 
it could have required Armadillo to use vehicles with rear seat head restraints. Id. 
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11. Armadillo admits that had it known before Archer's September 26, 2004 
injury that seat head restraints reduced the risk of neck injuries then it should have used 
vehicles with rear seat head restraints for transporting UP passengers. Id. 
Armadillo Had Vehicles With Rear Seat Head Restraints 
12. Armadillo admits that before Archer's September 26, 2004 injury, 
Armadillo had transported UP crew members in vehicles with rear seat head restraints. 
Id. 
13. Armadillo admits that the center seats of its vehicles did not have head 
restraints and some railroad location passengers were restricted from using the center 
seats. R. 894. 
14. Before Archer's September 26, 2004 injury, one third of Armadillo's 200 
vehicle fleet had rear seat head restraints. Id. 
15. Armadillo's fleet had Chevy Suburban vehicles with the capacity to 
transport up to five passengers with seat head restraints. Id. 
Armadillo is an Agent of UP 
16. Armadillo admits it is a common carrier. Id. 
17. On June 6, 2007, the district court ruled that for purposes of this case, 
Armadillo was an agent of UP on September 26, 2004, with respect to Archer's injuries. 
R. 346-348; R. 894; andR. 1273-1274. 
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18. On June 6, 2007, the district court ruled that Armadillo was performing an 
operational activity of UP in transporting Archer on September 26, 2004. R. 346-348; R. 
894 and R. 1273-1274. 
NHSTA Reports 
19. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHSTA) reported 
that there are approximately 272,464 whip lash injuries annually, of which 21,429 
involve rear outboard seated passengers. R. 894. 
20. The NHSTA reported that "[f|ewer rear seat occupants are exposed to risk 
in rear impacts because rear seats are much less likely to be occupied than front seats." 
Id. 
UP's Safety Rules 
21. UP extensively publishes safety rules governing its employees, such as 
Archer, in detailed fashion, and UP could have promulgated a safety rule requiring its 
employees to adjust and use seat head restraints when transported in vans. R. 896. 
22. UP could require its employees to properly adjust the rear seat head 
restraints by safety rule and contract, and require the driver to supervise this adjustment. 
R. 894. 
23. In 1990, UP's safety committee reported that numerous accidents and 
injuries were associated with transporting its crews. R. 895. 
24. Prior to the September 26, 2004 incident, UP prevented crew haulers from 
backing up vans when UP employees were in the vehicle. Id. 
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25. Armadillo stated that if UP gave Armadillo enough le'ad time, it could have 
used vehicles with head restraints for the outboard passengers. Id. 
Archer Did Not Have a Seat Head Restraint 
26. On September 26, 2004, the Armadillo van was full of passengers, and 
Archer could not sit in a seat with a head restraint while being transported in the course 
and scope of his employment with UP. R. 895. 
27. If the Armadillo van transporting Archer at the time of his injury had had a 
seat head restraint for him to use, he would have leaned back in the seat and looked 
forward, with his arms down. Id. 
28. Before the September 26, 2004 collision, it was Archer's custom to adjust 
seat head restraints and he would have followed any safety rule promulgated by UP 
requiring such adjustments. R. 896. 
Archer's Injury 
29. Archer's mechanism of injury was hyper-extension of a neck with stenosis, 
causing bruising of the spinal cord, resulting in a hollow spot inside the cord. Id. 
30. According to the NHSTA Report, Archer's biomechanical expert, Paul 
France, PhD., and UP, before Archer's September 26, 2004 injury, it was common 
knowledge that seat head restraints prevent or reduce neck injuries from rear end 
collisions. Id. 
31. According to Kade Huntsman, M.D., Archer's treating physician and 
orthopedic surgeon specializing in spine surgery, if a seat head restraint had been 
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provided to Archer on September 26, 2004, it is unlikely that Archer would have suffered 
significant injuries because the head restraint would have prevented hyper-extension of 
the neck, which with stenosis, caused the spinal cord injury. Id. 
32. According to Dr. France, in rear-end collision accidents of the magnitude of 
the September 26, 2004 Armadillo van collision (the collision accelerated the van an 
additional 6 or 7 M.P.H.), with seat head restraints for rear seated passengers, it is 
unlikely that a spinal cord injury would occur to the general population of passengers. R. 
896-897. 
33. According to Dr. Huntsman and Dr. France, the Spine articles Traumatic 
Myopathy in Patients With Cervical Spinal Stenosis Without Fracture or Dislocation and 
A Review of the Pathophysiology of Cervical Spondylotic Myelopathy With Insights for 
Potential Novel Mechanisms Drawn From Traumatic Spinal Cord Injury - attached to Dr. 
France's Report, express the mechanism of Archer's injury. R. 897, R. 1201-1202 and R. 
1349-1380. 
34. According to Dr. France, there is no difference in risk of neck injury, 
everything else being equal, to a rear seated adult passenger compared to a front seated 
adult passenger. R. 897. 
35. According to Dr. France, the purpose of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standards (FMVSS), with respect to seat head restraints, is not frustrated by installation 
of optional rear seat head restraints, because the purpose of the FMVSS is to reduce the 
number and severity of neck injuries, which is achieved with rear seat head restraints. Id. 
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36. Some of the Armadillo vehicles came from the manufacturer with rear seat 
head restraints. Id. 
Medical Causation 
37. Dr. Huntsman, Archer's treating physician and orthopedic surgeon 
specializing in spine surgery, stated the following: 
That based upon my education and training as a physician, my physical 
examinations of Archer, my review of the radiological films, including X-
ray and MRI, and the surgery I performed upon Archer on December 15, 
2004,1 make and hold the following opinions with a reasonable degree of 
medical probability: 
a. That the September 26, 2004 rear-end collision involving Mr. 
Archer as a passenger in a vehicle without a seat head restraint 
was one of the probable medical causes of the injuries I 
diagnosed and treated, including contusion to his spinal cord, 
radicular pain radiating from his neck into his right shoulder 
along the C5 nerve root distribution, right arm weakness, and 
changes in spinal reflexes; 
b. It is medically probable that Mr. Archer would not have suffered 
these injuries from the rear end collision if he had a seat head 
restraint at the time of the collision; and 
c. It is pure speculation that Mr. Archer would have suffered these 
injuries even if he had a seat head restraint at the time of the 
subject rear end collision. 
R. 1492 and 1539-1540. 
38. Dr. Huntsman testified that the accident caused a contusion to Archer's 
spinal cord, resulting in a permanent, hollow spot inside the cord. R. 1492. 
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39. Dr. Huntsman further testified that head restraints "prevent 
flexion/extension-type injury by avoiding excessive extension" and that the "neck doesn't 
excessively extend because there is something there to protect it. Id. 
40. Dr. Huntsman stated that the "fact that [Archer] was then involved in this 
motor vehicle accident in which his head and neck were not restrained did likely cause 
the myelopathy and likely caused the subsequent need for surgical intervention." Id. 
41. Biomedical expert, Dr. France, stated that a head restraint "would have 
likely reduced Mr. Archer's maximum posterior neck motion to be within a range of 15-
20 degrees extension of the neck." R. 1493 and 1548. 
42. Dr. France quoted Spine article, Traumatic Myelopathy In Patients With 
Cervical Spinal Stenosis Without Fracture Or Dislocation, stating that, "[pjatients with 
cervical spinal stenosis are uniquely vulnerable to hyper-extension injuries of the cervical 
spine." R. 1493. 
43. Dr. Huntsman stated that, "[t]he 1980 article from Spine regarding 
traumatic myelopathy in patients with cervical spinal stenosis without fracture and 
dislocation as well as the 1998 Spine article which reviewed the pathophysiology of 
cervical spondylotic myelopathy are accurate and I am in complete agreement with [sic]." 
Id. 
44. Dr. Huntsman testified that the Spine article was significant to the 
mechanism of injury in this case. Id. 
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45. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration .(NHTSA), found that 
seat head restraints help prevent hyperextension. Id. 
46. Dr France stated that, "[a] properly designed and positioned seat head 
restraint prevents hyper-extension of the cervical spine when used as intended, and would 
have likely prevent Mr. Archer's neck from hyper-extending, if used in such a manner. 
Preventing hyper-extension significantly reduces the frequency and severity of cervical, 
upper thoracic, and upper shoulder injuries in the general population." Id. 
47. When asked if it was his opinion that the head restraint, or the lack of head 
restraint in this particular instance, was a causative factor with the shoulder injury, Dr. 
Dennis H. Gordon, M.D., Archer's treating physician and orthopedic surgeon, testified, 
"Yes. I think it contributed to it, yes." R. 1493-1494. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Archer's neck and shoulder injuries, the subject of this FELA personal injury law 
suit, were caused by a rear end motor vehicle collision occurring on September 26, 2004. 
Archer was a passenger in a Chevrolet Van owned and operated by Armadillo. UP 
through its agent Armadillo was transporting UP employee Archer, in the course and 
scope of his employment with UP. On September 26, 2004, UP and Armadillo failed to 
provide Archer with transportation equipped with a rear seat head restraint and Archer 
suffered bruising and injury to his spinal cord and a rotator cuff and labrum tear in the 
right shoulder. 
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The district court's order granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment 
should be reversed and Appellees' motion denied for the following reasons: 
One, FELA imposes, and UP admits that it was responsible for identifying 
reasonably foreseeable hazards in the work place and for minimizing or eliminating these 
hazards. UP admits and the district court previously ruled that the subject van was 
Archer's work place at the time of his injuries. UP admits that rear end collision caused 
neck injuries are reasonably foreseeable work place hazards. UP admits that head 
restraints are important safety devices protecting against rear end collision caused neck 
injuries. 
Two, UP could have simply added rear seat head restraints as a mandatory safety 
feature in its agreement with Armadillo. Prior to the September 26, 2004 incident, UP 
had contracted with Armadillo to provide on the job transportation for UP employees. 
Armadillo had transported UP employees in rear seats with head restraints before 
Archer's injury and one third of Armadillo's 200 vehicle fleet were equipped with rear 
seat head restraints. UP admits it had the power and the right to require Armadillo to 
transport Archer in a vehicle equipped with head restraints. UP already had an existing 
list of required safety equipment for Armadillo vans, in its agreement with Armadillo. 
UP could have simply added rear seat head restraints to this list. UP negligently failed to 
exercise this power and right and did not require head restraints to prevent neck injuries, 
which UP admits was a reasonably foreseeable work place hazard to Archer. There are 
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genuine issues of material fact as to UP's negligence under FELA and Armadillo's 
negligence under the heightened standard of care as a common carrier. 
Three, there is no conflict preemption between MVSA, FMVSS, and FELA, 
preventing the transportation of Archer in Armadillo's vehicles with rear seat head 
restraints. The doctrine of conflict preemption applies when there is an actual conflict 
between state and federal law. Here, there is no state law to preempt and there is no 
actual conflict. MVSA and FMVSS govern manufacturers only, and MVSA specifically 
negates the preemption of state law claims. The purpose of MVSA, FMVSS and FELA, 
is to promote safety. There can be no irreconcilable conflict between these laws and 
Archer's FELA claims: 1) that Appellees should have used the vehicles they already had 
with rear seat head restraints to transport Archer; and 2) that by contract, UP should have 
required its employees be transported by vehicles with rear seat head restraints. 
Four, Archer's orthopedic and spine surgeons have the medical expertise to render 
medical causation opinions regarding the injuries caused by the failure to provide rear 
seat head restraints. Dr. Huntsman, Archer's treating physician and orthopedic surgeon, 
stated that to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the September 26, 2004 rear end 
collision involving Archer as a passenger in a vehicle without a seat head restraint was 
one of the probable medical causes of the injuries, and that it is medically probable that 
Archer would not have suffered these injuries from the rear end collision if he had a seat 
head restraint at the time of the collision. Dr. Gordon, Archer's treating physician and 
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orthopedic surgeon, testified that the lack of a head restraint was a causative factor with 
Archer's shoulder injury. 
Five, FELA is a remedial statute and a jury trial is a significant part of the federal 
remedy protecting rail road workers. A district court is justified in withdrawing a FELA 
case from the jury's consideration only in those extremely rare instances when there is a 
zero probability either of employer negligence or that any such negligence contributed to 
the injury of the employee. Archer has shown substantial evidence - far more than is 
required for a jury trial. The district court's ruling should be reversed and Appellee's 
motion for summary judgment denied accordingly. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. Federal Law Controls. 
All questions of law under FELA are governed by federal decisions. Urie v. 
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 (1949); New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 
147, 150 (1917). "What constitutes negligence for the statute's purposes is a federal 
question, not varying in accordance with the differing conceptions of negligence 
applicable under state and local laws for other purposes. Federal decisional law 
formulating and applying the concept governs." Urie, 337 U.S. at 174. Decisions of 
state courts construing the Act are not controlling but may be deemed persuasive. Young 
v. New York Cent. R. Co., 88 N.E.2d 220 (1949). 
25 
B. Summary Judgment is Particularly Inappropriate in this FELA Case. 
In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the appellate court 
gives the trial court's legal decisions no deference, reviewing for correctness. Kearns-
Tribune Corp. v. Salt Lake County Commission, 2001 UT 55, 28 P.3d 686, 688 (Utah 
2001). (Emphasis added). The appellate court views the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Utah 
R.Civ.P. 56; Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 116 P.3d 271, 275 (Utah 
2005). Summary judgment is a "drastic remedy" in Utah. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 
1178, 1181 (Utah 1993). Where there is any evidence that raises a question of material 
fact, no matter how improbable the evidence may appear, judgment as a matter of law is 
improper. Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 905 P.2d 297, 300 (Utah App. 1995). 
(Emphasis added). As stated by the Utah Supreme Court: 
We are cognizant of the desirability of permitting liligants to fully present 
their case to the court and that a summary judgment prevents this. For that 
reason courts are, and should be, reluctant to invoke this remedy. 
Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 354, 353 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1960). 
(Emphasis added). Accordingly, a party seeking summary judgment under Utah R.Civ.P. 
56 bears a substantial burden in demonstrating its propriety. 
Summary judgment is particularly inappropriate in this FELA case. FELA is a 
broad remedial statute and is to be liberally construed to further Congress1 remedial goal. 
Urie, at 180. It is well established that the role of the jury is significantly greater in 
FELA cases than in common law negligence actions. Eggert v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 
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538 F.2d 509, 511 (2nd Cir. 1976). "[T]o deprive railroad workers of the benefit of a jury 
trial in close or doubtful cases is to take away a goodly portion of the relief, which 
Congress has afforded them." Blair v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 323 U.S. 600, 601 (1945).1 
Federal law controls the kind and amount of evidence necessary to take a case to the 
jury. 
By the Federal Employers' Liability Act, Congress took possession of the 
field of employers' liability by employees in interstate transportation by 
rail, and all state laws upon that subject were superseded.... The kind or 
amount of evidence required to establish it is not subject to the control 
of the several states. 
Chicago M. & St. PaulRy. Co. v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472, 474 (1926)(Emphasis added). 
The standard for receiving a jury trial is less stringent in FELA cases than in 
common law tort cases. 
Although Federal Courts have generally rejected the "scintilla rule" that 
any evidence supporting a tort claim raises a jury question, courts have 
applied a rule very much like the "scintilla rule" to FELA cases. In 
FELA cases, "it is only necessary that the jury conclusion be one which 
is not outside the possibility of reason on the facts and circumstances 
shown." Mendoza v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 733 F.2d 631, 633 (91 
Cir. 1984) (citing Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500.... (other 
1
 See, also, Bailey v. Central Vermont. Ry.y 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943) (the right to a jury 
trial "is part and parcel of the remedy afforded to railroad workers" under the FELA.); 
Finley v. National R. Passenger Corp.,1991 WL 59322 at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("in a 
FELA case, the non-moving party can defeat a motion for summary judgment by 
presenting only a minimum amount of evidence in opposition to the motion."); Baltimore 
and O. R. Co. v. Taylor, 589 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) ("in FELA negligence 
actions, the role of the jury (fact finder) is much greater than in common-law negligence 
actions; the right of the fact finder to pass upon the question of the employer's liability 
must be most liberally viewed."); Seeberger v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 982 P.2d 
1149, 1152 (Wash. 1999) ("in determining whether the worker's negligence case survives 
a motion for summary judgment, a significantly reduced evidentiary standard applies in 
FELA cases."). 
27 
citations omitted). "By enacting FELA, Congress wanted to 'secure jury 
determinations in a larger proportion of cases than would be true of 
ordinary common law actions.' Jury trials were supposed to be part of 
the FELA remedy." Mendoza, 733 F.2d at 633 (citations omitted). This 
relaxed standard applies to both negligence and causation determinations. 
Pierce v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 823 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987) 
("A reviewing court must uphold a verdict even if it finds only 'slight' or 
'minimal' facts to support a jury's finding of negligence"); Oglesby v. 
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 6 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 1993). (" 'Under [the 
FELA] the test of the jury case is simply whether the proof justifies with 
reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the 
slightest, in producing injury.' ") (quoting Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506...) 
(alteration in original). 
Mullahon v. Union Pacific Railroad, 64 F.3d 1358, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1995)(Emphasis 
added). "The minimal FELA standard for raising a jury question" merely requires a 
showing of negligence that is "not outside the possibility of reason ...." Id. at 1364. 
As described by other courts "[t]he Supreme Court standard is that a district court 
is justified in withdrawing such issues from the jury's consideration 'only in those 
extremely rare instances when there is a zero probability either of employer negligence 
or that any such negligence contributed to the injury of an employee.'" Eckert v. 
Aliquippa & Southern R.R. Co., 828 F.2d 183, 187 (3rd Circ. 1987) (quoting Pehowic v. 
Erie Lackawanna R. Co., 430 F.2d 697, 699 (3rd Cir. 1970)). (Emphasis added). The 
instant case is not one of those extremely rare instances. The district court's ruling 
should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary judgment denied accordingly. 
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C. Appellees Owed a Duty to Archer to Provide Transportation Equipped With 
a Rear Seat Head Restraint 
1. Appellees had a non-delegable and continuing duty to provide Archer with a 
reasonably safe workplace. 
This is a FELA case brought under authority of Title 45 §§ 51-60, of the United 
States Code. In pertinent part it provides: 
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any 
of the several states . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering 
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce . . . for such 
injury resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the 
officers, agents, or employees or such carrier, or by reason of any defect or 
insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery 
. . . or other equipment. 
45 U.S.C. § 51. (Emphasis added). 
FELA creates a relaxed standard for negligence. Williams v. Long Island R.R. 
Co., 196 F.3d 402, 406 (2nd Cir. 1999). Under FELA, an employer has a non-
delegable and continuing duty to provide its employees with a reasonably safe 
workplace. Peyton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 962 F.2d 832, 833 (8th Cir. 1992); 
Ragsdell v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 688 F.2d 1282, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982). 
(Emphasis added). "Because of a 'myriad of factors' involved, whether the railroad used 
reasonable care in furnishing its employees a safe place to work is normally a question 
for the jury." Gallose v. Long Island R. Co., 878 F.2d 80, 85 (2nd Cir. 1989), citing 
7togwfe//,688F.2datl283. 
In Leek v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 200 F. Supp. 368, 370-71 (D.C.N.D. 
Va. 1962), railroad employees were passengers in a Yellow Cab Taxi which overturned 
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in a one car accident. Id. at 369. The Court held that the transportation was an integral 
part of the railroad's job subjecting employees to an inherent risk of injury. Id. at 370-71. 
The Court found that "[w]hile the necessity of transporting workers is not unique to 
railroading, it is one of the characteristics of the business. It would seem to be consonant 
with the spirit of the FELA that the employer should bear the risk of negligent injury 
to the employee while exposed to this risk." Id. at 371. (Emphasis added). 
In the instant case, UP admits that it is responsible to provide a reasonably safe 
workplace and that at the time of Archer's injuries on September 26, 2004, the Armadillo 
van was Archer's workplace. R. 892. Like Leek, Archer was being transported on 
September 26, 2004 and it was UP's duty to bear the risk of negligent injury to Archer 
while he was exposed to that risk. This is the previous trial court ruling in this case. R. 
346-348; R. 894; and R. 1273-1274. As held in Gallose and Ragsdell, whether UP used 
reasonable care in furnishing Archer a safe place to work is a question for the jury. The 
district court's ruling should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary judgment 
denied accordingly. 
2. Appellees breached their duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace (van) 
by not providing Archer with transportation equipped with a rear seat head 
restraint. 
"An employer breaches its duty to provide a safe workplace when it knows or 
should know of a potential hazard in the workplace, yet fails to exercise reasonable care 
to inform and protect its employees." Gallose v. Long Island R. Co., 878 F.2d 80, 84-85 
(2nd Cir. 1989). The railroad has a duty of reasonable care to make inspections, to 
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discover, and to protect is employees from any hazards in the work place. Cazad v, 
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 622 F.2d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1980); Williams v. Atlantic Coast 
Line R. Co., 190 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1951). 
UP's duty to provide head restraints is clearly established in Wier v. Soo Line RR 
Co., 1998 WL 474098 (N.D. 111.).2 In Wier, the Court held that the railroad could have 
insisted that its employees be transported in vans with rear seat head restraints simply by 
listing headrests as a mandatory safety feature in its agreement with the van company. 
Wier at 4. The Court further held that whether the railroad should have taken such steps 
is a material issue of fact in this case sufficient to defeat the railroad's motion for 
summary judgment. In Wier, the railroad contracted through Mile Post, a minivan owner, 
to provide transportation for employees, including the plaintiff engineer. Wier, &\2. A 
minivan without headrests was used to transport the railroad employees. Id. A FELA 
action was brought for neck injuries. Id. at 2-3. The railroad brought a motion for 
summary judgment contending that there could be no FELA liability for the absence of a 
headrest in the minivan. The Court recognizing that transporting railroad employees is a 
railroad operational activity held: 
[T]he record suggests that a prudent employer might have taken steps to 
ensure that its employees were transported in minivans equipped with 
rearseat headrests. Soo Line could have insisted that Mile Post provide 
such a guarantee, simply by listing headrests as a mandatory safety 
feature in its agreement with Mile Post .... Whether Soo Line should 
have taken such steps remains a material issue of fact in this case 
sufficient to defeat Soo Line's motion for summary judgment. 
2
 Wier v. Soo Line RR Co., 1998 WL 474098 (N.D. 111.) is attached for the Court's 
convenience. 
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Id. at 4. (Emphasis added). 
The same is true in this case. UP should have taken steps to ensure that Archer 
was transported in vans equipped with rear seat head restraints. Like Wier, UP could 
have simply listed rear seat headrests as a mandatory safety feature in its agreement with 
Armadillo. In fact, UP required the following transportation and safety equipment in 
Armadillo vans, prior to the September 26, 2004 incident: 
Section 18. VEHICLE CONDITION, EQUIPMENT AND SAFETY 
ITEMS 
All vehicles used in these services must be no more than three years old, in 
good mechanical condition and must be equipped with the following 
equipment: 
(1) Air conditioner 
(m) Heater 
(n) Operable safety belts for all passengers 
(o) Properly equipped First Aid Kit 
(p) Operable and inspected 2.51b. (ABC) fire extinguisher 
(q) Road flares 
(r) Spare tire 
(s) Jack and tools 
(t) Reflective striping 
(u) All mechanical items on the vehicle in good working order, 
with special attention paid to tires, brakes, and lights 
(v) Back up alarm devices, whether mechanical or electrical, 
where not specifically prohibited by lav/. 
R. 226 and 230. 
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Like Wier, UP could have added rear seat head restraints to the above list in its 
agreement with Armadillo. In fact, UP admits that it could have required rear seat head 
restraints in its agreement with Armadillo. R. 893. UP failed to do so and Archer was 
transported and injured in a van without rear seat head restraints. R. 230, 589, 615-616. 
UP breached its duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace when it should have insisted 
its employees be transported in vehicles with rear seat head restraints simply by listing 
them as a mandatory safety feature in its agreement with Armadillo. Nonetheless, like 
Wier, whether UP should have taken such steps remains a material issue of fact sufficient 
to defeat UP and Armadillo's motion for summary judgment. 
UP admits that it has a responsibility to identify and reduce reasonably foreseeable 
hazards within the workplace. R. 893. UP admits that rear end collisions are reasonably 
foreseeable hazards in the workplace and that it knew it was safer to have vehicles with 
rear seat head restraints. Id. Armadillo transported UP employees in rear seats with head 
restraints before Archer's injury and one third of Armadillo's 200 vehicle fleet was 
equipped with rear seat head restraints. Id. Therefore, vehicles with rear seat head 
restraints were readily available, UP knew it was safer to use those vehicles yet failed to 
take steps to ensure Archer was transported in a vehicle with rear seat head restraints. The 
district court's ruling should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary judgment 
denied accordingly. 
3
 In addition, UP extensively publishes safety rules governing its employees and could 
have certainly promulgated a safety rule requiring its employees tp adjust and use rear 
seat head restraints when transported in vans. R. 896. 
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3. An optional regulation for an automobile manufacturer has no bearing on 
UP's FELA duty and liability. 
Appellees improperly assert that because it is optional for an automobile 
manufacturer to install rear seat head restraints, then UP has no FELA duty to require 
them.4 This argument was properly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Urie, where 
the railroad argued that the maintenance of trade standards negates negligence. Urie, 337 
U.S. at 178. The Court held: 
[W]e ... reject the premise, for we think that negligence, within the 
meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, attached if respondent 
'knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known,' that prevalent 
standards of conduct were inadequate to protect petitioner and similar 
situated employees. 
Urie, 337 U.S. at 178 (citing Hill v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 336 U.S. 911 (1949)); 
Sadowski v. Long IslandR. Co., 292 N.Y. 448, 456-57 (1944). 
The Court further held in Urie, that the railroad's "knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of the alleged inadequacies of equipment was a jury question." Urie at 
178. (Emphasis added). The Court explained that: 
Evidence that some railroads furnished no such contrivances as plaintiff 
claimed were necessary for the use of men working under similar 
conditions or furnished similar places to work for men doing work similar 
to that required of plaintiff does not establish, as a matter of law, that no 
such contrivances or no different place in which to work or no different 
appliances to carry on the work were required in the case at bar in the 
exercise of ordinary care. The ultimate question of fact was not what 
particular protective means someone else used in similar work. It was 
whether or not, under the particular conditions described in this case, the 
4
 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.202 and 571.202a makes rear seat head restraints optional for 
automobile manufacturers before September 1, 2010. 
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defendant furnished plaintiff a reasonably safe place in which to work and 
such protection in connection with his work ... 
Urie at 179 (quoting Sadowski, 292 N.Y. at 456-57). 
In Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Company, 245 Cal. App. 2d 241 (1966), the 
plaintiff was injured in an accident while being transported in a pickup during the course 
and scope of his employment with the railroad. Id. at 242-43. The accident occurred in 
1962 in California, at which time seat belts were not required for manufacturers. Id. at 
244. The plaintiff brought a FELA claim against the railroad for its failure to equip its 
motor vehicles with seat belts. Id. at 242. The railroad conceded that the plaintiff was 
covered under FELA and that the pickup was his workplace at the time of the accident. 
Id. at 243. The railroad argued that because it was not required to install seat belts in 
California, and bus and taxicab companies had not installed seatbelts, the railroad has no 
duty to install them. Id. at 244. The Court held that the fact that there was no seat belt 
law in effect at the time of the accident, "obviously is not conclusive of this federal 
question[.]" Id. at 244. (Emphasis added). The Court further held that: 
Nor is defendant aided by evidence that bus and taxicab companies had not 
installed seat belts. F.E.L.A. liability attaches if defendant knew, or in the 
exercise of due care should have known, 'that prevalent standards of 
conduct were inadequate to protect' its employees. 
Id. (quoting, Urie, 337 U.S. at 178). 
Finally, the Court held that the defendant's failure to equip its motor vehicles with 
seat belts was a jury question. Id. at 244-45. (Emphasis added). 
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The same is true in this case. Like Mortensen, UP admits Archer is covered under 
FELA and that the Armadillo van was his workplace at the time of the September 26, 
2004 incident. R. 892. Like Mortensen, UP and Armadillo argued that because it is 
optional for an automobile manufacturer to install rear seat head restraints, then UP has 
no FELA duty to require them. Like was held in Mortensen, the fact that rear seat head 
restraints are optional for automobile manufacturers has no bearing in this FELA case. 
The district court's ruling should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary 
judgment denied accordingly. 
D. A Rear Seat Head Restraint is a Safety Device Which, Like Other Safety 
Devices, is Part of a Reasonably Safe Workplace. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 356 
U.S. 326, 331-32 (1958), that "when a railroad employee's injury is caused in whole or in 
part by the fault of others in performing, under contract, operational activities of his 
employer, such others are 'agents' of the employer within the meaning of § 1 of FELA." 
Relying on Sinkler, federal courts have held that transporting railroad employees 
from one point to another is an operational activity and as such, any companies 
transporting railroad employees are considered agents of the railroad. See, Leek v. 
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 200 F. Supp. 368 (D.C.W.Va. 1962); Penn Central Corp. v. 
Checker Cab Co., 488 F. Supp. 1225 (D.C. Mich. 1980); Hopson v. Texaco, Inc., 383 
U.S. 262, 263-64 (1966). 
In Pyzynski v. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co., 438 F. Supp. 1044 (D.C.N.Y. 
1977), the Court held that: 
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If defendant does delegate and relies upon the services of its agent to carry 
out its own duty, it may not shift its liability from itself to said agent when 
an employee seeks to hold it directly liable. Under FELA, the employer is 
the one owing the duty to the employee. The employee need not look 
elsewhere for his protection. He has a right under FELA to rely on his 
employer and none other. When the employer delegates its duty, or 
abdicates its control, the employer takes the risk, not the employee. 
Pyzynski, 438 F.Supp. at 1048. 
Moreover, the Armadillo van is constructively considered railroad equipment for 
purposes of FELA. 
Every common carrier by railroad...shall be liable in damages to any 
person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such 
commerce...for such injury ... by reason of any defect or insufficiency, 
due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, 
road bed, works, boats, wharfs, or other equipment. 
45U.S.C. §51. (Emphasis added). 
A motor vehicle is FELA equipment. Chapman v. Union Pacific Railroad, 467 
NW 2d 388, 392 (Neb. 1991); See, Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d 
241, 244 (1966) (FELA negligence case where truck was not equipped with seatbelts and 
seatbelts were not required for manufacturers at the time); Lewis v. Norfolk & Western 
Ry. Co., 646 NE 2d 1378, 1380 (111. App. 1995) (motor vehicle is equipment under 
FELA). 
UP's duty of care under FELA extends to third party property. In Carter v. Union 
Railroad Co., 438 F.2d 208, 210-11 (3rd Cir. 1971), the Court summarized the railroads 
non-delegable duty to provide a safe place to work as follows: 
The FELA imposes upon the employer a non-delegable duty to use 
reasonable care to furnish his employees a safe place to work, Sano v. 
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Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 282 F.2d 396 (3rd Cir. I960), and this duty extends 
beyond its premises and to property which third persons have a 
primary obligation to maintain. Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 
374 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 1667, 10 L.3d.2d 709 (1963); Nivens v. St. Louis 
Southwestern Ry. Co., 425 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 
879, 91 S.Ct. 121, 27 L.3d.2d 116 (1970); Payne v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 
309 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1962), cert, denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963); Cooker v. 
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 258 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1958); Chicago Great 
Western Ry v. Casura, 234 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1956). This duty includes a 
responsibility to inspect a third party's property for hazards and to 
take precautions to protect the employee from possible defect ... 
Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., supra; Nivens v. St. Louis Southwestern 
Ry., supra. 
(Emphasis added). 
In the instant case, UP contracted with Armadillo to provide on-the-job 
transportation for Archer and other train crew members. R. 203-235. On September 26, 
2004, Armadillo transported Archer in the course and scope of his employment with UP. 
R. 589 and 894. On June 6, 2007, the district court ruled that for purposes of this case, 
Armadillo was an agent of UP, and was performing an operational activity of UP in 
transporting Archer on September 26, 2004. R. 346-348; R. 894; and R. 1273-1274. 
(Trial court's June 6, 2007 ruling in this case). UP admits that it is responsible to provide 
a reasonably safe workplace and that at the time of Archer's injuries on September 26, 
2004 the Armadillo van was Archer's workplace. R. 892. 
UP's non-delegable duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace extends to 
Armadillo's van, including head restraints or lack thereof. UP's duty includes the 
responsibility to inspect Armadillo's vans for hazards and to take precautions to protect 
Archer. In turn, a rear seat head restraint is a safety device which, like other safety 
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devices, is a part of a reasonably safe workplace under FELA. Nevertheless, whether a 
rear seat head restraint is a safety device as part of a reasonably safe workplace on 
September 26, 2004 is a question for the jury. The district court's ruling should be 
reversed and Appellee's motion for summary judgment denied accordingly. 
E. Archer's FELA Claims are NOT Preempted by an Automobile Manufacturer 
Regulation. 
1. The doctrine of conflict preemption does not apply by definition. 
The district court improperly ruled that Archer's FELA claims are preempted by 
the doctrine of conflict preemption. R. 594-603 and R. 1605-1609. Specifically, the 
court ruled that MVSA and FMVSS, which make rear head restraints optional for 
automobile manufacturers, preempt Archer's FELA claim that UP was negligent in 
failing to transport Archer with a rear seat head restraint. R. 594-603 and R. 1605-1609. 
Contrary to the district court's ruling, the doctrine of conflict preemption applies when 
"state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law." English 
v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). (Emphasis added). Here, we have two 
federal laws - FELA and MVSA/FMVSS. Therefore, with no state law to preempt, the 
doctrine of conflict preemption does not apply by definition. 
2. The doctrine of conflict preemption does not apply - there is no actual 
conflict 
The district court misinterprets MVSA, FMVSS, and FELA in reaching the absurd 
conclusion that automobile manufacturer regulations preempt FELA. R. 594-603 and R. 
1605-1609. Contrary to the court's interpretation, MVSA and FMVSS apply exclusively 
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to manufacturers. Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 889 F.Supp. 451 (W.D.Okl. 1995) 
(MVSA case against manufacturer for failing to install air bag); Carden v. General 
Motors Corp., 509 F.3d 227, 229-230 (5th Cir. 2007) ("FMVSS therefore establishes the 
types of passenger restraint systems which car and truck manufacturers must install in 
their vehicles"). Conversely, FELA was enacted by Congress in 1908, and is the 
exclusive remedy for injured railroad workers, imposing a non-delegable and continuing 
duty on railroad employers to provide their employees with a reasonably safe workplace. 
Urie, 337 U.S. at 181; Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1943); 
Peyton, 962 F.2d at 833; Ragsdell, 688 F.2d at 1283. 
MVSA and FMVSS do not impose standards for railroad employers, common 
carriers, or a reasonably safe workplace under FELA. Instead, MVSA and FMVSS 
impose minimum standards for automobile manufacturers.5 It is illogical and 
unreasonable for a federal automobile manufacturer regulation to preempt FELA and its 
well defined jurisprudence, which is to be liberally construed in light of its prime purpose 
- the protection of employees and others by requiring the use of safe equipment. Lilly v. 
Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 486 (1943). 
3. Geier is inapplicable - FELA does not "actually conflict" with MVSA or 
FMVSS. 
Appellees relied heavily on Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, 529 U.S. 
861 (2000). In Geier, the plaintiff brought a claim against the manufacturer of her 1987 
5
 The FMVSS is "a minimum standard for motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment 
performance." 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e). (Emphasis added). 
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Honda, alleging that it was negligently designed. Geier, 529 U.S. at 865. The plaintiff 
alleged that Honda should have installed an airbag when it manufactured the 1987 
Accord. Id. at 881. The Court held that the plaintiffs claim conflicted with FMVSS 208, 
which only required that 10% of the manufacturer's fleet be equipped with any passive 
restraint device, not just airbags. Id. The Court specifically held that common law 
actions are pre-empted only to the extent that they actually conflict with the federal 
requirements. Id. at 872. (Emphasis added). "Actual conflict between state and federal 
law exists where the federal scheme expressly authorizes an activity which the state 
scheme disallows.9' Carden v. General Motors Corp., 509 F.3d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 2007). 
(Emphasis added). 
Geier is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. Unlike Geier, this is not a 
suit against a manufacturer. Unlike Geier, this is not a case of negligent design. This is a 
FELA case against a railroad for its failure to provide a reasonably safe workplace. 
Unlike Geier, there is no actual conflict. Plaintiff is alleging that UP was negligent under 
FELA in failing to provide a reasonably safe workplace, when it knew it was safer to use 
the existing Armadillo vehicles equipped with rear seat head restraints, yet failed to take 
steps to ensure Archer was transported in such a vehicle. Plaintiff is not alleging that 
Chevrolet should have installed rear seat head restraints. MVSA and FMVSS impose 
minimum standards for automobile manufacturers.6 FELA imposes standards for railroad 
6
 FMVSS is "a minimum standard for motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment 
performance." 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (MVSA). (Emphasis added). 
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employers, common carriers, and a reasonably safe workplace under FELA. FELA and 
MVSA/FMVSS do not conflict. 
Moreover, MVSA safety clause provides that "[compliance with a motor vehicle 
safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at 
common law." 49 U.S.C. §30103(e). (Emphasis added). The Court in Geier stated that 
the "saving clause assumes that there are some significant number of common-law 
liability cases to save." Geier at 868. The instant case, at the very least, is one of the 
cases the saving clause is meant to save: those that are not in actual conflict with MVSA. 
The district court's ruling should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary 
judgment denied accordingly. 
4. Statutory construction requires the Court read MVSA, FMVSS and FELA 
together, not with preemptive or preclusive effect. 
This is a matter of statutory construction. When evaluating FELA, MVSA and 
FMVSS, it is the duty of courts to find coexistence, making each law effective. Morton 
v. Mancari, All U.S. 535, 551 (1974) ("The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose 
among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is 
the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, 
to regard each as effective.") "We must read the statutes to give effect to each, if we can 
do so while preserving their sense of purpose." Watts v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 
(1981). "[RJepeals by implication are not favored...." Morton, All U.S. at 549. "The 
intention of the legislation to repeal must be 'clear and manifest.'" Watts, 451 U.S. at 
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267, quoting, Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 602 (1883). The presumption against 
preemption is illustrated by the U.S. Supreme Court's overriding unwillingness to leave 
injured parties without an adequate judicial remedy to recover damages. See, Sprietsma 
v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 52 (2002); United Contr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. 
Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1954). 
Federal preemption is a disfavored defense, particularly in the areas of health and 
safety. Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 2000) ("In view of the 
historic importance of federalism in these areas, the states' police powers relating to 
public health and safety are not preempted by federal law unless Congress' intent to do so 
is clearly expressed.") MVSA, FMVSS, and FELA can easily be read together. Safety is 
the object of FELA, MVSA and FMVSS. Head restraints promote safety. FMVSS 
provides, in relevant part, that: 
This standard specifies requirements for head restraints to reduce the 
frequency and severity of neck injury in rear-end and other collisions. 
49 C.F.R. §571.202. 
FELA mandates a safe work place and imposes a specific and remedial statutory 
duty upon the railroad. Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1943). 
FELA "was designed to put on the railroad industry some of the cost for the legs, eyes, 
arms, and lives which it consumed in its operations." Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp., 512 U.S. 532, 543 (1994); quoting, Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 
(1949). 
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Appellees and the district court improperly conflate FELA employer's non-
delegable and continuous duty of a reasonably safe work place, with the common law 
duty of ordinary care placed upon a private non-employer consumer, not in the business 
of transportation. R. 594-603 and R. 1605-1609, As described above, Archer has 
brought a claim against his employer railroad under FELA, a federal remedial right and 
protection of railroad workers with a well defined jurisprudence. Appellees have not 
shown any actual conflict between FELA, MVSA and FMVSS.7 The district court's 
ruling should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary judgment denied 
accordingly. 
F. Archer's Orthopedic and Spine Surgeons Have the Medical Expertise to 
Render Medical Causation Opinions Regarding the Injuries Caused by the 
Failure to Provide a Rear Seat Head Restraint. 
Expert testimony is generally required to establish a causal connection between an 
accident and an injury "unless the connection is a kind that would be obvious to laymen, 
such as a broken leg from being struck by an automobile. Moody v. Maine C. R.R. Co., 
823 F.2d 693, 695-96 (1st Cir. 1987). Utah Rule of Evidence 702 provides the parameters 
for admission of expert testimony: 
... [I]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Utah R. Evid. 702. 
7
 Federal preemption is an affirmative defense, and Defendant bears the burden of proof 
in establishing its applicability. Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Standard Haven, Inc., 901 
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In Utah, the ultimate question is whether, "on balance, the evidence will be helpful 
to the finder of fact." Balder as v. Starks, 2006 UT App 218, 138 P.3d 75, 81 (Utah App. 
2006). Expert testimony is helpful when the subject is not within "the knowledge or 
experience of the average individual." The standard for medical causation is that the 
physician must testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Sohm v. Dixie Eye 
Center, 2007 UT App 245, 166 P.3d 614 (Utah App 2007). The expressions "probably," 
"more likely than not," and others of similar import are proper qualifications for a 
medical expert's opinion testimony, if taken as a whole, the testimony reflects a 
professional opinion as to reasonable medical probabilities. Nunez v. Wilson, 507 P.2d 
329, 448 (Kan. 1973). "Probable" is defined as "likely to be or become true or real." 
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2009), retrieved from http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/probable. 
A treating physician is uniquely qualified to give an opinion about his or her 
diagnosis of a patient and the admissibility of such testimony should be given due 
deference. Banks v. INC Kalium Carlsbad Potash Co., 11 P.3d 1014, 1019 (N.M. 2003). 
"The rationale for giving greater weight to a treating physician's opinion is that he is 
employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe his patient ..." 
Holbrookv. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 30 F.3d 777, 783 (3rd Cir. 1996). 
In the instant case, Archer's experts have the medical expertise to render medical 
causation opinions regarding the injuries caused by the failure to provide a rear seat head 
F.2d 1373, 1377 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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restraint. The trial court ignored the language of Archer's expert reports and entered 
summary judgment despite Archer establishing questions of fact sufficient to go to the 
Dr. Huntsman, Archer's treating physician and orthopedic surgeon specializing in 
spine surgery, stated that to a reasonable degree of medical probability: 
The September 26, 2004 rear-end collision involving Mr. Archer as a 
passenger in a vehicle without a seat head restraint was one of the probable 
medical causes of the injuries I diagnosed and treated, including contusion 
to his spinal cord, radicular pain radiating from his neck into his right 
shoulder along the C5 nerve root distribution, right arm weakness, and 
changes in spinal reflexes; 
It is medically probable that Mr. Archer would not have suffered these 
injuries from the rear end collision if he had a seat head restraint at the time 
of the collision; and 
It is pure speculation that Mr. Archer would have suffered these injuries 
even if he had a seat head restraint at the time of the subject rear end 
collision. 
R. 1492 and 1539-1540. 
Dr. Huntsman testified that the accident caused a contusion to Archer's spinal 
cord, resulting in a permanent, hollow spot inside the cord. R. 1492. Dr. Huntsman 
further testified that head restraints "prevent flexion/extension-type injury by avoiding 
excessive extension" and that the "neck doesn't excessively extend because there is 
something there to protect it. Id. Dr. Huntsman stated that the "fact that [ Archer] was 
then involved in this motor vehicle accident in which his head and neck were not 
restrained did likely cause the myelopathy and likely caused the subsequent need for 
surgical intervention." Id. 
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Dr. Huntsman's position is supported by Dr. Gordon, Archer's treating physician 
and orthopedic surgeon, and biomedical expert Dr. France. When asked if it was his 
opinion that the head restraint, or the lack of head restraint in this particular instance, was 
a causative factor with the shoulder injury, Dr. Gordon testified, "Yes. I think it 
contributed to it, yes." R. 1493-1494. 
Dr. France stated that a head restraint "would have likely reduced Mr. Archer's 
maximum posterior neck motion to be within a range of 15-20 degrees extension of the 
neck." R. 1493 and 1548. Dr. France quoted Traumatic Myelopathy In Patients With 
Cervical Spinal Stenosis Without Fracture Or Dislocation, stating that, "[p]atients with 
cervical spinal stenosis are uniquely vulnerable to hyper-extension injuries of the cervical 
spine." R. 1493. Dr. Huntsman stated that, "[t]he 1980 article from Spine regarding 
traumatic myelopathy in patients with cervical spinal stenosis without fracture and 
dislocation as well as the 1998 Spine article which reviewed the pathophysiology of 
cervical spondylotic myelopathy are accurate and I am in complete agreement with." Id. 
Dr. Huntsman testified that the Spine articles were significant to the mechanism of injury 
in this case. Id. 
Finally, causation is a question of fact and jurors are empowered to weigh expert 
testimony as they deem appropriate. Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App. 189, 51 P.3d 724, 
728 (UtahApp. 2002); citing Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982); Nay v. 
General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1993). 
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G. There are Genuine Issues of Material Fact as to Armadillo's Negligence 
Under the Heightened Standard of Care as a Common Carrier 
Armadillo admits that it is a common carrier. R. 894. "Common carriers are held 
to a higher standard of care than the 'reasonably prudent person' standard." Lamb v. 
B&B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 930 (Utah 1993). The Utah Supreme Court 
stated that "[t]he heightened standard of care required of common carriers is predicated 
on the principle that '[pjersons using ordinary transportation devices, such as elevators 
and buses, normally expect to be carried safely, securely, and without incident to their 
destination.'" Id, at 930 (quoting, Harlan v. Six Flags Over Georgia Inc., 297 S.E.2d 
468, 469 (Ga. 1982)). The Court further discussed the rationale behind the common 
carrier standard of care: 
The "reasonably prudent person" standard of care is a flexible legal concept 
requiring a greater or lesser degree of care according to the nature of the 
circumstances that a reasonably prudent person would consider in assessing 
possible risks of injury. Common carriers are held to a higher standard of 
care than the "reasonably prudent person" standard. See Johnson v. Lewis, 
121 Utah 218, 225, 240 P.2d 498, 502 (1952); see also, McMaster v. Salt 
Lake Transp. Co., 108 Utah 207, 210, 159 P.2d 121, 122 (1945); Sine v. 
Salt Lake Transp. Co., 106 Utah 289, 296, 147 P.2d 875, 879 (1944). 
Passengers entrust common carriers with their personal safety, have little if 
any opportunity to protect themselves from harm caused by a common 
carrier, and pay the carrier for safe transportation. In addition, the public 
has an important stake in having the public transportation of persons be as 
safe as possible. 
Lamb, 869 P.2d at 930. 
Judge Learned Hand described the duties of a common carrier as follows: 
[H]is very enterprise is to carry passengers safely, and he# is bound to a 
much longer forecast of the dangers which surround them than he is as 
regards strangers. It is not perhaps important in just what terms this duty is 
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measured; usually they include the 'highest human foresight' possible in 
the circumstances. 
Giger v. New York N.K & H.R. Co., 60 F.2d 63, 64 (2nd Cir. 1932). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "the duty owing by the carrier to its 
passengers for hire is definitely greater than such carrier owes to guests and the general 
public ... the relationship of carrier to its passengers for hire is a circumstance which 
requires more foresight and greater caution than it owes to guests or the public 
generally." Johnson v. Lewis, 121 Utah 218, 225 (1952). 
In the instant case, Armadillo breached its duty of care as a common carrier, when 
it did not exercise more foresight and greater caution in transporting Plaintiff without a 
head restraint. Before Archer's September 26, 2004 injury, one third of Armadillo's 200 
vehicle fleet had rear seat head restraints. Id. The Chevy Suburban vehicles in 
Armadillo's fleet had the capacity to transport up to five passengers with seat head 
restraints. Id. Armadillo admits that before Archer's September 26, 2004 injury, it had 
transported UP crew members in vehicles with rear seat head restraints. R. 893. 
Armadillo admits that the center seats of its vehicles did not have head restraints and 
some railroad location passengers were restricted from using the center seats. R. 894. 
Armadillo admits that had it known before Archer's September 26, 2004 injury 
that seat head restraints reduced the risk of neck injuries then it should have used vehicles 
with rear seat head restraints for transporting UP passengers. R. 893. Armadillo should 
have known. Before Archer's September 26, 2004 injury, it was common knowledge 
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that seat head restraints prevent or reduce neck injuries from rear end collisions -
according to the NHSTA Report, biomedical expert Dr. France, and UP. R. 896. 
Negligence is a question of fact for the jury. Baczuk v. Salt Lake Regional 
Medical Center, 2000 UT App 225, 8 P.3d 1037, 1039 (Utah App. 2000). It is for the 
jury to decide whether the general field of danger should have been anticipated by 
common carrier Armadillo in transporting Archer without a head restraint. The district 
court's ruling should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary judgment denied 
accordingly. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A district court is justified in withdrawing the foregoing issues from the jury's 
consideration only in those extremely rare instances when there is a zero probability 
either of employer negligence or that any such negligence contributed to the injury of an 
employee. This is not one of those extremely rare instances. The record establishes that 
John Archer has introduced substantial evidence; far more than that required to bring his 
FELA and state claims to a jury. For the foregoing reasons, the district court's ruling 
should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary judgment denied accordingly. 
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10. Amended Order Granting Defendants Brown's Crew Car of Wyoming, Inc., d/b/a 
Armadillo Express's and Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
1 I.Epstein, N., Epstein, J., Benjamin, V., Ransohoff, J. (1980). Traumatic 
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12.Fehlings, M. G., Skaf, G. (1998). A Review of the Pathophysiology of Cervical 
Spondylotic Myelopathy With Insights for Potential Novel Mechanisms Drawn 
From Traumatic Spinal Cord Injury. Spine, 23, 24, 2730-2737. 
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Westlaw, 
45U.S.C.A.§51 Pagel 
Effective:[See Text Amendments] 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 45. Railroads (Refs & Annos) 
*® Chapter 2. Liability for Injuries to Employees (Refs & Annos) 
-* § 5L Liability of common carriers by railroad, in interstate or foreign commerce, for injuries to 
employees from negligence; employee defined 
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories, 
or between any of the States and Territories, or between the District of Columbia and any of the States or Territ-
ories, or between the District of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any foreign nation or nations, 
shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, 
or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving 
widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, 
then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from 
the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insuffi-
ciency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, 
or other equipment 
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or 
foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set 
forth shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce 
and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this chapter. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Apr. 22, 1908, c. 149, § 1, 35 Stat 65; Aug. 11, 1939, c. 685, § 1, 53 Stat 1404.) 
Current through P.L. 111-12 (excluding P.L. 1U-5, 111-8, and 111-11) approved 3-30-09 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
*® Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*® Part VIL Judgment 
-> RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For claimant, A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declarat-
ory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after ser-
vice of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party* A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declarat-
ory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in aocordance with Rule 
7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, A summaiy judgment, interlocutory in charac-
ter, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of dam- ages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion, If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the 
whole case or for ail the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examin-
ing the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what ma-
terial facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controver-
ted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including 
the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further pro-
ceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, 
and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made 
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmat-
ively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers 
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit af-
fidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or furthef affidavits. When a 
motion for summaiy judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if ap-
propriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
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(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that 
the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court 
may reftise the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depos-
itions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad 
faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the 
other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective November 1,1997; November 1,2004.] 
Current with amendments effective April 1,2009. 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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Effective; July 3,2007 
Code of Federal Regulations Currentness 
Title 49. Transportation 
Subtitle B. Other Regulations Relating to 
Transportation 
Chapter V. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, Department of Transporta- tion 
*®Part 571. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standards (Refs & Annos) 
*[§ Subpart B. Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standards (Refs <& Annos) 
+ § 571.202 Standard No. 202; 
Head restraints; Applicable at the 
manufacturers option until Septem-
ber 1,2009. 
SI. Purpose and scope. This standard specifies re-
quirements for head restraints to reduce the fre-
quency and severity of neck injury in rear-end and 
other collisions. 
52. Application. This standard applies to passenger 
cars, and to multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks 
and buses with a GVWR of 4,536 kg or less, manu-
factured before September 1, 2009. Until Septem-
ber 1, 2009, manufacturers may comply with the 
standard in this § 571.202, with the European regu-
lations referenced in S4.3 of this § 571.202, or with 
the standard in § 571.202a. For vehicles manufac-
tured on or after September 1, 2009 and before 
September 1, 2010, manufacturers may comply 
with the standard in this § 571.202 or with the 
European regulations referenced in S4.3 of this § 
571.202, instead of the standard in § 571.202a, only 
to the extent consistent with phase-in specified in § 
571.202a. 
53, Definitions. 
Head restraint means a device that limits rearward 
displacement of a seated occupant*s head relative to 
the occupant's torso. 
I leight means, when used in reference to a head re-
straint, the distance from the H-point, measured 
parallel to the torso reference line defined by the 
three dimensional SAE J826 (rev. Jul 95) manikin, 
to a plane normal to the torso reference line. 
Top of the head restraint means the point on the 
head restraint with the greatest height. 
84, Requirements. 
54.1 Each passenger car, and multipurpose pas-
senger vehicle, truck and bus with a GVWR of 
4,536 kg or less, must comply with, at the man-
ufacturer's option, 54,2, S4.4 or S4.5 of this 
section. 
54.2 Except for schoof buses, a head restraint 
that conforms to either S4.2 (a) or (b) of this 
section must be provided at each outboard front 
designated seating position, For school buses, a 
head restraint tfiat conforms to either S4.2 (a) 
or (b) of this section must be provided at the 
driver's seating position. 
(a) When tested in accordance with S5.1 of 
this section, limit rearward angular dis-
placement of the head reference line to 45 
degrees from the torso reference line; or 
(b) When adjusted to its full) extended 
design position, conform to each of the fol-
lowing; 
(1) When measured parallel to the 
torso line, the top of the head restraint 
must not be less than 700 mm above 
the seating reference point; 
(2) When measured either 64 mm be-
low the top of the head restraint or 635 
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mm above the seating reference point, 
the lateral width of the head restraint 
must be not less than: 
(i) 254 mm for use with bench-type 
seats; and 
(ii) 170 mm for use with individual seats; 
(3) When tested in accordance with 
S5.2 of this section, any portion of the 
head form in contact with the head re-
straint must not be displaced to more 
than 102 mm perpendicularly rearward 
of the displaced extended torso refer-
ence line during the application of the 
load specified in S5.2 (c) of this sec-
tion; and 
(4) When tested in accordance with 
S5.2 of this section, the head restraint 
must withstand an increasing load un-
til one of the following occurs: 
(i) Failure of the seat or seat back; or, 
(ii) Application of a load of 890N. 
S4.3 Incorporation by reference. 
The English language version of the Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE) Regulation 17: 
"Uniform Provisions Concerning the Approval 
of Vehicles with Regard to the Seats, their An-
chorages and any Head Restraints,, ECE 17 
Rev. 1/Add. 16/Rev. 4 (31 July 2002) is incor-
porated by reference in S4.4(a) of this section. 
The Director of the Federal Register has ap-
proved the incorporation by reference of this 
material in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) 
and 1 CFR Part 51. A copy of ECE 17 Rev. 
1/Add. 16/Rev. 4 (31 July 2002) may be ob-
tained from the ECE Internet site: ht-
tp://www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/wp29regs 
/r017r4e.pdf, or by writing to: United Nations, 
Conference Services Division, Distribution and 
Sales Section, Office C.115-1, Palais des Na-
tions, CH-1211, Geneva 10, Switzerland. A 
copy of ECE 17 Rev. 1/Add. 16/Rev. 4 (31 Ju-
ly 2002) may be inspected at NHTSA's Tech-
nical Information Services, 400 Seventh Street, 
SW., Plaza Level, Room 403, Washington, DC, 
or at the National Archives and Records Ad-
ministration (NARA). For information on the 
availability of this material at NARA, call 
202-741-6030, or go to: ht-
tp://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_o 
f_federal_regulations/ibrlocations.html, 
54.4 Except for school buses, a head restraint 
that conforms to S4.4 (a) and (b) of this section 
must be provided at each outboard front desig-
nated seating position, For school buses, a head 
restraint thai conforms to S4.4 (a) and (b) of 
this section must be provided at the driver's 
seating position. 
(a) The head restraint must comply with 
Paragraphs 5.1.1, 5.1.3, 5.3.1, 5.5 through 
5.13, 6.1.1, 6.1.3, and 6.4 through 6.8 of 
the English language version of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe (ECE) Reg-
ulation 17: ECE 17 Rev. 1/Add. 16/Rev. 4 
(31 July 2002). 
(b) The head restraint must meet the width 
requirements specified in S4.2(b)(2) of this 
section. 
54.5 Except for school buses, head restraints 
that conform to the requirements of § 571.202a 
must be provided at each front outboard desig-
nated seating position. If a rear head restraint 
(as defined in § 571.202a) is provided at a rear 
outboard designated seating position, it must 
conform to the requirements of § 571.202a ap-
plicable to rear head restraints. For school 
buses, a head restraint that conforms to the re-
quirements of § 571,202a must be installed at 
the driver's seating position. 
54.6 Where manufacturer options are specified 
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in this section or § 571,202a, the manufacturer 
must select an option by the time it certifies the 
vehicle and may not thereafter select a different 
option for that vehicle. The manufacturer may 
select different compliance options for differ-
ent designated seating positions to which the 
requirements of this section are applicable. 
Each manufacturer must, upon request from the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion, provide information regarding which of 
the compliance options it has selected for a par-
ticular vehicle or make/model, 
SI'I I Jniionsti nil" IIIUK'HIIJIH/S, 
S5.1 Compliance with $4,2(a) of this section is 
demonstrated in accordance with the following 
with the head restraint in its fully extended 
design position! 
(a) On the exterior profile of the head and 
torso of a dummy having the weight and 
seated height of a 95th percentile adult 
male with an approved representation of a 
human, articulated neck structure, or an 
approved equivalent test device, establish 
reference lines by the following method: 
(1) Position the dummy's back on a 
horizontal fiat surface with the lumbar 
joints in a straight line. 
(2) Rotate the head of the dummy rear-
ward until the back of the head con-
tacts the flat horizontal surface spe-
cified in S5.1(a)(1) of this section 
(3) Position the SAE J-826 two-
dimensional manikin's back against 
the flat surface specified in S5,l(a)(l) 
of this section, alongside the dummy 
with the H-point of the manikin 
aligned with the H-point of the dummy. 
(4) Establish the torso line of the 
manikin as defined in SAE Aerospace-
AulOii iw*. . , ;Jiii\v'.:. t . Ku-tO l'CIS, Sec. 
2.3.6, P.E 1.0 \, Scptembet 196/ 
(5) Establish tjie dummy torso refer-
ence line by superimposing the torso 
line of the manikin on the torso of the 
dummy, 
(6) Establish the head reference line 
by extending the dummy torso refer-
ence line onto the head. 
(b) At each designated seating position 
having a head restraint, place the dummy, 
snugly restrained by Type 2 seat belt, in 
the manufacturer's recommended design 
seating position, 
(c) During forward acceleration applied to 
the structure supporting the seat as de-
scribed in this paragraph, measure the 
maximum rearward angular displacement 
between the dummy torso reference line 
and head reference line. When graphically 
depicted, the magnitude of the acceleration 
curve shall not be less than that of a half-
sine wave having the amplitude of 78 m/s2 
and a duration of 80 milliseconds and not 
more than that of a half-sine wave curve 
having an amplitude of 94 m/s2 and a dur-
ation of 96 milliseconds, 
S5.2 Compliance with S4.2(b) of this section is 
demonstrated in accordance with the following 
with the head restraint in its fully extended 
design position! 
(a) Place a test device, having the back 
plan dimensions and torso line (centerline 
of the head room probe in full back posi-
tion), of the three dimensional SAE J826 
manikin, at the manufacturer's recommen-
ded design seated position, 
(b) Establish the displaced torso reference 
line by applying a fearward moment of 373 
Nm. about the seating reference point to the 
©2009 Thomson Reuters/West, No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works, 
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seat back through the test device back pan 
specified in S5.2(a) of this section. 
(c) After removing the back pan, using a 
165 mm diameter spherical head form or 
cylindrical head form having a 165 mm 
diameter in plan view and a 152 mm height 
in profile view, apply, perpendicular to the 
displaced torso reference line, a rearward 
initial load 64 mm below the top of the 
head restraint that will produce a 373 Nm 
moment about the seating reference point. 
(d) Gradually increase this initial load to 
890 N or until the seat or seat back fails, 
whichever occurs first. 
[54 FR 39187, Sept. 25, 1989; 61 FR 27025, May 
30, 1996; 63 FR 28935, May 27, 1998; 69 FR 
74883, Dec. 14,2004; 72 FR 25514, May 4,2007] 
SOURCE: 36 FR 22902, Dec. 2, 1971; 50 FR 
21056, June 6, 1985; 51 FR 9456, March 19, 1986; 
59 FR 37175, July 21, 1994; 59 FR 38940, Aug. 1, 
1994; 60 FR 58524, Nov. 28, 1995; 64 FR 10815, 
March 5, 1999; 64 FR 47582, Aug. 31, 1999, unless 
otherwise noted. 
AUTHORITY; 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 
30166 and 30177; delegation of authority at 49 
CFR1.50. 
49 C. F. R. § 571.202,49 CFR § 571.202 
Current through April 2,2009; 74 FR 15188 
(C) 2009 Thomson Reuters 
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49 C.F.R. § 571.202a 
Effective: July 3, 2007 
Code of Federal Regulations Currentness 
Title 49. Transportation 
Subtitle B, Other Regulations Relating to 
Transportation 
Chapter V. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, Department of Transporta- tion 
*iiPart 571. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standards (Refs & Annos) 
*H Subpart B. Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standards (Refs & Annos) 
*+ § 571.202a Standard No. 202a; 
Head restraints; Mandatory applic-
ability begins on September 1,2009 
SI. Purpose and scope. This standard specifies re-
quirements for head restraints to reduce the fre-
quency and severity of neck injury in rear -end and 
other collisions, 
S2. Application & incorporation by reference. 
S2.1 Application, This standard applies to pas-
senger cars, and to multipurpose passenger 
vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR of 
4,536 kg or less, manufactured on or after 
September I, 2009. However, the standard's re-
quirements for rear head restraints do not apply 
to vehicles manufactured before September 1, 
2010, and, for vehicles manufactured between 
September 1, 2010 and August 31, 2011, the 
requirements for rear head restraints apply only 
to the extent provided in S7. Until September 
1, 2009, manufacturers may comply with the 
standard in this § 571.202a, with the standard 
in § 571.202, or with the European regulations 
referenced in 54.3(a) of § 571.202. For 
vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 
€> 2009 Thomson Reuters/West 
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2009 and before September i, 2010, manufac-
turers may comply with the standard in § 
571.202 or with the European regulations refer-
enced in S4.3(a) of § 571.202, instead of the 
standard in this § 571.202a, only to the extent 
consistent with the phase-in specified in this § 
571.202a. 
S2.2 Incoi poratio *M*ence. 
(a) Society of Automotive Engineers 
(SAE) Recommended Practice J211/1 rev. 
Mar 95, "Instrumentation for Impact Test-
-Part 1-Electronic Instrumentation," SAE 
J211/1 (rev. Mar 95) is incorporated by 
reference in S5.2.5(b), S5.3.8, S5.3.9, and 
5.3.10 of this section. The Director of the 
Federal Register has approved the incor-
poration by reference of this material in ac-
cordance with 5 U,S.C, 552(a) and 1 CFR 
part 51. A copy of SAE J211/1 (rev. Mar 
95) may be obtained from SAE at the Soci-
ety of Automotive Engineers, Inc., 400 
Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA 
15096. A copy of SAE J211/1 (rev. Mar 
95) may be inspected at NHTSA's Tech-
nical Information Services, 400 Seventh 
Street, SW„ Plaza Level, Room 403, 
Washington, DC, or at the National 
Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA). For information on the availabil-
ity of this material at NARA, call 
202-741-6030, or go to; ht-
tp://www.archives.gov/federai register/cod 
e_of_federalj*eguIations/ibrJocations.html 
(b) Society of Automotive Engineers 
(SAE) Standard J826 "Devices for Use in 
Defining and Measuring Vehicle Seating 
Accommodation/* SAE J826 (rev. Jul 95) 
is incorporated by reference in S3, S5, 
S5.1, S5.1.1, S5.2, S5.2.1, S5.2.2, and 
S5.2.7 of this section. The Director of the 
Claim to 
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Federal Register has approved the incor-
poration by reference of this material in ac-
cordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 
Part 51. A copy of SAE J826 (rev. Jul 95) 
may be obtained from SAE at the Society 
of Automotive Engineers, Inc., 400 Com-
monwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096. 
A copy of SAE J826 (rev. Jul 95) may be 
inspected at NHTSA's Technical Informa-
tion Services, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Plaza Level, Room 403, Washington, DC 
or at the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA). For information 
on the availability of this material at 
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: ht-
tp:/Avww.archives.gov/federaljegister/cod 
e_of_federaljegulations/ibrJocations.html. 
S3. Definitions. 
Backset means the minimum horizontal distance 
between the rear of a representation of the head of a 
seated 50th percentile male occupant and the head 
restraint, as measured by the head restraint meas-
urement device. 
Head restraint means a device that limits rearward 
displacement of a seated occupant's head relative to 
the occupant's torso. 
Head restraint measurement device (HRMD) means 
the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) (July 
1995) J826 three-dimensional manikin with a head 
form attached, representing the head position of a 
seated 50th percentile male, with sliding scale at 
the back of the head for the purpose of measuring 
backset. The head form is designed by and avail-
able from the ICBC, 151 West Esplanade, North 
Vancouver, BC V7M 3H9, Canada (www.icbc.com). 
Height means, when used in reference to a head re-
straint, the distance from the H-point, measured 
parallel to the torso reference line defined by the 
three dimensional SAE J826 (July 1995) manikin, 
€> 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No 
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to a plane normal to the torso reference line. 
Intended for occupant use means, when used m ref-
erence to the adjustment of a seat, positions other 
than that intended solely for the purpose of allow-
ing ease of ingress and egress of occupants and ac-
cess to cargo storage areas of a vehicle. 
Rear head restraint means, at any rear outboard des-
ignated seating position, a rear seat back, or any in-
dependently adjustable seat component attached to 
or adjacent to a seat back, that has a height equal to 
or greater than 700 mm, in any position of backset 
and height adjustment, as measured in accordance 
with S5.1.1. 
Top of the head restraint means the point on the 
head restraint with the greatest height. 
S4. Requirements. Except as provided in S4.4, 
S4.2.1(a)(2) and S4.2.1(b)(2) of this section, each 
vehicle must comply with S4.1 of this section with 
the seat adjusted as intended for occupant use. 
Whenever a range of measurements is specified, the 
head restraint must meet th£ requirement at any po-
sition of adjustment within the specified range. 
54.1 Performance levels. In each vehicle other 
than a school bus, a head restraint that con-
forms to either S4.2 or S4.3 of this section 
must be provided at each front outboard desig-
nated seating position. In each equipped with 
rear outboard head restraints, the rear head re-
straint must conform to either S4.2 or S4.3 of 
this section. In each school bus, a head restraint 
that conforms to either S4.2 or S4.3 of this sec-
tion must be provided for the drivers seating 
position. At each designated seating position 
incapable of seating a 50th percentile male Hy-
brid III test dummy specified in 49 CFR Part 
572, Subpart E, the applicable head restraint 
must conform to S4.2 of this section. 
54.2 Dimensional and static performance. Each 
head restraint located in the front outboard des-
ignated seating position and each head restraint 
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located in the rear outboard designated seating 
position must conform to paragraphs S4.2.1 
through S4.2.7 of this section. Compliance is 
determined for the height requirements of 
S4.2.1 and the backset requirements of S4.2.3 
of this section by taking the arithmetic average 
of three measurements. 
(vl ? 1 Minimum height, 
(a) Front outhwiiid • 
positions. 
(1) Except as provided in 
S4,2.1(a)(2) of this section, when 
measured in accordance with 
S5.2.1(a)(1) of this section, the 
top of a head restraint located in a 
front outboard designated seating 
position must have a height not 
less than 800 mm in at least one 
position of adjustment 
(2) Exception. I lie requirements 
of S4.2.1(a)(1) do not apply if the 
interior surface of the vehicle at 
the roofline physically prevents a 
head restraint, located in the front 
outboard designated seating posi-
tion, from attaining the required 
height. In those instances in which 
this head restraint cannot attain 
the required height, when meas-
ured in accordance with 
S5.2,1(a)(2), the maximum vertic-
al distance between the top of the 
head restraint and the interior sur-
face of the vehicle at the roofline 
must not exceed 50 mm for con-
vertibles and 25 mm for all other 
vehicles. Notwithstanding this ex-
ception, when measured in ac-
cordance with S5.2.1(a)(2), the 
top of a head restraint located in a 
front: outboard designated seating 
position must have a height not 
less than 700 nun, in the lowest 
position of adjustment. 
(b) All outboard designated s.-utng 
positions equipped with head re str; :! t 
(i) Except as pro video m 
S4.2.1(b)(2) of this section, -.re* 
measured in accordance (* 
S5.2,1(b)(1) of this section, the 
top of a head restraint located in 
an outboard designated seating 
position must have a height not 
less than 750 mm in any positron 
of adjustment. 
(2) Exception, The requirements 
of S4.2,1(b)(1) do not apply if the 
interior surface of the vehicle at 
the roofline or the interior surface 
of the backlight physically prevent 
a head restraint, located in the rear 
outboard designated seating posi-
tion, from attaining the required 
height. In those instances in which 
this head restraint cannot attain 
the required height, when meas-
ured In accordance with 
85.2.1(b)(2), the maximum vertic-
al distance between the top of the 
head restraint and the interior sur-
face of the vehicle at the roofline 
or the interior surface of the back-
light must not exceed 50 mm for 
convertibles and 25 mm for all 
other vehicle's. 
S4.2.2 Width. When measured in accord-
ance with S5.2.2 of this section, 65 ± 3 
mm below the top of the head restraint, the 
lateral width of a head restraint must be 
not less than 170 mm, except the lateral 
width of the head restraint for front out-
board designated seating positions in a 
vehicle with a front center designated seat-
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ing position, must be not less than 254 mm. 
54.2.3 Front Outboard Designated Seating 
Position Backset. When measured in ac-
cordance with S5.2.3 of this section, the 
backset must not be more than 55 mm, 
when the seat is adjusted in accordance 
with S5,l. For adjustable restraints, the re-
quirements of this section must be met 
with the top of the head restraint in any 
height position of adjustment between 750 
mm and 800 mm, inclusive. If the top of 
the head restraint, in its lowest position of 
adjustment, is above 800 mm, the require-
ments of this section must be met at that 
position. If the head restraint position is in-
dependent of the seat back inclination pos-
ition, the head restraint must not be adjus-
ted such that backset is more than 55 mm 
when the seat back inclination is posi-
tioned closer to vertical than the position 
specified inS5.1. 
54.2.4 Gaps. 
All head restraints must meet limits for 
gaps in the head restraint specified in 
S4.2.4.1. For gaps between the seat and 
head restraint, adjustable head restraints 
must meet either the limits specified in 
S4.2.4.IorS4.2.4.2. 
S4.2.4.1 Gaps within the head restraint 
and between the head restraint and 
seat using a 165 mm sphere. When 
measured in accordance with S5.2.4.1 
of this section using the head form 
specified in that paragraph, there must 
not be any gap greater than 60 mm 
within or between the anterior surface 
of the head restraint and anterior sur-
face of the seat, with the head restraint 
adjusted to its lowest height position 
and any backset position, except as al-
lowed by S4.4. 
S4.2.4.2 Gaps between the adjustable 
head restraint and seat using a 25 mm 
cylinder. When measured in accord-
ance with S5.2.4.2 of this section us-
ing the 25 mm cylinder specified in 
that paragraph, there must not be any 
gap greater than 25 mm between the 
anterior surface of the head restraint 
and anterior surface of the seat, with 
the head restraint adjusted to its lowest 
height position and any backset posi-
tion, except as allowed by S4.4. 
54.2.5 Energy absorption. When the anteri-
or surface of the head restraint is impacted 
in accordance with S5.2.5 of this section 
by the head form specified in that para-
graph at any velocity up to and including 
24,1 km/h, the deceleration of the head 
form must not exceed 785 m/s2 (80 g) con-
tinuously for more than 3 milliseconds. 
54.2.6 Height retention. When tested in ac-
cordance with S5.2.6 of this section, the 
cylindrical test device specified in 
S5.2.6(b) must return to within 13 mm of 
its initial reference position after applica-
tion of at feast a 500 N load and sub-
sequent reduction of the load to 50 N ± 1 
N. During application of the initial 50 N 
reference load, as specified in 85.2.6(b)(2) 
of this section, the cylindrical test device 
must not move downward more than 25 mm. 
54.2.7 Backset retention, displacement, 
and strength. 
(a) Backset retention and displace-
ment. When tested in accordance with 
S5.2.7 of this section, the described 
head form must; 
(1) Not be displaced more than 25 
mm during the application of the 
inilial reference moment of 37 ± 
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0.71 fin; 
(2) Not be displaced more than 
102 mm perpendicularly and pos-
terior of the displaced extended 
torso reference line during the ap-
plication of a 373 ± 7.5 Nm mo 
ment about the H-point; arid 
(3) Return to within 13 mm of its 
initial reference position after the 
application of a 373 ± 7.5 Nm mo-
ment about the H-point and reduc-
tion of the moment to 37 ± 0.7 Nm. 
(b) Sti engfli. W lien the head restraint 
is tested in accordance with S5,2.7(b) 
of this section with the test device spe-
cified in that paragraph, the load ap-
plied to the head restraint must reach 
890 N and remain at 890 N for a peri-
od of 5 seconds. 
S4,3 Dynamic performance and width. At each 
forward-facing outboard designated seating po-
sition equipped with a head restraint, the head 
restraint adjusted midway between the lowest 
and the highest position of adjustment must 
conform to the following: 
$4.3.1 Injury criteria. When tested in ac-
cordance with S5.3 of this section, during a 
forward acceleration of the dynamic test 
platform described in S5.3J, the head re 
straint must: 
(a) Angular rotation. Limit posterioi 
angular rotation between the head and 
torso of the 50th percentile male Hy-
brid III test dummy specified in 49 
CFR part 572, subpart E, fitted with 
sensors to measure rotation between 
the head and torso, to 12 degrees for 
the dummy in all outboard designated 
seating positions; 
(b) Head injury criteria. Limit the 
maximum HICl5 value to 500. HICI5 
is calculated as follows-
For any two points in time, t, and t2> 
during the event which are separated 
by not more than a 15 millisecond 
time interval and where t, is less than 
t2, the head injury criterion (H1C15 ) 
is determined using the resultant head 
acceleration at the center of gravity of 
the dummy head, a
 r, expressed as a 
multiple of g (the acceleration of grav-
ity) and is calculated using the expres-
sion: 
HIC = 
$4.3.2 Width. The head restraint must have 
the lateral width specified .in S4.2.2 of this 
section. 
S4.4 Folding, or retracting rear head restraints 
non-use positions, A rear head restraint may be 
adjusted to a position at which its height does 
not comply with the requirements of S4.2.1 of 
( t . -
this section. However, in any such position, the 
head restraint must meet either S4.4(a), (b) or 
(c) of this section. 
(a) The head restraint must automatically 
return to a position in which its minimum 
height is not less than that specified in 
S4.2.1(b) of this section when a test 
dummy representing a 5th percentile fe-
male Hybrid III test dummy specified in 49 
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CFR part 572, subpart O is positioned ac-
cording to S5.4(a); or 
(b) The head restraint must, when tested in 
accordance with S5.4(b) of this section, be 
capable of manually rotating forward or 
rearward by not less than 60 degrees from 
any position of adjustment in which its 
minimum height is not less than that spe-
cified in S4.2.1(b) of this section. 
(c) The head restraint must, when tested in 
accordance with S5.4(b) of this section, 
cause the torso reference line angle to be at 
least 10 degrees closer to vertical than 
when the head restraint is in any position 
of adjustment in which its height is not less 
than that specified in S4.2.1(b)(i) of this 
section. 
54.5 Removability of head restraints. The head 
restraint must not be removable without a de-
liberate action distinct from any act necessary 
for upward adjustment. 
54.6 Compliance option selection. Where man-
ufacturer options are specified in this section, 
the manufacturer must select an option by the 
time it certifies the vehicle and may not there-
after select a different option for that vehicle. 
The manufacturer may select different compli-
ance options for different designated seating 
positions to which the requirements of this sec-
tion are applicable. Each manufacturer must, 
upon request from the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, provide inform-
ation regarding which of the compliance op-
tions it has selected for a particular vehicle or 
make/model 
54.7 Information in owner's manual. 
S4.7.1 The owner's manual for each 
vehicle must emphasize that all occupants, 
including the driver, should not operate a 
vehicle or sit in a vehicle's seat until the 
€> 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No 
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head restraints are placed in their proper 
positions in order to minimize the risk of 
neck injury in the event of a crash. 
S4.7.2 The owner's manual for each 
vehicle must— 
(a) Include an accurate description of 
the vehicle's head restraint system in 
an easily understandable format. The 
owner's manual must clearly identify 
which seats aref equipped with head re-
straints; 
(b) If the head restraints are remov-
able, the owner's manual must provide 
instructions on how to remove the 
head restraint by a deliberate action 
distinct from any act necessaiy for up-
ward adjustment, and how to reinstall 
head restraints; 
(c) Warn that all head restraints must 
be reinstalled to properly protect 
vehicle occupants. 
(d) Describe in an easily understand-
able format the adjustment of the head 
restraints and/or seat back to achieve 
appropriate head restraint position rel-
ative to the occupant's head, This dis-
cussion must include, at a minimum, 
accurate information on the following 
topics: 
(1) A presentation and explanation 
of the main components of the 
vehicle's head restraints. 
(2) The basic requirements for 
proper head restraint operation, 
including an explanation of the 
actions that may affect the proper 
functioning of the head restraints. 
(3) The basic requirements for 
proper positioning of a head re-
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straint in relation to an occupant's 
head position, including informa-
tion regarding the proper position-
ing of the center of gravity of an 
occupant's head or some other 
anatomical landmark in relation to 
the head restraint. 
S5. Procedures. Demonstrate compliance with S4.2 
through S4.4 of this section with any adjustable 
lumbar support adjusted to its most posterior nom-
inal design position. If the seat cushion adjusts in-
dependently of the seat back, position the seat cush-
ion such that the highest H-point position is 
achieved with respect to the seat back, as measured 
by SAE J826 (July 1995) manikin, with leg length 
specified in S10.4.2.1 of § 571.208 of this Part. If 
the specified position of the H-point can be 
achieved with a range of seat cushion inclination 
angles, adjust the seat inclination such that the most 
forward part of the seat cushion is at its lowest pos-
ition with respect to the most rearward part. All 
tests specified by this standard are conducted with 
the ambient temperature between 18 degrees C. and 
28 degrees C. 
S5.1 Except as specified in S5.2.3 and S5.3 of 
this section, if the seat back is adjustable, it is 
set at an initial inclination position closest to 
the manufacturer's design seat back angle, as 
measured by SAE J826 manikin. If there is 
more than one inclination position closest to 
the design angle, set the seat back inclination to 
the position closest to and rearward of the 
design angle. 
S5.1.1 Procedure for determining presence 
of head restraints in rear outboard seats. 
Measure the height of the top of a rear seat 
back or the top of any independently ad-
justable seat component attached to or ad-
jacent to the rear seat back in its highest 
position of adjustment using the scale in-
corporated into the SAE J826 (July 1995) 
manikin or an equivalent scale, which is 
positioned laterally within 15 mm of the 
centerline of the rear seat back or any inde-
pendently adjustable seat component at-
tached to or adjacent to the rear seat back. 
S5.2 Dimensional and* static performance pro-
cedures. Demonstrate compliance with S4.2 of 
this section in accordance with S5.2.1 through 
S5.2.7 of this section. Position the SAE J826 
(July 1995) manikin according to the seating 
procedure found in SAE J826 (July 1995). 
S5.2.I Procedure for height measurement. 
Demonstrate compliance with S4.2.1 of 
this section in accordance with S5.2J (a) 
and (b) of this section, using the headroom 
probe scale incorporated into the SAE J826 
(July 1995) manikin with the appropriate 
offset for the H-point position or an equi-
valent scale, which is positioned laterally 
within 15 mm of the head restraint center-
line. If the head restraint position is inde-
pendent of the seat back inclination posi-
tion, compliance is determined at a seat 
back inclination position closest to the 
design seat back angle, and each seat back 
inclination positlod less than the design 
seat back angle. 
(a)(0 Eor head restraints in front out-
board designated seating positions, ad-
just the top of the head restraint to the 
highest position and measure the height. 
(2) For head restraints located in 
the front outboard designated seat-
ing positions that are prevented by 
the interior surface of the vehicle 
at the roofline from meeting the 
required height as specified in 
S4.2.1(a)(1), measure the clear-
ance between the top of the head 
restraint and the interior surface of 
the vehicle at the roofline, with 
the seat adjusted to its lowest ver-
tical position intended for occu-
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pant use, by attempting to pass a 
25 mm sphere between them. Ad-
just the top of the head restraint to 
the lowest position and measure 
the height. 
(b)(1) For head restraints in all out-
board designated seating positions 
equipped with head restraints, adjust 
the top of the head restraint to the low-
est position other than allowed by S4.4 
and measure the height. 
(2) For head restraints located in 
rear outboard designated seating 
positions that are prevented by the 
interior surface of the vehicle at 
the roofline or the interior surface 
of the rear backlight from meeting 
the required height as specified in 
S4,2J{b)(J), measure the clear-
ance between the top of the head 
restraint or the seat back and the 
interior surface of the vehicle at 
the roofline or the interior surface 
of the rear backlight, with the seat 
adjusted to its lowest vertical pos-
ition intended for occupant use, by 
attempting to pass a 25 mm sphere 
between them. 
55.2.2 Procedure for width measurement. 
Demonstrate compliance with S4.2.2 of 
this section using calipers to measure the 
maximum dimension perpendicular to the 
vehicle vertical longitudinal plane of the 
intersection of the head restraint with a 
plane that is normal to the torso reference 
line of SAE J826 (July 1995) manikin and 
65 ± 3 mm below the top of the head re-
straint. 
55.2.3 Procedure for backset measurement. 
Demonstrate compliance with S4.2.3 of 
this section using the HRMD positioned 
laterally within 15 mm of the head restraint 
centerline. Adjust the front head restraint 
so that its top is at any height between and 
inclusive of 750 mm and 800 mm and its 
backset is in the maximum position other 
than allowed by S4.4. If the lowest posi-
tion of adjustment is above 800 mm, adjust 
the head restraint to that position. If the 
head restraint position is independent of 
the seat back inclination position, compli-
ance is determined at each seat back inclin-
ation position closest to and less than the 
design seat back angle. 
S5.2.4 Procedures for gap measurement. 
S5.2.4.1 Procedure using a 165 mm 
sphere. 
Demonstrate compliance with S4.2.4.I 
of this section in accordance with the 
procedures of S5.2AA (a) through (c) 
of this section, with the head restraint 
adjusted to its lowest height position 
and any backset position, except as al-
lowed by S4.4. 
(a) The area of measurement is 
anywhere on the anterior surface 
of the head restraint or seat with a 
height greater than 540 mm and 
within the following distances 
from the centerline of the seat-
(1) 127 mm for seats required to 
have 254 mm minimum head re-
straint width; and 
# 
(2) 85 mm for seats required to 
have a 170 mm head restraint width. 
(b) Applying a load of no more 
than 5 N against the area of meas-
urement specified in subparagraph 
(a), place a 165 ± 2 mm diameter 
spherical head form against any 
gap such that at least two points of 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.eom/pri^ 4/10/2009 
Page 10 of 23 
49 C.F.R. § 571.202a Page 9 
contact are made within the area. 
The surface roughness of the head 
form is less than 1.6 « m u » m , 
root mean square. 
(c) Determine the gap dimension 
by measuring the vertical straight 
line distance between the inner 
edges of the two furthest contact 
points, as shown in Figures 2, 3 
and 4. 
S5.2.4.2 Procedure using a 25 mm cyl-
inder. 
Demonstrate compliance with S4.2.4.2 
of this section in accordance with the 
procedures of S5.2.4.2 (a) through (c) 
of this section, with the head restraint 
adjusted to its lowest height position 
and any backset position, except as al-
lowed by S4.4, 
(a) The area of measurement is 
between the anterior surface of the 
head restraint and seat with a 
height greater than 540 mm and 
within the following distances 
from the centerline of the seat--
(1) 127 mm for seats required to 
have 254 mm minimum head re-
straint width; and 
(2) 85 mm for seats required to 
have a 170 mm head restraint width. 
(b) Orient a 25 ± 1 mm diameter 
cylinder such that its long axis is 
perpendicular to the seat back 
angle and in a vertical longitudin-
al vehicle plane. Applying a load 
of no more than 5 N along the axis 
of the cylinder, place the cylinder 
against any gap within the area of 
measurement specified in subpara-
graph (a). The surface roughness 
of the cylinder is less than 1.6 
« m u » m , root mean square. 
(c) Determine if at least 125 mm 
of the cylinder can completely 
pass through the gap. 
S5.2.5 Procedures for energy absorption. 
Demonstrate compliance with S4.2.5 of 
this section in accordance with S5.2.5 (a) 
through (e) of this section, with adjustable 
head restraints in any height and backset 
position of adjustment. 
(a) Use an impactor with a semispher-
ical head form with a 165 ± 2 mm dia-
meter and a surface roughness of less 
than 1.6 « m u » m , root mean square. 
The head form and associated base 
have a combined mass of 6.8 ± 0.05 kg. 
(b) Instrument the impactor with an 
acceleration sensing device whose out-
put is recorded in a data channel that 
conforms to the requirements for a 600 
Hz channel class as specified in SAE 
Recommended Practice J211/1 (March 
1995). The axis of the acceleration-sens-
ing device coigcides with the geomet-
ric center of the head form and the dir-
ection of impact. 
(c) Propel the impactor toward the 
head restraint. At the time of launch, 
the longitudinal axis of the impactor is 
within 2 degrees of being horizontal 
and parallel to the vehicle longitudinal 
axis. The direction of travel is posteri-
orly. 
(d) Constrain the movement of the 
head form so that it travels linearly 
along the path described in S5.2.5(c) 
of this section for not less than 25 mm 
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before making contact with the head 
restraint. 
(e) Impact the anterior surface of the 
seat or head restraint at any point with 
a height greater than 635 mm and 
within a distance of the head restraint 
vertical centerline of 70 mm. 
S5.2.6 Procedures for height retention. 
Demonstrate compliance with S4.2.6 of 
this section in accordance with S5,2.6(a) 
through (e) of this section. For head re-
straints that move with respect to the seat 
when occupant loading is applied to the 
seat back, S5.2.6(a) through (e) may be 
performed with the head restraint fixed in a 
position corresponding to the position 
when the seat is unoccupied. 
(a) Adjust the adjustable head restraint 
so that its top is at any of the follow-
ing height positions at any backset po-
sition-
(1) For front outboard designated 
seating positions-
(i) The highest position; and 
(ii) Not less than, but closest to 
800 mm; and 
(2) For rear outboard designated 
seating positions equipped with 
head restraints--
(i) The highest position; and 
(ii) Not less than, but closest to 
750 mm. 
(b)(1) Orient a cylindrical test device 
having a 165 ± 2 mm diameter in plan 
view (perpendicular to the axis of re-
volution), and a 152 mm length in pro-
file (through the axis of revolution) 
with a surface roughness of less than 
1.6 «mu»m, troot mean square, such 
that the axis of the revolution is hori-
zontal and in the longitudinal vertical 
plane through the longitudinal center-
line of the head restraint. Position the 
midpoint of the bottom surface of the 
cylinder in contact with the head re-
straint. 
(2) Establish initial reference pos-
ition by applying a vertical down-
ward load of 50 ± 1 N at the rate 
of 250 ± 50 N/minute. Determine 
the reference position after 5.5 £ 
0 5 seconds at this load. 
(c) Increase the load at the rate of 250 
i 50 N/minute to at least 500 N and 
maintain this load for 5.5 ± 0.5 seconds. 
(d) Reduce the load at the rate of 250 
i 50 N/minute until the load is com-
pletely removed. Maintain this condi-
tion for not more than two minutes. 
(e) Increase the load at the rate of 250 
db 50 N/minute to 50 ± 1 N and, after 
5.5 i 0.5 seconds at this load, determ-
ine the position of the cylindrical 
device with respect to its initial refer-
ence position. 
S5.2.7 Procedures for backset retention, 
displacement, and strength. Demonstrate 
compliance with S4.2.7 of this section in 
accordance with S5.2.7(a) and (b) of this 
section. The load vectors that generate mo-
ment on the head restraint are initially con-
tained in a vertical plane parallel to the 
vehicle longitudinal centerline. 
(a) Backset retention and displace-
ment. For head restraints that move 
with respect to the seat when occupant 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
http://web2Avestlawxom/pri 4/10/2009 
49 C.F.R. § 571.202a 
loading is applied to the seat back, 
S5.2.7(a)(l) through (8) may be per-
formed with the head restraint fixed in 
a position corresponding to the posi-
tion when the seat is unoccupied. 
(1) Adjust the head restraint so 
that its top is at a height closest to 
and not less than: 
(i) 800 mm for front outboard des-
ignated seating positions (or the 
highest position of adjustment for 
head restraints subject to 
S4.2.1(a)(2)); and 
(ii) 750 mm for rear outboard des-
ignated seating positions equipped 
with head restraints (or the highest 
position of adjustment for rear 
head restraints subject to 
S4.2.1(b)(2)). 
(2) Adjust the head restraint to 
any backset position. 
(3) In the seat, place a test device 
having the back pan dimensions 
and torso reference line (vertical 
center line), when viewed later-
ally, with the head room probe in 
the full back position, of the three 
dimensional SAE J826 (July 
1995) manikin; 
(4) Establish the displaced torso 
reference line by creating a pos-
terior moment of 373 ± 7.5 Nm 
about the H-point by applying a 
force to the seat back through the 
back pan at the rate of 187 ± 37 
Nm/minute. The initial location on 
(he bacfc pan of the moment gen-
erating force vector has a height 
of 290 mm ± 13 mm. Apply the 
force vector normal to the torso 
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reference line and maintain it 
within 2 degrees of a vertical 
plane parallel to the vehicle lon-
gitudinal centerline. Constrain the 
back pan to rotate about the H-
point. Rotate the force vector dir-
ection with the back pan. 
(5) Maintain the position of the 
back pan as established in 
85.2.7(a)(4) of this section. Using 
a 165 ± 2 mm diameter spherical 
head form,with a surface rough-
ness of less than 1.6 « m u » m , 
root mean square, establish the 
head form initial reference posi-
tion by applying, perpendicular to 
the displaced torso reference line, 
a posterior initial load at the seat 
centerline at a height 65 ± 3 mm 
below the top of the head restraint 
that will produce a 37 ± 0.7 Nm 
moment about the H-point. After 
maintaining this moment for 5.5 ± 
0.5 seconds, measure the posterior 
displacement of the head form 
during the application of the load. 
(6) Increase the initial load at the 
rate of 187 ± 37 Nm/minute until 
a 373 ± 7.5 Nm moment about the 
H-point is produced. Maintain the 
load level producing that moment 
for 5.5 ± • 0.5 seconds and then 
measure the posterior displace-
ment of the head form relative to 
the displaced torso reference line. 
(7) Reduce the load at the rate of 
187 ± 37 Nm/minute until it is 
completely removed. Maintain 
this condition for not more than 
two minutes. 
(8) Increase the load at the rate of 
187 ± 37 Nm/minute until a 37 ± 
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0.7 Nm moment about the H-point 
is produced. After maintaining the 
load level producing that moment 
for 5.5 ± 0.5 seconds, measure the 
posterior displacement of the head 
form position with respect to its 
initial reference position; and 
(b) Strength. Increase the load spe-
cified in S5.2.7(a)(7) of this section at 
the rate of 250 ± 50 N/minute to at 
least 890 N and maintain this load 
level for 5.5 ± 0.5 seconds. 
S5.3 Procedures for dynamic performance. 
Demonstrate compliance with S4.3 of this sec-
tion in accordance with S5.3.1 though S5.3.9 of 
this section with a 50th percentile male Hybrid 
HI test dummy specified in 49 CFR Part 572 
Subpart E, fitted with sensors to measure head 
to torso rotation. The dummy with all sensors 
is to continue to meet all specifications in 49 
CFR Part 572 Subpart E. The restraint is posi-
tioned midway between the lowest and the 
highest position of adjustment. 
55.3.1 Mount the vehicle on a dynamic test 
platform at the vehicle altitude set forth in 
S13.3 of § 571.208 of this part, so that the 
longitudinal centerline of the vehicle is 
parallel to the direction of the test platform 
travel and so that movement between the 
base of the vehicle and the test platform is 
prevented. Instrument the platform with an 
accelerometer and data processing system. 
Position the accelerometer sensitive axis 
parallel to the direction of test platform 
travel. 
55.3.2 Remove the tires, wheels, fluids, 
and all unsecured components. Remove or 
rigidly secure the engine, transmission, 
axles, exhaust, vehicle frame and any other 
vehicle component necessary to assure that 
all points on the acceleration vs. time plot 
measured by an accelerometer on the dy-
namic test platform fall within the corridor 
described in Figure 1 and Table 1. 
55.3.3 Place any moveable windows in the 
fully open position. 
55.3.4 Seat Adjustment. At each outboard 
designated seating position, if the seat back 
is adjustable, it is set at an initial inclina-
tion position closest to 25 degrees from the 
vertical, as measured by SAE J826 (July 
1995) manikin. If there is more than one 
inclination position closest to 25 degrees 
from the vertical, set the seat back inclina-
tion to the position closest to and rearward 
of 25 degrees. Using any control that 
primarily moves the entire seat vertically, 
place the seat in the lowest position. Using 
any control that primarily moves the entire 
seat in the fore and aft directions, place the 
seat midway between the forwardmost and 
rearmost position. If an adjustment posi-
tion does not exist midway between the 
forwardmost and rearmost positions, the 
closest adjustment position to the rear of 
the midpoint is used. Adjust the seat cush-
ion and seat back as required by S5 and 
S5.1 of this sectiori. If the head restraint is 
adjustable, adjust the top of the head re-
straint to a position midway between the 
lowest position of adjustment and the 
highest position of adjustment. If an ad-
justment position midway between the 
lowest and the highest position does not 
exist, adjust the head restraint to a position 
below and nearest to midway between the 
lowest position of adjustment and the 
highest position of adjustment. 
55.3.5 Seat Belt Adjustment. Prior to pla-
cing the Type 2 seat belt around the test 
dummy, fully extend the webbing from the 
seat belt retractor(s) and release it tliree 
times to remove slack. If an adjustable seat 
belt D-ring anchorage exists, place it in the 
adjustment position closest to the mid-
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position. If an adjustment position does not 
exist midway between the highest and low-
est position, the closest adjustment posi-
tion above the midpoint is used. 
55.3.6 Dress and adjust each test dummy 
as specified in S8.1.8.2 through S8.1.8,3 of 
§ 571.208 of this Part. The stabilized test 
temperature of the test dummy is at any 
temperature level between 69 degrees F 
and 72 degrees F, inclusive. 
55.3.7 Test dummy positioning procedure. 
Place a test dummy at each outboard desig-
nated seating position equipped with a 
head restraint. 
55.3.7.1 Head. The transverse instru-
mentation platform of the head is level 
within 1/2 degree. To level the head 
of the test dummy> the following se-
quence is followed. First, adjust the 
position of the H-point within the lim-
its set forth in SiO.4.2.1 of § 571.208 
to level the transverse instrumentation 
platform of the head of the test 
dummy. If the transverse instrumenta-
tion platform of the head is still not 
level, then adjust the pelvic angle of 
the test dummy. If the transverse in-
strumentation platform of the head is 
still not level, then adjust the neck 
bracket of the dummy the minimum 
amount necessary from the non-
adjusted "0" setting to ensure that the 
transverse instrumentation platform of 
the head is horizontal within 1/2 de-
gree. The test dummy remains within 
the limits specified in S 10.4.2.1 of § 
571.208 after any adjustment of the 
neck bracket. 
55.3.7.2 Upper arms and hands. Posi-
tion each test dummy as specified in 
S10.2 and S10.3 of § 571.208 of this Part. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No 
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55.3.7.3 Torso. Position each test 
dummy as specified in SI 0.4.1.1, 
S10.4.1.2, and S10.4.2.1 of § 571.208 
of this Part, except that the midsagittai 
plane of the dummy is aligned within 
15 mm of the head restraint centerline. 
If the midsagittai plane of the dummy 
cannot be aligned within 15 mm of the 
head restraint centerline then align the 
midsagittai plane of the dummy as 
close as possible to the head restraint 
centerline. 
55.3.7.4 Legs. Position each test 
dummy as specified in SI0.5 of § 
571.208 of this Part, except that final 
adjustment to accommodate placement 
of the feet in accordance with S5.3.7.5 
of this section is permitted. 
55.3.7.5 Feet. Position each test 
dummy as specified in SI0.6 of § 
571.208 of this Part, except that for 
rear outboard designated seating posi-
tions the feet of the test dummy are 
placed flat on the floorpan and beneath 
the front seat as far forward as pos-
sible without front seat interference. 
For rear outboard designated seating 
positions, if necessary, the distance 
between the knees can be changed in 
order to place the feet beneath the seat. 
55.3.8 Accelerate the dynamic test plat-
form to 17.3 ± 0,6 km/h. AH of the points 
on the acceleration vs. time curve fall 
within the corridor described in Figure 1 
and Table 1 when filtered to channel class 
60, as specified in.the SAE Recommended 
Practice J211/1 (March 1995). Measure the 
maximum posterior angular displacement. 
55.3.9 Calculate the angular displacement 
from the output of instrumentation placed 
in the torso and head of the test dummy 
and an algorithm capable of determining 
tim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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the relative angular displacement to within 
one degree and conforming to the require-
ments of a 600 Hz channel class, as spe-
cified in SAE Recommended Practice 
1211/1, March 1995. No data generated 
after 200 ms from the beginning of the for-
ward acceleration are used in determining 
angular displacement of the head with re-
spect to the torso. 
S5.3.10 Calculate the H1C,5 from the out-
put of instrumentation placed in the head 
of the test dummy, using the equation in 
S4.3.1(b) of this section and conforming to 
the requirements for a 1000 Hz channel 
class as specified in SAE Recommended 
Practice J211/1 (March 1995). No data 
generated after 200 ms from the beginning 
of the forward acceleration are used in de-
termining HIC. 
S5.4 Procedures for folding or retracting head 
restraints for unoccupied rear outboard desig-
nated seating positions. 
(a) Demonstrate compliance with S4.4 (a) 
of this section, using a 5th percentile fe-
male Hybrid III test dummy specified in 49 
CFR Part 572, Subpart O, in accordance 
With the following procedure-
(1) Position the test dummy in the seat 
such that the dummy's midsaggital 
plane is aligned within the 15 mm of 
the head restraint centerline and is par-
allel to a vertical plane parallel to the 
vehicle longitudinal centerline. 
(2) Hold the dummy's thighs down and 
push rearward on the upper torso to 
maximize the dummy's pelvic angle. 
(3) Place the legs as close as possible 
to 90 degrees to the thighs. Push rear-
ward on the dummy's knees to force 
the pelvis into the scat so there is no 
gap between the pelvis and the seat 
back or until contact occurs between 
the back of the dummy's calves and 
the front of the seat cushion such that 
the angle between the dummy's thighs 
and legs begins to change. 
(4) Note the position of the head re-
straint. Remove the dummy from the 
seat. If the head restraint returns to a 
retracted position upon removal of the 
dummy, manua41y place it in the noted 
position. Determine compliance with 
the height requirements of S4.2.1 of 
this section by using the test proced-
ures of S5.2.1 of this section. 
(b) Demonstrate compliance with S4.4 (b) 
of this section in accordance with the fol-
lowing procedure: 
(1) Place the rear head restraint in any 
position meeting the requirements of 
S4.2 of this section; 
(2) Strike a line on the head restraint. 
Measure the angle or range of angles 
of the head restraint reference line as 
projected onto a vertical longitudinal 
vehicle plane. Alternatively, measure 
the torso reference line angle with the 
SAE J826 (July 1995) manikin; 
(3) Fold or retract the head restraint to 
a position in which its minimum 
height is less than that specified in 
S4.2.I (b) of this section; 
(4) Determine the minimum change in 
the head restraint reference line angle 
as projected onto a vertical longitudin-
al vehicle plane from the angle or 
range of angles measured in 5.4(b)(2). 
Alternatively, determine the change in 
the torso reference line angle with the 
SAE J826 (July 1995) manikin. 
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S6. Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 
2009, and before September 1, 2010 (Phase-in of § 
571.202a). 
(a) For vehicles manufactured for sale in the 
United States on or after September I, 2009, 
and befoie September 1, 2010, a percentage of 
the manufacturer's production, as specified in 
S6.1, shall meet the requirements specified in 
this § 571.202a without regard to any option to 
comply with the standard in § 571.202 or with 
the European regulations referenced in S4.3(a) 
of § 571.202. So long as this percentage re-
quirement is met, a vehicle may comply with 
the standard in this § 571.202a, with the stand-
ard in § 571.202, or with the European regula-
tions referenced in S4.3(a) of § 571.202. 
(b) Notwithstanding S6(a), vehicles that are 
manufactured in two or more stages or that are 
altered (within the meaning of 49 CFR 567.7) 
after having previously been certified in ac-
cordance with Part 567 of this chapter may 
comply with the standard in this § 571.202a, 
with the standard in § 571.202, or with the 
European regulations referenced in S4.3(a) of § 
571.202. 
S6.1 Phase-in percentage. For vehicles manu-
factured by a manufacturer on or after Septem-
ber 1, 2009, and before September 1, 2010, the 
amount of vehicles complying with S6(a) shall 
be not less than 80 percent of: 
(a) If the manufacturer has manufactured 
vehicles for sale in the United States dur-
ing both of the two production years prior 
to September 1, 2009, the manufacturer's 
average annual production of vehicles 
manufactured on or after September 1, 
2007, and before September 1,2010, or 
(b) The manufacturer's production on or 
after September 1, 2009, and before 
September 1,2010. 
S6.2 Vehicles produced by more than one man-
ufacturer. 
56.2.1 For the purpose of calculating aver-
age annual production of vehicles for each 
manufacturer and the number of vehicles 
manufactured by each manufacturer under 
S6.1, a vehicle produced by more than one 
manufacturer shall be attributed to a single 
manufacturer as follows, subject to S6.2.2. 
(a) A vehicle that is imported shall be 
attributed to the importer. 
(b) A vehicle manufactured in the 
United States by more than one manu-
facturer, one of which also markets the 
vehicle, shall be attributed to the man-
ufacturer that markets the vehicle. 
56.2.2 A vehicle produced by more than 
one manufacturer shall be attributed to any 
one of the vehicle's manufacturers spe-
cified by an express written contract, re-
ported to the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration under 49 CFR Part 
585, between the manufacturer so specified 
and the manufacturer to which the vehicle 
would otherwise be attributed under S6.2.1. 
S7. Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 
2010, and before September 1, 2011 (Phase-in of 
rear seat requirements of § 571.202a). 
(a) For vehicles manufactured for sale In the 
United States on or after September 1, 2010, 
and before September 1, 2011 a percentage of 
the manufacturer's production of vehicles 
equipped with rear outboard head restraints, as 
specified m S7.1, shall meet the requirements 
specified in this § 571.202a for rear head re-
straints. 
(b) Vehicles that are manufactured in two or 
more stages or that are altered (within the 
meaning of 49 CFR 567.7) after having previ-
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ously been certified in accordance with Part 
567 of this chapter are not subject to the re-
quirement specified in S7(a). 
57.1 Phase-in percentage. For vehicles manu-
factured by a manufacturer on or after Septem-
ber 1, 2010, and before September 1, 2011, the 
amount of vehicles equipped with rear out-
board head restraints complying with S7(a) 
shall be not less than 80 percent of: 
(a) If the manufacturer has manufactured 
vehicles for sale in the United States dur-
ing both of the two production years prior 
to September I, 2010, the manufacturer's 
average annual production of vehicles 
equipped with rear outboard head restraints 
manufactured on or after September 1, 
2008, and before September 1,2011, or 
(b) The manufacturer's production of 
vehicles equipped with rear outboard head 
restraints on or after September 1, 2010, 
and before September 1,2011. 
57.2 Vehicles produced by more than one man-
ufacturer. 
S7.2.1 For the purpose of calculating aver-
age annual production of vehicles for each 
manufacturer and the number of vehicles 
manufactured by each manufacturer under 
S6.1, a vehicle produced by more than one 
manufacturer shall be attributed to a single 
manufacturer as follows, subject to S7.2.2. 
(a) A vehicle that is imported shall be 
attributed to the importer, 
(b) A vehicle manufactured in the 
United States by more than one manu-
facturer, one of which also markets the 
vehicle, shall be attributed to the man-
ufacturer that markets the vehicle. 
S7.2.2 A vehicle produced by more than 
one manufacturer shall be attributed to any 
one of the vehicle's manufacturers spe-
cified by an express written contract, re-
ported to the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration under 49 CFR Part 
585, between the manufacturer so specified 
and the manufacturer to which the vehicle 
would otherwise be attributed under S7.2.1. 
Table 1 of 57L202a - Sled pulse corridor reference point locations. 
iReference Point 
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0 
28 
60 
92 : 
4 
38.5 
49.5 
84 | 
[Acceleration (m/s2) 1 
10 
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Figure 1 of §571.202a - Sled pulse acceleration corridor. The target acceleration 
with time expressed in milliseconds is a = 86 Sln(nt/88) m/s2, for, V »17.3 ± 0.6 
km/h. The time zero for the test is defined by the point when the sled acceleration 
achieves 2,5 m/s2 (0.25 G'$). 
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Figure 2 of §571.202a - Measurement of a vertical gap "a". 
165 mmdia. 
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Figure 3 of §57L202a - Measurement of a horizontal gap "a". 
I 
165 mm dia. 
sphere 
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Figure 4 of §57L202a - Portion of gap above 540 mm height 
Lowest In-Use Adjusted Height Position 
Gap Above 
540 mm Height 
640 mm 
[69 FR 74884, Dec. 14, 2004; 71 FR 12148, March 
9,2006; 72 FR 25514, May 4,2007] 
SOURCE: 36 FR 22902, Dec. 2, 1971; 50 FR 
21056, June 6, 1985; 51-FR 9456, March 19, 1986; 
59 FR 37175, July 21, 1994; 59 FR 38940, Aug. 1, 
1994; 60 FR 58524, Nov. 28, 1995; 64 FR 10815, 
March 5, 1999; 64 FR 47582, Aug. 31, 1999, unless 
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AUTHORITY: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 
30J66 and 30177; delegation of authority at 49 
CFR1.50. 
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49 U.S.C.A.§ 30101 Pagel 
Effective:[See Text Amendments] 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 49. Transportation (Refs & Annos) 
Subtitle VI. Motor Vehicle and Driver Programs 
Pait A. General 
*6i Chapter 301. Motor Vehicle Safety (Refs & Annos) 
*® Subchapter I. General 
-* § 30101. Purpose and policy 
The purpose of this chapter is to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries resulting from traffic accidents. 
Therefore it is necessary-
(1) to pi escribe motor vehicle safety standards for motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment in interstate 
commerce; and 
(2) to carry out needed safety research and development. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Added Pub.L. 103-272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 941.) 
Current through P.L. 111-12 (excluding P,L. 111-5,111-8, and 111 -11) approved 3-30-09 
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49 U.S.C.A. § 30103 Page 1 
Effective:[See Text Amendments] 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 49. Transportation (Refs & Annos) 
Subtitle VI. Motor Vehicle and Driver Programs 
Part A. General 
*B Chapter 301. Motor Vehicle Safety (Refs & Annos) 
*® Subchapter I. General 
_t § 30103. Relationship to other laws 
(a) Uniformity of reguIations.-TTie Secretary of Transportation may not prescribe a safety regulation related to 
a motor vehicle subject to subchapter I of chapter 135 of this title that differs from a motor vehicle safety stand-
ard prescribed under this chapter. However, the Secretary may prescribe, for a motor vehicle operated by a carri-
er subject to subchapter I of chapter 135, a safety regulation that imposes a higher standard of performance after 
manufacture than that required by an applicable standard in effect at the time of manufacture. 
(b) Preemption.—(1) When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political 
subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of perform-
ance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed 
under this chapter. However, the United States Government, a State, or a political subdivision of a State may 
prescribe a standard for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment obtained for its own use that imposes a 
higher performance requirement than that required by the otherwise applicable standard under this chapter. 
(2) A State may enforce a standard that is identical to a standard prescribed under this chapter. 
(c) Antitrust laws.-This chapter does not-
(1) exempt from the antitrust laws conduct that is unlawful under those laws; or 
(2) prohibit under the antitrust laws conduct that is lawful under those laws. 
(d) Warranty obligations and additional legal rights and remedies.-Sections 30117(b), 30118-30121, 
30166(f), and 30167(a) and (b) of this title do not establish or affect a warranty obligation under a law of the 
United States or a State. A remedy under those sections and sections 30161 and 30162 of this title is in addition 
to other rights and remedies under other laws of the United States or a State. 
(c) Common law liability.-Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does 
not exempt a person from liability at common law. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Added Pub.L. 103-272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 943, and amended PubX. 104-88, Title III, § 308(j), Dec. 
29, 1995, 109 Stat. 947.) 
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Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 1998 WL 474098 (N.D.Iit.) 
(Cite as: 1998 WL 474098 (N.D.IIh)) 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, N,D. Illinois. 
John B. WIER and Linda M. Wier, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SOO LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, d/b/a CP 
Rail Systems, Mile Post Inns, Inc., and David 
Castaneda, Defendants. 
SOO LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, d/b/a CP 
Rail Systems, and Mile Post Inns, Inc., 
Crossclaimants, 
v, 
David CASTANEDA, Crossdefendant. 
No, 96 C 2094. 
Aug. 3,1998. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
HART, District J. 
*1 Plaintiffs, husband and wife, John Wier 
("Wier") and Linda Wier, bring this personal injury 
action against Wier's employer, the Soo Line Rail-
road Company ("Soo Line"). The action arises out 
of a two-vehicle traffic accident which occurred 
during the course of Wier*s employment. Also 
named as defendants are Mile Post Inns, Inc. ("Mile 
Post"), the owner and manager of the mini van in 
which Wier was traveling as a passenger, David 
Jones ("Jones"), the driver of the minivan, and 
David Castaneda ("Castaneda"), the driver of the 
other vehicle. On March 13, 1997, Jones moved for 
summary judgment. The court ordered judgment in 
his favor and dismissed him as defendant. Presently 
pending is the motion of defendants Soo Line and 
Mile Post for summary judgment. 
On a motion for summary judgment, the entire re-
cord is considered with all reasonable inferences 
drawn in favor of the nonmovant and all factual dis-
putes resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Valance 
v.. Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269, 1274 (7th Cir.1997); Patel 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No 
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v. Allstate Insurance Co., 105 F.3d 365, 367 (7th 
Cir.1997). The burden of establishing a lack of any 
genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant. 
Essex v. United Parcel Service, Inc., I l l F.3d 
1304, 1308 (7th Cir.1997). The nonmovant, 
however, must make a showing sufficient to estab-
lish any essential element for which he or she will 
bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 
F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir.1997). The movant need not 
provide affidavits or deposition testimony showing 
the nonexistence of such essential elements. 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Also, it is not sufficient to 
show evidence of purportedly disputed facts if 
those facts are not plausible in light of the entire re-
cord. See NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 
45 F.3d 231, 236 (7th Cir.), cert, denied,5\5 U.S. 
1104, 115 S.Ct. 2249, 132 L.Ed.2d 257 (1995); Co-
valt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 481, 485 (7th 
Cir. 1991); Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 
844 F.2d 473, 476-77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,4U 
U.S. 852, 109 S.Ct. 137, 102 L.Ed.2d 110 (1988). 
As the Seventh Circuit has summarized: 
The moving party bears the initial burden of direct-
ing the district court to the determinative issues and 
the available evidence that pertains to each. "[A] 
party seeking summary judgment always bears the 
initial responsibility of informing the district court 
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those 
portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any* which it believes demon-
strate the absence of a genuine issue of material 
fact rCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 
106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); id. at 325 
("the burden on the moving party may be dis-
charged by 'showing'-that is, pointing out to the 
district court-that there is an absence of evidence to 
support the nonmoving party's case"). Then, with 
respect to issues that the non-moving party will 
bear the burden of proving at trial, the non-moving 
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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party must come forward with affidavits, depos-
itions, answers to interrogatories or admissions and 
designate specific facts which establish that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.The non-moving 
party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must 
designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories or admissions that estab-
lish that there is a genuine triable issue. Id. The 
non-moving party "must do more than simply show 
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the ma-
terial facts.'5Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 
LJEd.2d 538 (1986)."The mere existence of a scin-
tilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving 
party's] position will be insufficient; there must be 
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find 
for the [non-moving $dxty].nAnderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 
*2 Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1992). 
Resolving all genuine disputes and drawing all 
reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor, the facts 
are as follows. At all relevant times, Wier was em-
ployed as an engineer for Soo Line, a railroad oper-
ator. On May 29, 1994, Wier was injured in a 
traffic accident while being transported between 
employment locations. The accident occurred 
when, while stopped at a traffic signal, the minivan 
in which Wier was traveling was struck in the rear 
by Castaneda's vehicle. Wier, who was seated on 
the right side of the minivan's rear seat, sustained 
whiplash injuries on impact and currently suffers 
from posttraumatic vertigo related to the accident .FNI 
FN1. This diagnosis was made by Dr. 
Timothy Hain ("Hain"), an otolaryngolo-
gist at Northwestern University Medical 
School. See Exhibit H to Plf. Mem. 
The minivan was owned and operated by Mile Post, 
a common carrier. At all relevant times, Mile Post 
provided transportation services for Soo Line, pur-
suant to an agreement brokered by a third 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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^ B y the terms of that agreement, Mile Post was 
obliged to supply Soo Line with vehicles capable of 
transporting seven passengers and their luggage in 
an efficient and comfortable manner. The vehicles 
were required to be in good mechanical condition 
and furnished with specified equipment including 
seat belts for all passengers, fire extinguishers and 
road flares.FN*Mile Post had not made any struc-
tural alterations to the minivan after purchasing it 
from the manufacturer. 
FN2.See Exhibit B to Def. Stm. The agree-
ment was concluded by Mile Post and 
Crew Transportation Services, Co., acting 
as broker. 
FN3. Agreement, § 17, at Exhibit B to Def. 
Stm. 
Wier offers the expert opinion of Dr, Daniel 
Pacheco ("Pacheco"), a mechanical engineer and 
expert in safety and accident investigation. Pacheco 
concludes that Wier sustained whiplash injuries as a 
result of the minivan not being equipped with head-
rests for the rearseat passengers. In his opinion, the 
minivan should have been so equipped given the in-
tended occupancy of the minivan and the foreseeab-
ility of a rear-end collision. Pacheco relies in part 
on Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 202, 
49 C.F.R. § 571,202, which states that headrests re-
duce the frequency and severity of neck injuries in 
rear-end collisions. However, in his deposition, 
Pacheco conceded that Standard No. 202 does not 
require the installation of headrests on seats in the 
rear of minivans.FN4 
FN4. Exhibit E to Def. Stm. 
Defendants produced their own expert engineer, 
Stanley Sangdahl ("Sangdahl"). He opines that 
while headrests are designed to diminish the likeli-
hood of injury in rear-end collisions, they cannot 
prevent injury in all instances. In Sangdahl's opin-
ion, it is impossible to predict the effect of head-
rests on the likelihood or severity of injury to indi-
vidual occupants in rear-end collisions.FN5It is un-
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disputed that, at all relevant times, there were other 
brands of minivans on the market that were 
equipped with rearseat headrests. 
FN5. Sangdahi's Affidavit at Exhibit F to 
Def. Stm. 
Count I of the complaint contains claims by Wier 
against Soo Line pursuant to the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § S\et seq. 
The remaining claims come within the court's di-
versity jurisdiction.FN*Wier alleges common law 
negligence against Mile Post in Count II and 
against Castaneda in Count III, Counts IV and V set 
out claims for loss of consortium against Mile Post 
and Castaneda, respectively. Soo Line and Mile 
Post crossclaim for contribution against 
Castaneda.^PIaintiffs complain principally that 
defendants were negligent in failing to provide Wi-
er with a safe means of transportation. Specifically, 
it is alleged that the van should have been equipped 
with rear headrests or other restraining devices to 
prevent or reduce injury in a foreseeable rear-end 
collision. 
FN6. John and Linda Wier are citizens of 
Wisconsin. Mile Post is incorporated and 
has its principal place of business in 
Nevada. Castaneda is a citizen of Illinois. 
The complaint, which was filed on April 
10, 1996, alleges that the amounts in con-
troversy with respect to the claims of John 
Wier and the claims of Linda Wier, re-
spectively exceed $50,000. 
FN7. The pleadings refer to this claim as a 
counterclaim although it is in fact a 
crossclaim. 
*3 Defendants depict this lawsuit as "a products li-
ability cause of action masquerading as a FELA vi-
olation or common negligence cause of action."Def. 
Mem. at 3-4. Defendants describe themselves as 
consumers or end-users of the minivan, owing no 
special duties to Wier, a fellow consumer. They 
seek summary judgment on grounds of breach of 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No 
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duty and causation. 
The first issue to be considered is the extent of Soo 
Line's duty to guarantee the safety of the minivan. 
FELA creates a toit remedy for railroad employees 
injured on the job. Lancaster v. Norfolk & Western 
Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 807, 812 (7th Cir.1985), cert. 
denied,4%0 U.S. 945, 107 S.Ct. 1602, 94 L.Ed.2d 
788 (1987). The statute provides in relevant part: 
Every common carrier by railroad ... shall be liable 
in damages to any person suffering injury while he 
is employed by such carrier ... resulting in whole or 
in part from the negligence of any of the officers, 
agents or employees of such earner, or by reason of 
any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in 
its cars, engines, appliances, machineiy ... or other 
equipment. 
45 U.S.C. §51. 
In light of its broad remedial purpose, FELA is lib-
erally construed in favor of railroad employees. 
Consolidated Rait Corp, v. Gottschall, 512 U.S. 
532, 543, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994); 
Lisek v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 30 F.3d 823, 
831 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied,5\3 U.S. 1112, 115 
S.Ct. 904, 130 L.Ed.2d 787 (1995). To establish 
negligence, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach, 
foreseeability and causation. Fulk v. Illinois Central 
R.R. Co., 22 F.3d 120, 124 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied,5\3 U.S. 870, 115 S.Ct. 193, 130 L.Ed.2d 
125 (1994). However, that burden is significantly 
lighter than it would be in an ordinary negligence 
case. A plaintiff need only show that the employer's 
negligence "played any part, even the slightest in 
producing the injury".//*/*//! v. Burlington North-
ern R.R. Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.1990) 
(quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 352 
U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957)). 
This lightened burden of proof means that a FELA 
plaintiff can survive a motion for summary judg-
ment provided there is even slight evidence of neg-
ligence. Lisek, 30 F.3d at &32;Harbin, 921 F.2d at 
131. 
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Under FELA, a railroad employer has a duty to 
provide its employees with a reasonably safe work-
place and safe equipment. Shenker v. Baltimore and 
Ohio RR. Co., 374 U.S. i, 7, 83 S.Ct. 1667, 10 
L.Ed.2d 709 (1963); Williams v. National RR Pas-
senger Corp., 1997 WL 754175 *2 (NJD.I1I. 
NOY.20, 1997). Courts have recognized that unsafe 
conditions in railroad vehicles may give rise to liab-
ility under the statute. See, e.g., Finley v. National 
RR. Passenger Corp., 1997 WL 59322 *8 (E.D.Pa. 
Feb. 12, 1997) (defective window collapsed injuring 
employee); George v. Burlington Northern RR. 
Co., 1994 WL 523713 *3 (N.D.IU. Sept.26, 1994) 
(trainman injured when attempting to align defect-
ive drawbar); Korte v. New York, NM. & H.R Co,, 
191 F.2d S6t 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,342 U.S. 
868, 72 S.Ct. 108, 96 L.Ed. 652 (1951) (ticket col-
lector injured when opening defective trap door); 
Sullivan v. Aliguippa & S.RR. Co,, 57 F.Supp. 353, 
354 (W.D.Pa.1944) (defective handbrake resulted 
in injury to brakeman). 
*4 The employer's duty is nondelegable and applies 
even when the employee is required to go onto the 
premises of a third party over which the employer 
has no control. Shenker, 374 U.S. at 7. Moreover, 
the concept of agency is broadly defined for the 
purposes of FELA. Liability extends to the acts of 
others contractually bound to perform operational 
activities on behalf of the employer. Sinkler v. Mis-
souri Pacific RR. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 331-32, 78 
S.Ct. 758, 2 L.Ed.2d 799 (1958). Specifically, 
transporting railroad employees has been recog-
nized as one such operational activity. Austin v. Soo 
Line RR. Co,, 1996 WL 539123 *3 (N.D.IU. 
Sept.20, 1996) (quoting Leek v. Baltimore & Ohio 
RR. Co,, 200 F.Supp. 368, 370-71 
(N.D.W.Va.1962)). 
To establish breach of duty, the employee must 
show that the employer failed to act as a reasonable 
and prudent person would ordinarily act under the 
circumstances. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line RR, 
Co., 318 U.S. 54, 67, 63 S.Ct. 444, 87 L.Ed. 610 
(1943). However, liability is limited to hazards 
which the employer could have reasonably fore-
seen. Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio RR. Co., 372 
U.S. 108, 117, 83 S.Ct. 650, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963); 
Dukes v. Illinois Central RR. Co., 934 F.Supp. 939, 
945 (NJD.II1.1996) (citing Gallose v. Long Island 
RR. Co. 878 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
It is undisputed that Soo Line is a common carrier 
by railroad for the puiposes of FELA and that Wier 
was employed by Soo Line at all relevant times. By 
virtue of Soo Line's duty to provide a safe means of 
transportation for its employees, Wier contends that 
Soo Line was required to provide a minivan 
equipped with rearseat headrests. Since it was not 
involved in the manufacture of the minivan, Soo 
Line disputes that it was under any duty to guaran-
tee the safety of the minivan. It argues that an em-
ployer cannot be liable under FELA merely for per-
mitting an employee to ride in one type of mass 
produced passenger vehicle as opposed to another. 
Soo Line's position would be more tenable if all 
mass produced passenger vehicles (in this case, 
minivans) were identical". However, Wier has 
shown that, at all relevant times, there were other 
brands of minivans available which were equipped 
with rearseat headrests. Wier contends that the be-
nefits of headrests are well known and are recog-
nized by federal safety standards. In these circum-
stances, a factfinder might reasonably conclude that 
Soo Line knew or ought to have known of the haz-
ard posed by the absence of headrests. This conclu-
sion is underscored by the fact that Soo Line's 
agreement with Mile Post specifically addressed the 
issue of safety, although it did not include headrests 
in the list of mandatory safety features. Thus, Soo 
Line is precluded from simply relying on the judg-
ment of the manufacturer as to the adequacy of the 
minivan's safety features. 
Read in the light most favorable to Wier, the record 
suggests that a prudent employer might have taken 
steps to ensure that its employees were transported 
in minivans equipped with rearseat headrests. Soo 
Line could have insisted that Mile Post provide 
such a guarantee, simply by listing headrests as a 
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mandatory safety feature in its agreement with Mile 
Post. Alternatively, it was open to Soo Line to find 
another transport service that adequately addressed 
vehicle safety concerns. Whether Soo Line should 
have taken such steps remains a material issue of 
fact in this case sufficient to defeat Soo Line's mo-
tion for summary judgment. 
*5 As an additional matter, for the reasons stated 
below, Wier has presented enough evidence to sug-
gest that Mile Post may have been negligent in fail-
ing to provide transportation in a vehicle equipped 
with rearseat headrests. Since Mite Post was acting 
at the behest of Soo Line, it was acting as Soo 
Line's agent for these purposes. Austin, 1996 WL 
539123 *3;Servais v, T.J. Management of Min-
neapolis, Inc., 973 F.Supp. 885, 893 (D.Minn. 1997) 
(distinguishing, for purposes of an indemnity claim, 
an employer's own negligence from the negligence 
of a transportation agent attributable to the employ-
er under FELA). Thus, for this reason also, sum-
mary judgment In favor of Soo Line is inappropri-
ate. 
Soo Line also moves for summary judgment on the 
issue of proximate cause. It disputes Wier's conten-
tion that his injuries were caused by the lack of a 
headrest. The parties present conflicting expert 
testimony in this regard. Pacheco, plaintiffs' expert, 
concludes that the lack of a headrest was a direct 
cause of Wier's injuries. Sangdahl, defendants' ex-
pert, opines that it is impossible to quantify the ef-
fect headrests may have on the likelihood or degree 
of injury in rear-end collisions. 
As a preliminary matter, defendants question 
Pacheco's expertise by pointing out that he is not an 
expert in biomechanics. However, Pacheco is a 
mechanical engineer with expertise in the areas of 
design and test engineering and product safety. 
Moreover, he works for an engineering consultancy 
firm that specializes in accident 
investigations.^Expert testimony may be offered 
when scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No 
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Fed.R.Evid. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals* Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 
125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); Gruca v. Alpha Thera-
peutic Corp., 51 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir,1995). The 
district court has wide discretion in determining the 
competency of a witness as an expert and the relev-
ancy of his or her testimony with respect to a par-
ticular subject. Roback v. V.I.P. Transport, Inc., 90 
F.3d 1207, 1215 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. 
Stevenson, 6 F.3d 1262, 1267 (7th Cir.1993). In his 
deposition, Pacheco emphasized that he could not 
speak to the injury itself.^Rather, he stated that 
his testimony was based on engineering expertise, 
having regard to mechanics and dynamics. 
Pacheco's testimony relates to these subjects and 
his knowledge distinguishes him from the ordinary 
person. Downes v. Volkswagen of American, Inc., 
41 F.3d 1132, 1143 (7th Cir.1994); Stevenson, 6 
F.3d at 1267. Defendants have failed to explain 
why Pacheco is not an expert for the purposes of 
the proffered testimony. 
FN8. Exhibit E to Def. Stm. 
FN9. Wier presents the testimony of Hain 
regarding the nature and extent of Wier's 
injuries. See Exhibit H to Plf. Mem. 
When the testimony of experts conflicts, it is the 
exclusive province of the jury to determine the 
weight to be given to the opinion of each expert, 
based on an assessment of their respective credibil-
ity. United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 142 (2d 
Cir.1988); Perfection Spring & Stamping Corp. v. 
Exacio Spring Corp., I998.WL 142424 *5 (N.D.Ill. 
March 26, 1998); Van Houten-Maynard v. ANR 
Pipeline Co., 870 F.Supp. 206, 209 (N.D.Ill. 1994). 
For the purposes of this motion, it is sufficient to 
note that Wier has produced an expert willing and 
able to testify as to proximate cause. In the view of 
that expert, the lack of rearseat headrests in the 
minivan in which Wier was traveling contributed to 
the injuries he sustained. Thus, whether the lack of 
a headrest on Wier's seat proximately caused his in-
juries remains a material issue in this case. Accord-
ingly, Soo Line's motion for summary judgment 
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will be denied with respect to the issue of proxim-
ate cause. 
*6 Mile Post moves for summary judgment on the 
same grounds as Soo Line. The parties implicitly 
agree that Wier's Count II negligence claim is gov-
erned by Illinois law. It is undisputed that, at all rel-
evant times, Mile Post was a common carrier of 
passengers for hire. Mile Post contends that it was 
under no duty at common law to provide a minivan 
equipped with rearseat headrests. Additionally, it 
argues that the lack of a headrest was not the prox-
imate cause of Wier's injuries. It fails to cite any 
legal precedent in support of either of these propos-
itions. 
The elements of a common law action for negli-
gence are (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; 
and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately result-
ing from that breach. Mieher v. Brown, 54 IH.2d 
539, 301 N.E.2d 307, 308 (1973). In Illinois, a 
common carrier must exercise the highest degree of 
care for the safety of its passengers consistent with 
the practical operation of its conveyances. Katamqy 
v. Chicago Transit Authority, 53 I!!.2d 27, 289 
N.E,2d 623, 625 (1972); Rotheli v. Chicago Transit 
Authority, 7 I11.2d 172, 130 N.E.2d 172, 175 
(1955). Specifically, a carrier must take all reason-
able action to avoid foreseeable accidents and con-
sequential injuries to passengers. Wasserman v. 
City of Chicago, 190 lll.App.3d 1064, 138 Ill.Dec. 
319, 547 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1st Dist.1989), appeal 
denied, 129 IH.2d 573, 140 Ill.Dec. 681, 550 N.E.2d 
566 (1990); Gordon v. Chicago Transit Authority, 
128 Ill.App.3d 493, 83 Ill.Dec. 743, 470 N.E.2d 
1163,1169 (1st Dist.1984). 
Mile Post asserts that, while rearseat headrests may 
be desirable, common carriers are not obliged to 
use them. But reading the record in the light most 
favorable to Wier, a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that by transporting Wier in a vehicle that 
lacked rearseat headrests, Mile Post was not exer-
cising the highest degree of care consistent with its 
practical operations to guarantee his safety. This 
genuine issue of material fact is sufficient to defeat 
Mile Post's claim for summary judgment with re-
spect to Mile Post's duty of care. 
On the issue of proximate cause, the standard of 
proof required of Wier with respect to his claim 
against Mile Post is higher than that pertaining to 
his FELA claim against Sao Line. Wier must show 
that, but for Mile Post's failure to provide seats 
equipped with headrests, he would probably not 
have been injured. Smith v. Chicago Limousine Ser-
vice, Inc., 109 lll.App.3d 755, 65 IlKDec. 289, 441 
N.E.2d 81, 85 (1st Dist.1982) (quoting Kind v. 
Hycel, Inc., 56 Ill.App.3d 772, 14 Ill.Dec. 374, 372 
N.E.2d 385, 396 (1st Dist.1977)). In this regard, for 
the reasons stated above, Wier has produced suffi-
cient evidence to survive Mile Post's motion for 
summary judgment. The proximate causal relation-
ship between Mile Post's selection of a vehicle 
without rearseat headrests and Wier's subsequent 
injuiies is an issue of material fact in this case. Ac-
cordingly, summary judgment in favor of Mile Post 
will be denied with respect to the issue of proxim-
ate cause. 
*7 Finally, Mile Post does not expressly address 
Linda Wier's Count IV loss of consortium claim in 
its motion for summary judgment. To the extent 
that the motion may be construed as implicity seek-
ing summary judgment with respect to Count IV, 
the motion is denied for the reasons stated above. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' 
motion for summary judgment [31] is denied. In 
open court on September 15, 1998 at 9:15 a.m., the 
parties shall file an original and one copy of a top-
bound, final pretrial order in full compliance with 
Local Rule 5.00. 
N.D.IH.,1998. 
Wier v. Soo Line R. Co. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 1998 WL 474098 
(N.D.I11.) 
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) PROPOSED ORDER 
> Civil No. 060909436 
1 Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton 
The matter of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Application of 
FELA Liability to Van Transportation having come before the Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton, 
JUN 0 7 2007 
SAU LAKE COUNTY 
By s&_ Deputy Ctefk 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That said Motion is GRANTED in the following respects. 
2. That for purposes of this case, Defendant Brown's Crew Car of Wyoming, Inc. is 
deemed to be an agent of Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company in connection with 
« 
transportation of Plaintiff. 
3. That at the time of the accident at issue, Defendant Brown's Crew Car of 
Wyoming, Inc. was performing an operational activity of Defendant Union Pacific Railroad 
Company in transporting Plaintiff John Archer. 
4. That said motion is DENIED in connection with Plaintiffs request for a finding 
that the vehicle owned and operated by Defendant Brown's Crew Car of Wyoming, Inc. was the 
constructive property of Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company. 
Dated this b day of 
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the within and foregoing PROPOSED ORDER to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Philip G. Arnold 
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777 108th Ave.. NE, Suite 2050 
Bellevue, Washington 98004 
Ralph C. Petty 
10 West Broadway Suite 800 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101 
Peter H. Christensen 
Ryan P. Atkinson 
STRONG &HANNI 
3 Triad Center Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
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RULING 29 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 22, 2008 
2 JUDGE JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: Let's take the matter of John D. Archer 
5 vs. April Gaultney and others. Case No. 060909436. Will 
6 counsel state their appearances? 
7 MR. MEWBORN: I'm James Mewborn for the defendants, 
8 Brown's (inaudible) of Wyoming, Union Pacific Railroad. 
9 MR. ATKINSON: Ryan Atkinson, Your Honor, for April 
10 Gaultney. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. And you're just sitting in 
12 right? 
13 MR. ATKINSON: Yes, I am. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. ARNOLD: Phil Arnold for plaintiff, John 
16 Archer. 
17 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. All right, Mr. 
18 Mewborn, this is your motion. 
19 I'll tell you, counsel, that I've reviewed a rather 
20 substantial number of pages in preparation so I believe that 
21 I'm pretty well up to speed and just then, Mr. Mewborn, it 
22 appears that the issues then are three, the negligence 
23 against Armadillo based on failure to install rear seat head 
24 restraints; negligence against Armadillo's driver, Casey 
25 Sorensen; and the FELA claim against Union Pacific; is that 
1 correct? 
2 MR. MEWBORN: That's correct, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: And it's true then, Mr. Arnold, that 
4 I you did conceded in your briefs the breach of third party 
5 contract and concerning the uninsured, under insured motorist 
6 and the off-track vehicle accident? 
7 MR. ARNOLD: Yes, we have, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. So that's where we are, is that 
9 right, just those three claims? 
10 MR. MEWBORN: Yes. 
11 THE COURT: Okay, so I will entertain some argument 
12 but I think I really am pretty familiar with what's going on. 
13 MR. MEWBORN: I'm glad you had a chance to look at 
14 all that paper, Your Honor. It's quite a lot I understand 
15 and I'll try to kind of get through it fairly quickly then. 
16 Basically we're moving for Summary Judgment here because the 
17 plaintiff is seeking to impose liability on all of my clients 
18 because they didn't require head restraints on all of your 
19 transport vehicles. The undisputed evidence is that we got a 
20 rear-end accident in September 2004 where the pretty simple 
21 facts, one driver, Ms. Gaultney, admittedly dozed off at the 
22 wheel and the next thing she knew she was waking up and 
23 realized that she had been in a rear-end collision, had rear-
24 ended the Armadillo van. That's undisputed, 
25 It's also undisputed that there are no complains to 
1 either defendant about the lack of rear head restraints prior 
2 to this incident and the National Highway Traffic Safety 
3 Administration does not in fact require such head restraints 
4 and one of the documents that we've submitted to Your Honor 
5 is the regulatory discussion by the NITSA from 2004 where 
6 they considered and rejected a rule requiring head restraints 
7 and they pointed out that existing head restraints were 
8 largely ineffective at protecting rearward movement of 
9 passengers. 
10 So we've got that and frankly, there's no evidence 
11 of any carrier or transport company, whether it's' railroad 
12 shuttle companies or taxi companies or airport shuttles being 
13 required to only purchase vehicles with these rear head 
44 restraints and there's nothing unique about the business that 
15 Armadillo is in and nobody is required to have those head 
16 restraints. In fact, as we know NITSA doesn't require it and 
17 essentially what the plaintiff is seeking to do in this case 
18 is to have the Court impose this requirement on my client and 
19 in effect this particular industry when the federal 
20 government has not seen fit to require manufacturers to 
21 install these head restraints. 
22 In their opposition, the plaintiff challenges just 
23 a handful of the long list of undisputed facts that we have 
24 listed in our moving papers and the points that the plaintiff 
25 does not object to or contravene is that neither Archer nor 
1 Gaultney have knowledge of anything that Sorensen did, that 
2 our driver that caused or contributed to the accident, that 
3 at the time this 2001 van was manufactured, NITSA did not 
4 require installation of rear head restraints and that in 
5 March of 2005 NITSA considered and rejected a proposed change 
6 to the requirement of rear head resti^aints dr the lack of a 
7 requirement of rear head restraints and NITSA found that the 
8 use of properly manufactured head restraints reduces the 
9 possibility of neck injuries in rear-end collisions but 
10 doesn't eliminate or prevent all such injuries. 
11 Plaintiff doesn't dispute that prior to the 
12 accident neither Union Pacific nor Armadillo had received any 
13 complaints or concerns about the absence of head restraints, 
44 They don't dispute that there's a variety of these type of 
15 devices out there, some of which are better than others. 
16 Although there is an adjustable head restraint available as 
17 an option for this particular 2001 van. Neither plaintiffs 
18 expert nor our expert, mechanical experts were able to locate 
19 such a van within 100 mile radius of Salt Lake City and also, 
20 the effectiveness of the head restraint system can be 
21 affected by the position of the person sitting in the van. 
22 The real issue here, Your Honor, is whether there's 
23 a duty on the part of Armadillo to provide vans, 
24 transportation with rear head restraints and'the fact is -
25 and that's a legal issue, of course, it's not a matter to be 
1 determined by experts, it's one for the Court and under -
2 well, foresee ability would be one of the iSsues that would 
3 go into whether there's a duty and again, there's no 
4 particular, there is no evidence of foresee ability that the 
5 head- restraint would have done anything. In fact the 
6 evidence accumulated by the federal agency is that these head 
7 restraints are really kind of hit or miss proposition, 
8 We've touched on the issue also of conflict 
9 prevention as a kind of an interesting, I thought kind of an 
10 interesting argument that's applicable to this case. It 
11 hasn't been, as far as I can tell, hasn't b<3en applied in 
12 this particular case, the U.S. Supreme Court case, the Guyer 
13 vs. American Honda Company case dealt with a suit, against the 
-14 manufacturer for not having air bags and the Court rejected a 
15 requirement, rejected enforcing the plaintiff's request to 
16 find liability on the part of the manufacturer and the same 
17 rationale really applies here that where you're got NITSA 
18 never requiring the head restraints on rear seats and that 
19 basically you have a consumer here that is being, the 
20 plaintiff is asking to impose a rule on consumer when the 
21 manufacturer itself has no such obligation to install head 
22 restraints. 
23 THE COURT: And your argument to apply this 
24 conflict preemption is that a state court is equivalent to 
25 state regulation? 
1 MR. MEWBORN: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: And that's what plaintiff took issue 
3 with? 
4 I MR. MEWBORN: Yes, that's my -
5 THE COURT: And you're just saying that the state 
6 court action really is the equivalent of applying state law 
7 whether it's through the courts in adjudicating or the 
8 legislature by passing statute? 
9 MR. MEWBORN: Yes, whether it's statute or 
10 regulation or court decision. 
11 And again, there is no evidence, they've 
12 acknowledged as much by not contesting the fact that there's 
13 no evidence that Mr. Sorensen, the driver, did anything wrong 
-14 and Ms. Gaultney couldn't point to anything, Mr. Archer in 
15 his deposition couldn't point to anything. There's just 
16 nothing to support that. 
17 The plaintiff in opposition to our motion has 
18 submitted a number of affidavits from Mr. Archer -himself and 
19 from a couple of doctors and from Mr. France, the plaintiff's 
20 expert and as Your Honor knows from our reply brief, you 
21 know, we're taking the position that they can't have reports 
22 and deposition testimony saying one thing and then come up on 
23 a summary judgment motion and say just conclusory statements 
24 that yes a head restraint would have made a difference. In 
25 the case of the two doctors, they've already disqualified 
1 themselves in their depositions saying they don't have any 
2 particular biomechanical training and they're not head 
3 restraint experts but yet they come up with very similarly 
4 worded affidavits saying, yes, it would have made a 
5 difference when the agency that performed that investigation 
6 in 2004 (inaudible) concluded otherwise, 
7 With regard to the specific head restraint system 
8 that was available as an option, our expert, Mr. Ashmead, Dr. 
9 Ashmead, has opined that he doesn't think that head restraint 
10 would have made any difference and Dr. France, plaintiff's 
11 expert, from his deposition testimony, he went to a dealer to 
12 see what was available. The dealer was actually surprised 
13 that there was a head restraint available as an option. Dr. 
JL4 France has not done any particular study or testing of that 
15 particular head restraint system, to determine even if it 
16 were installed it would have been one of the more effective 
17 head restraint systems. 
18 Basically, Your Honor, the plaintiff has a case 
19 where the driver itself, himself, didn't do anything wrong 
20 and plaintiff is looking for a theory to hang some liability 
21 on Armadillo and the U.P. Railroad and the evidence just 
22 isn't there either that a head restraint would have made a 
23 difference, there's no causation. It's asking the jury to 
24 speculate about a number of factors as to had there been head 
25 restraint, they have to speculate would it have been 
1 effective and that Mr. Archer would have been sitting in a 
2 fashion that it would have made it effective and all of that 
3 is speculation. Basically that's it, Your Honor, unless you 
4 have any questions. 
5 THE COURT: So essentially what you're saying is 
6 that the duty is not owed based - essentially you argued that 
7 foresee ability is really the critical issue here, that there 
8 is no duty since Dyer didn't impose a duty on a manufacturer, 
9 essentially bootstrapping it to a consumer, can't be done 
10 either. But if I were to find a duty, the causation is 
11 lacking also. 
12 MR. MEWBORN: That's right. The plaintiffs claim 
13 fails on multiple levels, Your Honor, 
JL4 THE COURT: Okay. No, I think that's all I - I 
15 don't have any further questions at the moment. 
16 Mr. Arnold? 
17 MR. ARNOLD: Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: And also, I know I focused on Mr. 
19 Mewborn but I've also reviewed of course your response and 
20 attachments as well. 
21 MR. ARNOLD: Thank you, Your Honor. This case is a 
22 rear-end motor vehicle accident. John Archer went to work, 
23 the van that he was injured in was his workplace. He didn't 
24 have any prior neck or shoulder complaints or symptoms or 
25 history. 
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1 I'll address first the issue of the Federal Motor 
2 Vehicle Safety Standards which obviously apply only to 
3 manufacturers. They don't apply to consumers or other users. 
4 In this case we're not simply alleging that the defendant 
5 should have retrofitted the van that Mr. Archer was a 
6 passenger in, they had a choice. They could have used the 
7 200 vehicles that they did have, one-third of the fleet of 
8 Armadillo had rear seat head restraints. They could have 
9 used those vehicles if they wanted to. If they didn't want 
10 to use one of those 200 vehicles then they could have 
11 retrofitted the van. There's no prohibition against that. 
12 This is in part a Federal Employer's Liability Act 
13 case. The standard for negligence and for causation is 
-14 different than the state standard for negligence for a common 
15 carrier. FELA causation is based upon proving in whole or in 
16 part, even the slightest part of causation. It's a remedial 
17 statute and part of the remedy as has been articulated by the 
18 Supreme Court is a jury trial. More cases in the FELA avenue 
19 go to trial than in normal negligence cases. I say that but 
20 I think we have a very strong case here. Defendant claims a 
21 lack of foresee ability. We provided the Court a number of 
22 admissions where Union Pacific has admitted that it has a 
23 responsibility to provide a safe workplace. The van that Mr. 
24 Archer was riding in on the day of his injury was his 
25 workplace. They admit they had a responsibility to identify 
1 reasonably foreseeable hazards, They admitted that rear-end 
2 collisions were reasonable foreseeable hazards. In 1990 the 
3 Union Pacific had a safety committee with noted that there 
4 was a large number of accidents occurring when they 
5 transported their crews. The Union Pacific admits they have 
6 a responsibility to reduce the risk of any foreseeable hazard 
7 and more importantly, the Union Pacific knew before this 
8 motor vehicle accident that seat head! restraints were 
9 important safety devices and reduced the risk of neck 
10 injuries in rear-end collisions. That was the Bryzitis 
11 deposition. He was the speaking agent on behalf of the U.P. 
12 That's our Exhibit 10, Pages 12, Line 6 through 17, Pages 25, 
13 Line 12 through 24, They admit the function of a seat head 
14 rest before Mr, Archer's injury. They admit they could have 
15 required Armadillo to have a seat head restraint in the rear 
16 seat or they could have had Armadillo provide one of the 
17 vehicles that already had a seat head restraint, 
18 Armadillo takes the position that they didn't know 
19 what a seat head restraint was which is inconsistent with the 
20 common public knowledge of seat head restraints. We provided 
21 the Court in our material fact No. 35, the information that 
22 seat head restraints way before, for 30 years before Mr. 
23 Archer's injury, was a subject of congressional testimony, 
24 safety literature, medical literature. It had been put into 
25 insurance company, consumer publications and the 
10 
1 manufacturers themselves had put the purpose and use of seat 
2 head restraints in their automobile owner's manuals, 
3 Armadillo, through its speaking agent, admits that 
4 they had transported Union Pacific crews and vehicles with 
5 rear seat head restraints. They also admitted that some of 
6 the vehicles that rear seat head restraints, the rear seat 
7 head restraints were adjacent to the windows and that the 
8 center rear seat did not have a head restraint and at certain 
9 railroad locations, railroaders were restricted from using 
10 those center seats without the rear seat head restraints when 
11 transported by Armadillo. This is before Mr, Archer's 
12 injury, 
13 THE COURT: And where is that in the deposition? 
-14 MR. ARNOLD: That is in material statement of fact 
15 No. 14, 15 and 16. 
16 THE COURT: In the affidavit though, where is it in 
17 the deposition, not the affidavit, but the deposition? 
18 MR. ARNOLD: It's in Mr. Brown's deposition, 
19 Exhibit 11 and it's on Page 17. I can read that to the Court 
20 if the Court would like me to, 
21 THE COURT: I've got it here. 
22 MR. ARNOLD: Page 17, Line 14 and it states, 
23 question, this is Mr, Brown, "Well, what would prevent you 
24 from purchasing a September 26, 2001 Suburban that had five 
25 seat head rests for passengers?" 
11 
1 Answer, "No, you see you just said five* Your 
2 previous question said all passengers. I was looking at the 
3 center seat and to my knowledge there's never been a head 
4 rest for the center seat." 
5 Question, "Part of the contract between Armadillo 
6 and (inaudible) Transportation Services, Inc. operating on 
7 behalf of U.P., must provide vehicles that were no more than 
8 three years of ago; is that correct?" 
9 "Yes." 
10 And he goes on to say that given enough lead time, 
11 they could have all their fleet have rear seat head 
12 restraints. 
13 Going onto Page 10, Line 15, question, "So you're 
J.4 saying that some Armadillo vehicles purchased, the 
15 manufacturer put the head rests for cill the. passengers on the 
16 outward seats in the rear and in some vehicles they did not?" 
17 Answer, "Varying by make and model." 
18 Then on Page 7, Line 20. Answer, "And that, well, 
19 there are some railroad locations have limited it to five 
20 passengers where we did no use the center seats. It could 
21 hold seven passengers." 
22 Putting that together, what they're saying is that 
23 in those vehicles that didn't have head rests in the center 
24 seats, railroad crews were restricted from using those seats 
25 before Mr. Archer's injury. And as I have said, they had 
12 
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1 compliance with NITSA requirements and so how does that duty 
2 then go to Onion Pacific or Armadillo, Union Pacific really 
3 under FELA, to impose a greater requirement than is required 
4 by federal regulatory and imposed upon the actual 
5 manufacturer? 
6 MR. ARNOLD: This is the argument that the van 
7 should have been retrofitted because we do have the argument 
8 that there was vehicles that had rear seat head rests. 
9 THE COURT: But not retrofitted, they were 
10 different vehicles, 
11 MR. ARNOLD: They were different vehicles. 
12 THE COURT: They were Suburbans, not vans? 
13 MR. ARNOLD: They were different vehicles that 
-14 could have been used. 
15 THE COURT: Right. 
16 MR. ARNOLD: Well, it's a complicated discussion, 
17 Dr. France points out that most adults sit in the front seat. 
18 In the back seat you tend to have children and there's less 
19 injuries occurring in the back seat because of non-adult use. 
20 He says in his affidavit though is that for an adult, the 
21 risk of a whiplash type injury is the same whether you're 
22 seated in the front seat or the rear seat and so the National 
23 Highway Traffic Safety Agency is just looking at the numbers 
24 and a cost and that's when they made that decision. Now -
25 THE COURT: But did Dr. France look at this 
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s t a n d a r d s t o p r e v e n t a l l neck movement t h e n we c o u l d p r e v e n t 
1 all whiplash injuries, the sore neck that might last a day, 
2 So there's two different injuries being contemplated here, 
3 hyper extension for the spinal cord injury and the sore neck 
4 muscles for preventing all rearward neck movement. So that's 
5 a nuance and Dr. France and the neurosurgeon point out 
6 there's a hyper extension injury that occurred to Mr, Archer 
7 and the hyper extension injury is what contused his spinal 
8 cord. So yes, the standard that Mr. Archer would have been 
9 subjected to, would have prevented hyper extension but would 
10 not perhaps have prevented sore neck muscles that could have 
11 lasted a day or two or three. 
12 The duty for the railroad is different than the 
13 ordinary consumer. The duty of the railroad is to provide 
-14 Mr. Archer a reasonably safe place to work is a continuing 
15 non-delible duty. They have a duty to investigate potential 
16 hazards in the workplace and to take reasonable action to 
17 remedy those hazards. It's remedial statute. It's not as 
18 ordinary consumers such as perhaps Mr. Mewborn or I taking a 
19 friend to a movie in our vehicle. This is a duty growing 
20 from the relationship of an employer owing safety duties and 
21 responsibilities to an employee, Mr. Archer. Armadillo Van 
22 is an agent of the Union Pacific as the Court has previously 
23 ruled. So the rear seat head restraint is analogous to any 
24 other safety device and here it was an important safety 
25 device to prevent hyper extension. It was foreseeable that 
16 
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1 THE COURT: And what do they know about vehicles? 
2 MR. ARNOLD: What do they know about vehicles? I 
3 think that rear-end motor vehicle collision's are a common 
4 occurrence in our society and in the medical practice. I 
5 know, that the defense in its opening brief made that argument 
6 without citing any authority that a doctor, a medical doctor 
7 is not qualified to testify to medical causation with respect 
8 to a rear-end motor vehicle collision but that -
9 THE COURT: Certainly the doctors can speak to the 
10 cause of the injury which is a contusion, but can a doctor 
11 really speak to the presence of absence of equipment in a 
12 vehicle that might have intervened? 
13 MR. ARNOLD: Well, yes, because in this case the 
-14 issue is could hyper-extension have been prevented? And Dr. 
15 France and the NITSA say yes, you could prevent hyper-
16 extension with the standard that was then prevalent and it's 
17 the hyper-extension mechanism. Dr. Huntsman related in his 
18 affidavit as well as Dr. France, an article published in the 
19 medical journal, Spine, that talked about hyper-extension 
20 causing these types of neck, cervical cord contusions. So it 
21 was in the medical literature and that is what is relevant in 
22 this case. Now whether, you know, a head rest provides 
23 protection against all injury and how much rear displacement 
24 of the head is there with headrest A and B, no, they wouldn't 
25 know that but they do know it prevents hyper-extension 
18 
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1 Traffic Safety Agency which says manufacturers do not have to 
2 put in rear headrests in the rear seat, they can if they want 
3 and the Federal Employer's Liability Act says that you're 
4 suppose to provide a reasonably safe place to work and 
5 investigate potential hazards and reduce reasonable 
6 foreseeable risks with safety devices in essence is our 
7 argument and the seat headrest is a safety device. 
8 You have a common carrier, Armadillo, in this 
9 business that had vehicles that had rear seat head restraints 
10 and that should have known constructively, you know, based 
11 upon the public domain information that seat head restraints 
12 are there for a purpose, that the manufacturers in the 
13 owner's manual provides information why they're there and 
-14 that they just simply can't duck their head*in the sand and 
15 claim ignorance. We don't have to prove actual notice to 
16 Armadillo subjectively, we just have to say that there's 
17 enough there to take it to a jury and I think there's 
18 substantial information to take it to a jury. 
19 THE COURT: So you're not accepting, you just 
20 reject defendant's argument that the state court 
21 determination is the equivalent of state legislation statute 
22 so that the preemption applies? 
23 MR. ARNOLD: No -
24 THE COURT: You're saying simply no? 
25 MR. ARNOLD: No. I don't go that far. I think 
20 
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1 sham affidavits I think is an unfortunate one. If you look 
2 at - and I'd like to go specifically and look at the evidence 
3 and direct the Court's attention to Exhibit 7 which is the 
4 deposition of Dennis Gordon, an orthopedic surgeon, on Page 
5 45, Iiine 23, there the question is "Therefore, it's your 
6 opinion that the head restraint or the lack.of head restraint 
7 in this particular instance was a causative factor with the 
8 shoulder injury?" 
9 Answer, "Yes, I think it contributed to it, yes." 
10 Then when you go to his affidavit, Exhibit 15, 
11 Paragraph B, it's consistent. In his affidavit he says, "The 
12 absence of a seat head restraint is one of the probable 
13 medical causes of the aforementioned injuries.7' There's no 
,14 inconsistency there. 
15 We go to Dr. Huntsman and his deposition, Exhibit 5 
16 on Page 33, Line 9, the question says, "I'm looking at the 
17 bottom paragraph of page 1 of this June 6, 2007 letter. You 
18 were asked whether or not the absence of a seat or head 
19 restraint was one of the medical causes of the neck injury 
20 that you treated Mr. Archer for, correct," 
21 Answer, "Correct." 
22 Question, "What's your understanding as to what the 
23 intent of the head restraint is in an automobile?" 
24 Answer, "To prevent flexion, extension type injury 
25 by avoiding excessive extension." 
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1 "The fact that he was then involved in this motor vehicle 
2 accident in which his head and neck were not restrained, did 
3 likely cause the myopathy and likely caused a subsequent need 
4 for surgical intervention." 
5 I Likely, that's before the deposition- The 
6 depositions never asked him in the terms of medical 
7 probability. The defense counsel didn't aslj: him, well, gosh, 
8 I mean, can you rule out the possibility? No, I can't. 
9 Then Dr. Huntsman in his affidavit in Exhibit 14 
10 consistently states in Paragraph 5(b) "It is medically 
11 probable that Mr. Archer would not have suffered these 
12 injuries from a rear-end collision if he had a seat head 
13 restraint at the time of the collision." 
-14 Those are all consistent. Those aren't sham 
15 affidavits, those aren't a neurosurgeon who is impeaching 
16 himself and testifying falsely or an orthopedic surgeon who 
17 is impeaching himself or testifying falsely. They're 
18 consistent with their pre-deposition statements, they're 
19 consistent with the questions that were asked at the 
20 deposition and consistent with the affidavit. 
21 Your Honor, this case really is about the absence 
22 of a simple safety device, a seat head restraint to prevent 
23 hyper-extension of the neck posing factual questions for the 
24 jury with respect to the Union Pacific and the common carrier 
25 Armadillo. 
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1 kind of stepping back and listening to it is that a motor 
2 vehicle manufacturer who has the expertise and employees, 
3 auto design engineers, you know, government regulations 
4 specialists, probably bioraechanical engineers, they do these 
5 testing, crash testing, while they don't have an obligation 
6 under federal regulations to provide rear head restraints in 
7 vehicles of this type, a consumer company like Armadillo who 
8 has none of those resources available or on board, has a 
9 higher duty than does a Chevrolet or a General Motors and I 
10 mean, it strikes me that to require a company like Armadillo 
11 or a company like an airport shuttle service which basically 
12 uses the same kind of vehicles, basically you're saying, the 
13 plaintiff is saying that they need to have orthopedic 
-14 surgeons and head restraint experts and motor vehicle design 
15 engineers in order to make vehicle design decisions about 
.16 what features to add on and whether the particular feature is 
17 appropriate• You know, it's not enough just to say, okay, 
18 General Motors has an optional head restraining that not even 
19 a dealer was aware of until he looked it up at Dr. France's 
20 request, but you know, we've also got to make a 
21 determination, you know, that just because GM provides it, 
22 that's not good enough, we've got to look at it and make sure 
23 it's an adequate whiplash control device which strikes me as 
24 really, really backwards and it kind of ties into the 
25 preemption argument. 
-26 
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1 where the company would tell passengers not to ride in the 
2 middle seat. I don't think that it specifically dealt, his 
3 testimony dealt with anything to do with the existence or 
4 non-existence of a head restraint. I mean, there's certainly 
5 other possibilities for that, explanations for that such as 
6 not, you know, trying not to block the rear view of the 
7 driver or perhaps lack of a shoulder harness in some of those 
8 seat positions. 
9 With respect to the doctor's opinions, I mean, 
10 orthopedic doctors certainly have lots of expertise but at 
11 least the particular doctors that we're dealing with in this 
12 case have indicated that they aren't experts in head 
13 restraints. There's no evidence that they've made any 
.14 particular study of head restraints or this particular 
15 vehicle and head restraint system in particular. The only 
16 evidence with respect to this particular head restraint is 
17 that of Dr. Ashby, our expert who says it doesn't think it 
18 would have made any difference. There's nothing to 
19 contradict that, Your Honor, and I guess for all those 
20 reasons as for the reasons set forth in our filings, that's 
21 why we're looking for summary judgment. 
22 THE COURT: What about really, that gets down to 
23 the last arguments really we've been talking about, what a 
24 jury might consider and that's not where summary judgment is. 
25 What I need to determine is again, those tort elements, the 
28 
1 duty, foresee ability -
2 MR, MEWBORN: And again, like I think the evidence 
3 is uncontradicted, there is no - the evidence is that there's 
4 nobody at Brown's (inaudible) Car or the (inaudible) that had 
5 any particular specialized knowledge about head restraints 
6 more than, you know, a person walking down the street that 
7 you had some general sense that, yeah, head restraints are a 
8 good idea but there's nothing beyond that and there's nothing 
9 to show that this particular head restraint system available 
10 on this vehicle would have made any difference and, you know, 
11 the government agency charged with examining such things, 
12 NITSA, has not required head restraints and if they can't 
13 find the justification to do it, it's hard to see how 
-14 imposing in litigation that duty on a private company makes 
15 any sense. 
16 THE COURT: All right, thanks. Okay, 
17 MR. MEWBORN: Okay, thank you. 
18 THE COURT: Starting with the issue of disputed 
19 facts. There were four facts designated in plaintiff's 
20 response that were disputed, 3, 23, 26 and 32, No. 3 really 
21 simply wasn't a dispute; No. 23, I find not to be material; 
22 No. 26 I find is cited really out of context; and No. 32 
23 regarding the doctor's opinions of causation. First, I am 
24 agreeing with counsel for the defendant with regard to the 
25 affidavits submitted with plaintiff's response. I'm not 
29 
1 going to consider them. I don't believe that area of 
2 expertise is part of an M.D. So I have not considered those 
3 affidavits and accordingly, I find that there is no genuine 
4 issue of material fact in this case. Moreover, I'm persuaded 
5 in all areas by defendant's position and I find that the 
6 defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. So I'm 
7 granting the Motion for Summary Judgment in each instance. 
8 Mr. Mewborn, if you will prepare then an order 
9 consistent with my ruling. 
10 MR. MEWBORN: Yes Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: All right, thanks. Thank you for the 
12 arguments, 
13 MR. MEWBORN: Thank you. 
,14 THE COURT: Thanks for coming to sunny Utah, 
15 I (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
16 
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ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS UNION PACIFIC 
EtAlLROAD COMPANY AND BROWN'S CREW 
CAR OF WYOMING, INC. 
By_ 
Third Judicial District 
DEC J ! m 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN D.ARCHER, 
Plaintiff 
APRIL GAULTNBY, an individual; 
BROWN'S CREW CAR OF WYOMING, INC. 
d/b/a ARMADILLO EXPRESS, a Wyoming 
Corporation; and UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Delawaie corporation, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 060909436 
Honoiable Judith S. H. Atherton 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING 
miWNVAmS BROWN'S CREW 
CAR OF WYOMING, INC., d/b/a 
ARMADILLO EXPRESS'S AND 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on Defendants Brown's Crew Car of 
Wyoming, Inc., d/b/a Armadillo Express's and Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on September 22,2008. Attorney Philip G. Arnold appeared on behalf of the 
Plaintiff John D. Archer. Attorney James R Mewborn appeared on behalf of the Defendants 
Brown's Crew Car of Wyoming, Lie, d/b/a Armadillo Express ("Armadillo") and Union Pacific 
Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"). AttomeyRyan Atkinson appeared on behalf of the Defendant 
Apiil Gaultney, 
The Court having read the memoranda filed with respect to the Motion and having heard oral 
argument and being ftill advised in the premises, hereby GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment based upon the following grounds: 
1. Neither Armadillo nor Union Pacific owed Plaintiff a duty to provide transportation 
equipped with rear seat head restraints. 
2. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration does not impose a duty on 
vehicle manufacturers to install rear seat head restraints and specifically consideied 
and rejected imposing such a duty upon manufactuters. Imposing such a duty upon 
consumers such as Armadillo or Union Pacific would be inconsistent with the 
NHTSA manufacturing requirements, particularly in light fof the absence of 
specialized knowledge of head lestraints on the part of defendants in this case 
Plaintiffs claims against Armadillo and Union Pacific based upon failure of 
2 
Armadillo and Union Pacific to provide transportation with leai seat head restraints 
are therefore barred by the doctrine of conflict preemption, 
3, Even if Armadillo and/or Union Pacific owed Plaintiff a duty, and Plaintiffs claims 
were not barred by the doctrine of conflict preemption, PlaintifFis unable to prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff would not have suffered his injuries if 
there had been rear seat head restraints installed in the subject van. Indeed, Plaintiffs 
experts are unable to offer any opinions as to whether the existence of a rear seat 
head restraint would have prevented the Plaintiffs injuries. 
4. There are no disputed material facts demonstrating any negligence on behalf of 
Armadillo's driver, Casey Sorensen. 
Based upon the foregoing, Counts II and IV of the Amended Complaint against Defendants 
are dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. Plaintiff has conceded Defendants' aiguments on 
summary judgment pertaining to Counts V and VI of the Amended Complaint, and those claims are 
therefore dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
The Court hereby ORDERS that all of the Plaintiff s claims against the Defendants Brown's 
Crew Car of Wyoming, Inc., d/b/a Armadillo Express and Union Pacific Railroad Company aie 
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits. 
Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court expressly determines 
that there is no just reason for delay and expressly directs entry of final judgment in favor of Brown's 
Crew Car of Wyoming, Inc., d/b/a Annadillo Express, and the Union Pacific Railroad Company. 
DATED this- 16 • day of " k ^ 7 , , 2008 
BY THE 
^Tlird 
VHonorabli 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I heieby certify that on this 13th day of November, 2008,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing {PROPOSED] AMENDED ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS 
BROWN'S CREW CAR OF WYOMING, INC., d/b/a ARMADILLO EXPRESS'S AND 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Philip G. Arnold, Esq. 
James K. Vucinovich, Esq. 
Bahareh Samanian, Esq. 
Rossi, Cox, Vucinovich, P.C. 
10900 NE 8th Street, Suite 1122 
Bellevue, WA 95004-4456 
Ralph CVPetty, Esq. 
10 West Broadway 
Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Peter H. Chiistensen, Esq. 
Ryan P. Atkinson, Bsq. 
Strong & Hanni 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
^C§^a-*-^6»_ 
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Tab 11 
Traumatic Myelopathy in 
Patients With Cervical 
Spinal Stenosis Without 
Fracture or Dislocation 
Methods of Diagnosis, 
Management, and Prognosis 
NANCY EPSTEIN, MD,* JOSEPH A. EPSTEIN, MD.t 
VALLO BENJAMIN, MD,* and 
JOSEPH RANSOHOFF, MD* 
The NewYork University Spinal Cord Trauma Center recently completed 
an evaluation of 200 patients seen over a period of four years, from 
1974 to 1978. A unique group of 23 patients with cervical spinal ste-
nosis and myelopathy without fracture or dislocation was isolated. The 
presence of a narrow canal significantly Influenced morbidity and progno-
sis. Based on a review of plain roentgenograms and myelograms, there 
were seven patients with an average age of 41 who had absolute low lev-
els of narrowing of the spinal canal without evidence of degenerative 
changes. The remaining 16 patients, averaging 61 years of age, h^d su-
perimposed spondylosis. In both groups, patients with the lowest antero-
posterior diameters of the spinal canal had the most severe myelopathy 
after trauma. Patients with absolute stenosis were more susceptible to 
traumatic myelopathy than were those with relative stenosis. Varying the 
dose of steroids to maximal levels had no effect on prognosis. Patients 
showing improvement during the intitial 48 hours had the greatest degree 
of eventual recovery. [Key words: Traumatic myelopathy, cervical spinal 
steonosis, surgery] 
HE NEW YORK University Spinal Cord 
Trauma Center recently completed an evalu-
ation of 200 patients seen over a period of 
four years, from 1974 to 1978. A unique 
£ From the New York University Medical Center, Department of 
Neurosurgery, 550 First Avenue, New York, New Yorlc,# and the 
[ong Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Center, Long Island, New 
iork.t 
f This work was partially supported by NINCDS Grant Number NS 
I0164-O651 NSPA. 
[Submitted for publication April 20, 1979. 
Fine authors express their appreciation to Mrs. Juliette Newman, 
pwrdinator of the Spina! Cord Injury Center, and to Ms. Sherry 
[?ynn Grimm for her dedicated efforts in editing and preparing the 
|*fttt$cript. 
P&-2436/80/U24-O489S0100 
v 1980 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 
group of 23 patients with cervical spinal stenosis and 
myelopathy without fracture or dislocation was isolated. 
These patients had unusual clinical findings, which had 
a specific impact on methods of treatment, morbidity, 
and prognosis. 
All patients arriving at the Center were assessed on 
the basis of a complete neurologic evaluation followed 
by roentgenographic examination of the spine to iden-
tify and to document the presence of fracture and sub-
luxation. Patients were thei> randomly assigned to dif-
fering steroid dose schedules currently being evaluated. 
For patients with cervical trauma, myelography was 
performed within the first 48 hours by means of a Cl-2 
puncture after institution of tong traction to reduce dis-
I 
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locations and to maintain vertebral alignment. Studies 
of spinal evoked sensory potential were carried out for 
the majority of patients. 
In the comprehensive management of all 200 cases, 
myelography evidence of external compression upon 
the spinal cord in patients with partial or complete cord 
lesions justified operative decompression. However, in 
the 23 patients with asymptomatic cervical spinal ste-
nosis prior to injury who did not have fracture or dis-
location, myelography evidence of complete block was 
infrequent (Table 1), and new criteria regarding treat-
ment had to be developed. These 23 patients were ran-
domly assigned to receive differing doses of steroids, 
depending on the current protocols. Surgical decom-
pression was utilized only for patients whose conditions 
deteriorated clinically. 
For such patients, if the myelogram showed relevant 
ventral defects, an anterior diskectomy and fusion were 
performed. If the defects were posterior, laminectomy 
was done with duroplasty and fusion. Myelotomy was 
considered on a randomized basis only if significant 
cord swelling was present below C5 in the presence of 
myelopathy. 
The neurologic status of each patient was evaluated 
periodically throughout the period of hospitalization. 
Motor power was quantitated m the following manner: 
0 to 5 points were assigned for each extremity, with 0 
representing total absence of function and 5 represent-
ing normal strength. The sum of the points for the four 
extremities rendered a possible maximum of 20/20 
points. The four-extremity totals for the entire group 
were then added up. This sum was divided by the num-
ber of patients in the various groups, to provide an aver-
age figure for the motor ability of each patient in a par-
ticular category (Tables 2 and 3). The sensory 
examination was conducted according to customary 
charting patterns. The selected steroid dose was contin-
ued for each patient for a ten-day period and then dis-
continued. These schedules were changed as data dur-
ing the current study was evaluated. The regimens used 
were as follows: The first 104 patients were randomly 
assigned to treatment with steroids with or without 
Amicar.* Fifty-one cases were treated with Solu-
Medrol,"!" iv, or Medrol,* po, given in dosages of 20 to 40 
mg every six hours. Amicar was used in a dose of 1-2 g 
hour for 63 patients. The last 86 patients were given ei-
ther high doses* or low doses* of steroids. Treatment of 
the 23 patients with cervical spinal stenosis and myelop-
* 6-Anrinocaproic acid, Lederte Laboratories, Pearl River, New 
York. 
t Methylprednisolotie sodium succinate, The Upjohn Company, 
Kalamazoo, Michigan. 
f Mcthylprcdaisolonc tablets, The Upjohn Company, Kalamazoo, 
Michigan. 
* High dose: 1 g Solu-Medrol iv daily. 
f Low dose: 160 mg Solu-Medrol iv daily. 
Table 1. Myelography Data for Patients with Absolute and 
Relative Narrowing of the Spinal Canal 
Total 
numbtv 
No Partial Total of 
Group block block block pal/ems 
Absolute narrowing of 5 t 1 y 
the canal 
Relative narrowing of the 6 7 3 16 
canal with spondylosis 
Total number of patients 11 8 4 23 
athy without fracture or dislocation was evenly distrib-
uted among variable dosage schedules. 
CASE MATERIAL 
On the basis of the findings of the plain roentgeno-
graphic studies of the spine, there were 7 patients witfc 
evidence of absolute stenosis showing low levels of nar-
rowing of the spinal canal without evidence of degener* 
ative arthropathy. The remaining 16 patients had rela-
tive stenosis with narrowing of the spinal canal and 
superimposed developmental changes associated with 
spondylosis (Figure 1). The anatomic alteratic-ns were 
similar to those described by Verbiest18 who distin-
guished between patients with relative and patients with 
absolute stenosis of the lumbar spinal canal and for 
whom absolute stenosis implied a ventrodorsal diameter 
of 10 mm ox less, while relative stenosis implied a canal 
of greater depth. In the absolute group, small intrusions 
normally not producing symptoms became clinically 
significant. In our patients, remarkably similar measure-
ments of the cervical spinal canal conformed to the 
range of normal and abnormal already reported for the 
lumbar region. A diameter of less than 10 mm was con-
sidered to be indicative of absolute narrowing. Mea-
surements less than 13 mm were placed in the category 
of relative stenosis, the anteroposterior diameter of the 
canal being measured from the most prominent verte-
bral osteophytes to the posterior laminar line. The con-
siderable variation in landmarks of the spondylotic 
spine made interpretation of the measurements vulner-
able to effects of changes in projection and posture. 
Myelographic evidence of abnormal widening of the 
spinal cord to 2.5 cm was related to pathologic swelling 
Table 2. Results of Motor Examination of Patients with Partial or 
Complete Deficits According to the Type of Canal Narrowing^ 
Group 
Patients with absolute narrowing 
of the canal (7) 
Patients with relative narrowing 
of the canal (16) 
Total group 
At 
admission 
4.9 
8.3 
7.2 
At 3 
days 
4.0 
8.5 
6.0 
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Table 3. Results of Motor Examination of 16 Surgically and 
Nonsurglcally-Trealed Patients with Partial Neurologic Deficits 
Group 
At At 3 
admission days 
At6 
weeks 
patients with narrow canals 
Surgically treated (5) » 8.0 8.2 10.2 
Nonsurgical treated (11) 10.7 10.5 13.9 
Total group (16) 8.8 9.5 11.7 
caused by trauma, including intramedullary hemor-
rhage and edema (Figures 2 and 3). Clinically, evidence 
of myelopathy was most severe for patients with abso-
lute congenitally narrow canals, as compared with those 
with relatively narrow canals with superimposed devel-
opmental changes. 
The majority of patients were injured in falls (Table 
4). The estimated neurologic levels of injury were: four 
at C3-4, nine at C4-5, nine at C5-6, and one at C6-1 
(Xable 5). Myelographic data for the 23 patients showed 
that only four (17%) of the 23 patients had a complete 
block. Eleven (48%) had no block, and eight (35%) had 
a partial block (Table 1). In addition, myelographic evi-
dence of swelling of the cord was seen for 15 (65%) 
cases, 10 of which had relatively narrow canals with 
spondylosis. No finding suggestive of an anteriorly situ-
ated disc was encountered. Plain films and myelograms 
at C3-4, C4-5, and C5-6 of the 16 patients with relative 
narrowing of the canal and spondylosis demonstrated 
numerous levels of ridging. The maximal cord swelling 
that occurred at or below the highest level of radio-
graphic change was possibly related to greater mobility 
of the vertebral segments above the area of spondylosis. 
The greatest neurologic deficit was seen for the seven 
patients in the group with absolute narrowing. At ad-
mission three (42%) had evidence of partial cord lesions, 
and four—complete. Of the 16 patients in the group 
with relative narrowing of the canal and spondylosis, 12 
(72%) had partial cord lesions, and four—complete. 
In both groups, patients who improved neurologically 
within 48 hours of admission showed the greatest degree 
of eventual recovery. Rapid, intermediate, and no im-
provement were defined in tenns of the degree of motor 
or sensory recovery that occurred within 48 hours of in-
jury. Of the 23 patients, eight showed rapid improve-
ment, seven showed intermediate improvement, and 
eight with total lesions at admission were unchanged 
(Tables 2 and 6). 
The neurologic parameters included an evaluation of 
long tract signs, plantar responses, deep tendon reflexes, 
and evidence of fiaccidity and spasticity, as well as signs 
of bowel and bladder dysfunction. At six weeks, in the 
combined groups, long tract signs with spastic paralysis 
were found in 10/23 instances. Nine patients showed 
evidence of flaccid paralysis, and the remaining patients 
had unilateral spasticity. With regard to bowel and 
bladder function, 19/23 (78.2%) were incontinent at ad-
mission, and the number had declined to 17/23 (60%) 
by six weeks. 
Of the five deaths, only one occurred in the group of 
five surgically treated patients. 
The operations performed were three anterior Clo-
ward fusions at one or two interspaces and two laminec-
tomies from C2-7 (Table 7). Of the five patients under-
going surgery, all had significant neurologic defects. 
SP9NDYLOCHONDRQSIS OF THE CERVICAL SPINE 
NPRflAl, n (h RAWS 
Fig 1 . Variations of the splnat canals of 100 cer-
vical spines studied by Arnold.1. In A, the ventro-
dorsal diameter of the spinal cord at the maxi-
mum cervical enlargement averages 0.8 cm. The 
average canal measures 1.4 cm In the same di-
ameter. The total normal and abnormal ranges 
are illustrated \n the remaining drawings. The hor-
izontal lines illustrate the relations between the 
posterior, supenor border of the articular facets 
and the leading inferior surface of the lamina and 
base of the spinous process. In the presence of a 
narrow canal, the laminar arch is frequently shah 
'low, and the incised line will pass through the 
posterior tips of the facets and the base of the la 
rmna. The lateral view (see Figure 2A) illustrates 
.tins finding and ts helpful in establishing the pres-
ence of stenosis Variations in the height of the 
Pedicle are also reflected by changes in the dor-
soventral diameter of the spinal canal. 
W?30 
SP?Ng « VOLUME S « NUMBER 6 • NO\ R/06CEM8ER 1980 
492 TRAUMATIC MYELOPATHY • EPbic lNETAL 
Ftg 2. Roentgenograph^ studies of a 63-yeaf. 
old man who sustained a hyperextension injurC 
to the spina! cord when he fell from a ladder 
He showed evidence of severe central cord Injury 
and a C4 -5 neurologic level of involvement 
Only^minimal leg movements and positional 
sense were retained. The presence of posterior 
column function was confirmed by somatosen-
sory evoked cortical potentials. Plain cervical 
spinal films (A) show spondytotic changes at C4 
C5, and C6, with minimal posterior osteo-
phytes. However, the posterior margins of the 
facets closely approximate the base of the spj. 
nous process and lamina at all levels (arrow), 
suggesting an underlying stenosis. In the myelo^  
gram (B), the spinal cord is widened at the C4~ 
5 level (arrows) to a diameter of 2.5 cm. The 
ventrodorsal diameter of the spinal canal in A 
averages 1.3 cm. After anterior cervical de-
compression and fusion at C4 -5 , there was no 
change in the patient's cMcal status. At hlbw-
up five days after surgery, evoked potentials 
showed some increase in amplitude. The pa* 
tient subsequently died of sepsis and renal fail-
ure. 
Four had partial cord injuries, and one had completed 
cord injury. Postoperatively, one patient died of renal 
failure and sepsis. Neurologicaily, two improved and 
two remained unchanged (Figures 2 and 3). 
DISCUSSION 
The value of surgical decompression and fusion in 
aiding recovery remains conjectural. For patients with 
presumed instability, early rehabilitation is facilitated 
by fusion. While the information derived from a study 
of this small number of patients has no statistical value, 
the improvement in the neurologic status of two of the 
five patients operated upon cannot be disregarded. The 
spontaneous improvement in the conditions of the pa-
tients not operated upon reflects the importance of cau-
tious delay to permit vital signs to stabilize and to allow 
the effects of corticosteroids to become apparent. The 
use of a firm, molded cervical support and tong traction 
is mandatory until evidence of stability has been con-
firmed and while the effects of medical management are 
being assessed. As Table 3 indicates, for this small 
group, there was no significant difference between the 
neurologic recovery of patients not operated upon and 
that of patients treated with a decompressive procedure 
by either approach. 
No particular steroid schedule was superior to any of 
the others in so far as the degree of recovery was con-
cerned. Variations in the time interval between injury, 
admission, and institution of steroid treatment made no 
difference. 
Throughout all phases of recovery, patients with rela-
tive narrowing of the canal and spondylosis had greater 
improvement in neurologic status, with twice the quan-
t i sed motor ability of patients with absolute stenosis. 
Patients with the lowest anteroposterior diameter of 
the canal suffered the greatest degree of trauma to the 
spinal cord because of the absence of available space. 
Since hyperextension results in maximal narrowing of 
the spinal canal, all margins of safety are abruptly de-
pleted with consequent crushing of the cord. 
The spinal columns in older patients with spondylosis 
and relative narrowing are less mobile than those of 
younger patients. The less mobile column would be 
more resistant to hyperextension and olisthesis, factors 
which contribute to further narrowing of the anteropos-
terior diameter of the spinal canal. Such individuals re-
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Fig 3. Roentgenographs studies of a 79-
year-old woman who sustained an acute hy-
perextension Injury with severe central cord 
trauma. The patient had no hand function, 
minimal bilateral leg movements, and pres-
ervation of positional sense. A. In the lateral 
exposure, degenerative changes are mini-
mat. However, the anteroposterior diameter 
of the spinal canal in the mid- and lower cer-
vical area averages only 1.3 cm. Notice that 
the base of the spinous process as it joins 
the leading margin of the lamina is In close 
approximation to the projections of the artic-
ular facets. B. In the myelogram, the spinal 
cord is slightly widened to 2 cm in the lower 
and midcervlcal areas. The lateral gutters 
remain patent. The patient was not treated 
surgically and showed no improvement in 
condition. 
main unusually susceptible to cord injury because of 
various intrusions into the spinal canal caused by in-
folded yellow ligaments and hypcrtrophied arthrotic 
joints and lamina. The abnonnal movements of the ver-
tebral bodies above and below portions of the spine 
fused by spondylarthrosis add to destruction of the 
cord. 
Many authors have constructed tables of the dimen-
sions of the normal spinal canal on the basis of findings 
in cervical spinal roentgenograms of living subjects and 
cadavers. The result has been considerable variation in 
the measurements obtained.»-**.*•"••» Arnold's1 data 
demonstrated an average C5 anteroposterior diameter 
of 14 mm, the values ranging from 10 to 18 mm (see 
Figure 1). Hinck7 evaluated roentgenograms of chil-
dren: the measurements at C3-5 were from 14.8 mm to 
p.l mm. When the 18-year-olds were considered as 
adults, the adults' canal at C3-4 and C4-5 measured 
F'7.3 mm and 16.7 mm, respectively* From age 3 to 18, 
jwiere had been an increase in the anteroposterior diam-
eter of the canal of less than 3.3 mm. Wolfe et al'° found 
l& average diameter of 17 mm, with a range of 12-20 
. Patients with an anteroposterior diameter of 10 
or less had symptoms of cervical spondylotic my-
opathy. Normaiand abnormal values must be related 
clinical findings in order to be significant, empha-
sizing the basic defect in measurements where the land-
marks are obscure at best. Under no circumstances 
should such data replace a most critical and thorough-
going neurologic evaluation as the basis for proper 
management. 
Spinal stenosis associated with the narrowed antero-
posterior diameter of the canal is rarely accompanied by 
a concomitant decrease in the size of the neural fora-
mens.7"* The nerve root in a normal foramen is usually 
displaced, rather than compressfed, and surgical decom-
pression by laminectomy for these patients does not re-
quire extensive foramenotomy. 
Myelography shows evidence of changes in the inter-
nal dimensions of the spinal canal caused by thickened 
Table 4. Causes of Injuries to Patients with Absolute Narrowing of 
the Canal or with Relative Narrowing of the Canal with Spondylosis 
Group 
Absolute narrowing 
{7 patients) 
Relative narrowing with 
spondylosis 0 6 patients) 
Total 
(23 patients) 
Fails 
5 
11 
16 
Sports 
acci-
dents 
0 
3 
3 
Auto 
acci-
dents 
f 
2 
3 
Motor-
cycle 
acci-
dents 
1 
0 
1 
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Table 6. Neurologic Levels of Injury for Patients with Absolute 
Narrowing of the Canal Versus Patients with Relative Narrowing of 
the Canals with Spondylosis 
Group C3-4 C4-5 C 5 - 6 C6~7 Total 
Absolute narrowing of 2 4 1 0 7 
the canal 
Relative narrowing of 2 5 8 1 16 
the canal with 
spondylosis 
Total % 4 9 9 t 
ligamenta flava and lamina, hypertrophied posterior 
facets, and, often, spurs insufficiently calcified to be rec-
ognized on plain films. 
During myelography of patients with cervical spinal 
stenosis, there is delayed movement of iophendylate 
into narrowed lateral gutters, with poor filling of de-
formed axillary pouches, varying degrees of block, and 
a widened cord with scant subarachnoid space (Figures 
2 and 3).3-5 
Widening of the cord similar to that of patients, with 
spinal stenosis may be found in many pathologic states. 
Robertson" described myelographic studies of two pa-
tients with spinal cord necrosis and wide spinal cords re-
sembling intramedullary tumors. Similar myelographic 
changes can be seen in patients with central disc her-
niations, spondylosis, arterial thrombosis, demyelinat-
ing disease, syringomyelia, hydromyelia, abscess, and' 
arteriovenous malformations. A good lateral roentgeno-
gram aids in the differential diagnosis. 
The significance of soft-tissue investments of the 
dural sac can be dealt with both in static and biody-
namic terms. These investments include the yellow and 
the posterior longitudinal ligaments, the epidural fat, 
and the blood vessels. Arnold1 cited the following data 
based on studies of cadavers: the average diameters of 
the canals measured 1.4-2.5 cm, the cords measured 0.8 
by 1.3 cm, and the soft tissues measured 3 mm, leaving 
a reserve of space of 3 mm (see Figure 1). The liga-
mentum flavum could bulge inward by 4-6 mm in ex-
tension and. could increase to 6-8 mm in thickness. 
In an autopsy study of 42 cadavers, Brieg3 demonstrated 
that the spinal cord slides 2-3 mm and adapts itself to 
the length of the canal. In flexion, it elongates, and in 
Table 6. Degrees of Resolution for Patients with Absolute 
Narrowing of the Canals as Compared to Those with Relative 
Narrowing of the Canal and Spondylosis (48 Hours After 
Admission) 
Group 
Absolute narrowing of 
the canal (7 patients) 
Relative narrowing of 
the canal (16 patients) 
Totals 
(23 patients) 
Rapid 
change 
2 -
6° 
8* 
inter-
mediate 
change 
1 # 
6* 
7* 
No 
change/ 
stow 
change 
4" 
4* 
8° 
Total 
7* 
16# 
23* 
extension, it shortens and thickens in cross-sectional di-
ameter. In extension, the posterior portion of the cord 
exhibits gjeater relative shortening with respect to the 
anterior portion. In eight of 11 patients with spondylosis 
studied in full extension, the cord appeared to be deeply 
grooved posteriorly by the bulging of the ligamentum 
flavum. With neck flexion, the cord widened and there 
was ventral ridging. In extension, ridging, discal intru-
sion, and infolding of the ligamentum flavum would 
contribute to cord compression, as well as to ischemia. 
Such changes can be devastating for patients with nar-
row canals, in whom an epidural fat cushion is minimal 
or absent. 
On the basis of studies of 21 cadavers of persons aged 
41-96, Waltz19 found that the transverse area of the spi-
nal canal from C3-4 to C7-T1 was smaller in extension 
(1.9 cm) than in flexion (2.2 cm). The average trans-
verse area was diminished by 15% in extension. In ex-
tension, the annulus fibrosis bulged posteriorly into the 
canal to cause a 14-16% reduction in the transverse di-
ameter. In addition, the shortened cord was 7-19% 
thicker, emphasizing its unique vulnerability in this pos-
ture. Altogether, the vertebral structures in flexion and 
in extension showed a relative shortening of the anterior 
margins of the spinal canal during hyperflexion of 3%. 
A 25% shortening of the posterior structures occurred 
during hyperextension. Hyperextension resulted in a 
25% reduction in the size of the foramina. Since flexion 
is limited by the approximation of the chin to the ster-
num, an automatic check exists in this position. 
Where available space is concerned, the stenotic ca-
nal has a reduced, if not absent, margin of safety, ren-
dering the cord maximally susceptible to minimal 
trauma, especially during hyperextension.1,5 
Moiel10 described two patients with cervical hyper-
extension injuries without evidence of fracture or dis-
location. The myelopathy was consistent with a central 
cord syndrome. Both patients were immediately made 
quadriplegic. Results of the tomograms were normal. 
Myelograms showed a widened cord consistent with 
cord concussion and contusion. The absence of fracture 
and subluxation was explained as a "recoil" phenome-
non wherein temporary subluxation causing injury was 
followed by spontaneous reduction. 
Taylor1*-17 documented hyperextension cord injury of 
patients at autopsy, showing ruptured anterior longitu-
dinal ligaments in the presence of normal spinal films. 
Pathologically, contused cord with or without hemato-
myelia was found with or without the presence of a wid-
ened cord observed by myelography (see Figure 3). 
Ohwada11 studied 12 patients, with an average age of 
30 years, who had cervical stenosis and myelopathy and 
in whom a widened spinal cord resembling an intra-
medullary tumor was evident by myelography. Com-
puterized and transverse axial tomography showed mai-
development of the neural arches resulting in flattening 
\or\\ 
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Table 7. Neurologic Deficits and Operative Procedures tor Patients with Absolute Narrowing and with Relative Narrowing of the Canals 
with Spondylosis 
Group 
Absolute narrowing of the canal 
Relative narrowing of the canal with spondylosis 
Totals 
Number of 
patients 
7 
18 
23 
Part/a/ 
deffcft 
3(43%) 
12(75%) 
15(65%) 
Complete 
deficit III 
Surgical 
t treatment* 
and anterior 
fusion 
2 
1 
3 
Laminectomy 
and fusion 
1 
1 
2 
• With partial deficit- only • 
af the spinal canal in the transverse plane (see Figures 2 
and 3). 
In support of OhwadaV1 findings, Epstein et al5 cited 
results for six cases. Two of these patients had hyper-
extension injuries with acute myelopathy, one demon-
strating hematomyelia at operation. On the basis of 
plain lateral roentgenograms, Ohwada11 found that the 
neural arches were hidden behind the articular proc-
esses, making the diagnosis of stenosis indicated by such 
films possible (see Figure I). In his 12 cases, the diagno-
sis of narrowed canal syndrome was made using four 
criteria: (1) a small anteroposterior diameter of the ca-
Eial; (2) absence of spondylosis; (3) maldevelopment or 
Battening of the neural arches; and (4) presence of a 
motor, dominant cervical myelopathy. The patients' 
conditions improved symptomatically after laminar de-
compression had been done. 
Schneider14,15 observed a group of patients who had 
preservation of light touch and vibratory sensation after 
receiving cervical cord injuries with myelographic evi-
dence of widening of the cord. The patients' neurologic 
feficit showed rapid and spontaneous resolution within 
M hours after injury. Laminectomy often made the con-
dition worse. Schneider thought that the patients with 
central cord injuries had a good prognosis for recovery 
because of the reversibility of the effects of concussion, 
contusion, and cord swelling. Conservative manage-
ment was used, unless myelographic block or radio-
graphic bony impingement on the canal was demon-
strated. When there was spontaneous improvement, the 
use of aggressive measures was delayed. These princi-
pals remain a noteworthy guide for the management of 
patients with spinal stenosis without fracture or dis-
location. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Patients with cervical spinal stenosis are uniquely 
vulnerable to hyperextension injuries of the spinal cord. 
Trauma to the cord is often manifested by evidence of 
central cord injury and a motor, dominant myelopathy. 
Treatment consists of immobilization and the use of ste-
roids with proper respiratory, biochemical, and meta-
bolic support. Early improvement in the neurologic 
status is an excellent prognostic sign and makes con-
servative care mandatory. Results of appropriate plain 
films and myelography soon after admission establish 
criteria for surgical intervention, depending on the pa-
tient's neurologic status. The presence of a myelo-
graphic block and a failing or poorly sustained neuro-
logic status in five of our most seriously injured patients 
justified surgical decompression by either an anterior or 
posterior approach. 
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9 A Review of the Pathophysiology of 
Cervical Spondylotic Myelopathy With 
Insights for Potential Novel Mechanisms 
Drawn From Traumatic Spinal 
Cord Injury 
Michael 6. Fehlings, MD, PhD, FRCSC, and Ghassan Skat MD, FRCSC 
Cervical myelopathy is the most serious complication of 
cervical spondylosis and is the most common acquired 
cause of spinal cord dysfunction. This disorder was orig-
inally described by Stookey in 1928 and was attributed 
to compression of the cord by cartilaginous nodules of 
degenerated disc material/4 The definition of cervical 
spondylotic myelopathy (CSM) as a distinct clinical en-
tity began to evolve in 1956 when Clarke and Robinson 
distinguished this condition from cervical myelopathy 
caused by acute disc prolapse.19 The pathophysiology of 
CSM has not been fully elucidated and is of particular 
relevance, given the failure in some patients of the con-
dition to respond to appropriate medical and surgi-
cal therapy. 
The first part of this review will examine the neuro-
pathologic course of CSM with an emphasis on features 
that provide potential insight into underlying mecha-
nisms (Table 1). Next, the pathophysiology of CSM will 
be discussed in the context of static and dynamic me-
chanical factors and ischemia (Table 2). The third part of 
this review will examine selected cellular and molecular 
mechanisms of traumatic spinal cord injury including 
glutamatergic toxicity, free radical- and cationic-
mediated cell injury, and apoptosis, all of which may be 
of relevance to the pathophysiology of CSM (Table 3). 
• Neuropathology Course of Cervical 
Spondylotic Myelopathy 
Key Pathologic Features of Cervical 
Spondylotic Myelopathy 
The pathologic features of CSM are summarized in 
Table 1. Histologic analysis of the spinal cord of pa-
tients with CSM characteristically shows that the cen-
tral gray and medial portions of the myelinated long 
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tracts are affected most severely and show evidence of 
cystic cavitation, gliosis, and demyelination.38,40 Wal-
lerian degeneration of the posterior columns and pos-
terolateral tracts occurs cephalad to the site of com-
pression. Anterior horn cell dropout occurs at the site 
of compression, and the corticospinal tracts undergo 
degeneration, with loss of myelin staining caudal to 
the site of compression.48,15 
Temporal Evolution of Pathologic Changes 
Ogino et al conducted a clinicopatbologic study in 
which nine patients with CSM were observed clinically, 
radiographically, and, at time of death, neuropathotogi-
cally. The severity of pathologic changes in the cord cor-
related well with the extent of spinal cord compression, 
measured by the anteroposterior compression ratio. The 
posterolateral white matter fibers, including the lateral 
corticospinal tracts, were most susceptible to minor de-
grees of compression. In contrast, anterior horn cell loss 
and localized infarction of the gray matter was associ-
ated with more severe degrees of compression. With an 
anteroposterior compression ratio of less than 20%, ex-
tensive infarction of all the gray matter occurred. Al-
though the lateral white matter tracts were involved in 
cases of severe compression, the anterior columns were 
remarkably resistant to degeneration, a finding consis-
tent with other clinical and experimental reports.9 De-
generation of the dorsal columns, particularly medially, 
was seen only in cases of severe compression. The patho-
logic changes showed an excellent correlation with clin-
ical neurologic findings. The four patients in this series 
with mild to moderate cord compression exhibited 
mainly long-tract signs in /he lower extremities consis-
tent with early involvement of the corticospinal tracts. 
Four patients with severe cord compression had spastic 
quadriparesis and showed marked disability of the hands 
and fingers accompanied by severe intrinsic hand muscle 
wasting, caused by a combination of corticospinal rract 
degeneration and anterior horn cell loss. 
2730 
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Table 1. Pathology of Cervical Spondylotic Myelopathy 
Central gray and medial white matter most severely affected 
Wallerian degeneration of posterior columns cephalad to site of com-
pression and of corticospinal tracts caudal to site of compression 
Relative sparing of anterior columns 
Progression of pathological changes varies with severity of compression 
Lateral corticospinal tracts most vulnerable to compression 
Anterior horn cell loss or localized infarction of gray matter associ-
ated with severe compression 
Extensive infarction of gray and white matter associated with anteri-
or/posterior compression ratios of <20% 
Role of Axial Tension on Ischemia and 
Axonal Degeneration 
Breig et ai14 observed that the anterior columns and the 
subpial axons in the dorsal columns were relatively pre-
served, even in advanced cases of CSM. The blood sup-
ply of the subpial portion of the dorsal columns was 
thought to be resistant to ventral compression, because 
the posterior spinal arteries "zigzag" and are not put 
under tension when the cord elongates in cervical flex-
ion. Similarly, the arteries supplying the anterior col-
umns run in an anteroposterior direction so that the 
stresses that flatten the cord do not narrow them. In 
contrast, the vascular supply of the gray matter and me-
dial white matter arises from transverse perforating ves-
sels that arborize from the anterior sulcal arterial system. 
Accordingly, Breig et al concluded that the most proba-
ble cause of gray matter degeneration and medial white 
matter degeneration was mechanical distortion and oc-
clusion of the transverse penetrating vessels of the spinal 
cord arising from the anterior sulcal arteries. In particu-
lar, the medial aspect of the dorsal columns and lateral 
corticospinal tracts were vulnerable to injury from isch-
emia and axial tension. These pathologic observations, 
Table 2. Pathophysiology of Cervical 
Spondylotic Myelopathy 
Mechanical factors 
Static 
Canal stenosis 
Severity of spinal cord compression 
Dynamic 
Changes in flexion 
In flexion, the spinal cord lengthens causing increased tension 
on dorsal fiber tracts 
Changes in extension 
Role of ischemia 
Pathological evidence 
Pathological changes in cord predominantly in the distribution of 
anterior spinal artery 
Hyalinization and thickening of walls of anterior spinal artery and 
perforating vessels 
Possible role of periradicular fibrosis 
Experimental evidence 
Compression of cord with Fogerty balloon catheter causes isch-
emia due to compression/stretching of transversely placed In-
tramedullary vessels 
Microangiographic, autoradiographic/ and hydrogen clearance evi-
dence of ischemia due to compression 
Pathophysiological effects of ischemia are additive with compres-
sion 
Table 3. Mechanisms of Traumatic Spinal Cord Injury of 
Potential Relevance to Cervical Spondylotic Myelopathy 
Mechanical factors (static/dynamic) 
Ischemia 
Free-radical mediated cell injury 
Cation-mediated injury (Na+/Ca++) 
Linked to protease activation (calpain) 
Glutamatergic cell injury 
lonotropic glutamate receptors 
NMDA (anterior horn cell injury) 
AMPA/katnate (white matter Injury) 
Metabotroprc receptors (coupled to 6 proteins) 
Group 1 mGluRs (linked to rises in Ca + * through PLC) 
Group 2,3 mGluRs (negatively coupled to cAMP) 
Apoptosis (programmed cell death) 
Proapoptotlc genes: Box, Bcl-xS, c-fosr c-jun, p75N6FR, and ICE-like 
proteases 
Genes that block apoptosis: Bcl-2 and Bcl-xL 
which suggest a significant role for ischemia, have been 
validated in experimental models discussed later. 
• Pathophysiology oif Cervical Spondylotic Myelopathy 
Static Mechanical Factors 
Spinal Canal Size. The presenoe of cervical spondylosis 
alone does not usually result in myelopathy. Normally, 
there is ample tolerance of the spinal cord to encroach-
ment of spondylosis, and the development of myelopathy 
is more likely to occur in patients with a developmentally 
narrow spinal canal. The normal cervical canal diameter 
from C3 to C7 in whites is 17-18 mm,17,37 with slight 
variation between sexes. It is noteworthy, however, that 
the normal dimensions of the cervical canal are consid-
erably smaller in Asians.42 
Arnold5 demonstrated a high correlation between 
sagittal diameter of the cervical spinal canal in cervical 
spondylosis and the development of myelopathy. A sag-
ittal diameter of 12 mm or less was a critical factor in the 
development of cervical spondylotic myelopathy. Simi-
larly, Adams and Logue1 identified three groups of pa-
tients with spondylosis, and in group 3 (with cervical 
myelopathy), the sagittal diameter was 11.8 mm (range, 
9-IS mm). 
The cervical cord varies little ^ n size from CI to C7, 
measuring approximately 10 mm in diameter (range, 
8.5-11.5 mm).56 Accordingly, in a normally sized cervi-
cal spinal canal, up to two thirds of the canal is unoccu-
pied by the spinal cord from CI to C3, compared with 
one quarter from C4 to C7. Thus, the normal spinal 
canal has sufficient space to accommodate the develop-
ment of spondylotic changes without cord compression, 
and CSM is more likely to develop in a congenitaily nar-
rowed cervical canal, where additional narrowing by 
spondylotic changes results in spinal cord compres-
sion.35 
Progressive Cervical Spondylosis. Although a decreased 
sagittal diameter is essentia! to the development of CSM, 
progressive cervical spondylotic changes are clearly also 
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a key feature in the pathogenesis of this disorder. These 
changes, which can include disc degeneration and osteo-
phytosis anteriorly, uncovertebral joint hyperostosis an-
terolaterally, and facet hypertrophy and ligamentum fla-
vum buckling posteriorly, result in circumferential 
narrowing of the cervical canal.55 
Burrows17 studied the sagittal diameter of the spinal 
canal in cervical spondylosis radiographically and noted 
three distinct types of degenerative encroachment in the 
cervical spinal caAal. The first type involved obliteration 
of the neuroforamens by osteophyric overgrowth at the 
posterolateral margin of the vertebral body. The second 
type involved encroachment on the neural canal of an 
osteophytic spur or "bar" across the back of the degen-
erated disc, producing an impression on the spinal cord 
by direct compression. The third encroachment was 
caused by degeneration, hypertrophy, and buckling of 
the ligamentum flavum. Burrows concluded that the ini-
tial size of the canal was a key underlying factor in the 
eventual development of cervical spondylotic myelopa-
thy. Similar conclusions were reached by Murone51 in a 
study of 51 Japanese men. 
Edwards and LaRocca24 measured the developmental 
sagittal diameter and the spondylotic sagittal diameter in 
patients with symptomatic and refractory cervical spon-
dylosis. The difference between the two measurements 
was termed the spondylosis index and represented the 
degree of spondylotic narrowing for each cervical seg-
ment. It was found that patients with preexisting nar-
rowed cervical canals became symptomatic at an index 
of 2 mm versus 3.45 mm in the patients with normal 
cervical dimensions. The patients with more severe 
symptoms of myelopathy had the narrowest sagittal di-
ameters. C5-C6 had the greatest frequency and extent of 
involvement in both groups. These investigators sug-
gested the existence of a premyelopathic group of pa-
tients with midcervical sagittal diameters between 10 
mm and 13 mm. In this group, spondylotic narrowing of 
approximately 2 mm would result in CSM. In contrast, 
patients with sagittal diameters of 17 mm or more were 
thought to be at low risk for the development of CSM. 
Ball et al* examined genetic influences on the devel-
opment of spondylotic changes in twins and found a 
statistically significant concordance of radiologic fea-
tures in monozygous and, to a lesser extent, dizygotic 
twin pairs. Patients older than 50 years with normal cer-
vical spine radiographs were significantly more likely to 
have a sibling with normal or only mildly abnor-
mal radiographs. 
Severity of Spinal Cord Compression. There is evidence that 
symptoms of cord compression appear after the cord has 
been reduced in size by 30% or to a transverse area of 
less than 60 mm".5' Moreover, Ogino et al observed that 
the severity of pathologic changes in the spine of patients 
with CSM correlated significantly with the exrent of 
compression.'3 Similar morphometric studies were per-
formed by Fujiwara et al using radiographic techniques 
including computed tomographic myelography.29 The 
transverse area of the spinal cord was measured to deter-
mine the severity of cervical cord compression and was 
related to prognosis with surgical intervention. Although 
the transverse area did not correlate well with the preop-
erative neurologic status, rhis measurement was found to 
be the most significant factor in determining the response 
to surgery. In patients with a transverse area greater than 
30 mm2, functional recovery after decompression was 
favorable. In contrast, there was a poor response to sur-
gery when the transverse area was less than 30 mm2. 
Thus, 30 mm2 proved to be the critical size of area com-
pression, below which the cervical spinal cord could 
not recover. 
Dynamic Mechanical Factors 
It is intuitive that the extent of mechanical compression 
of the spinal cord could be significantly influenced by 
movement of the cervical spine. As reviewed by White 
and Panjabi,70 several investigators have observed that 
the functional diameter of the cervical spinal canal may 
be reduced to a critical level or less with flexion and ex-
tension. 
In flexion, the spinal cord must lengthen or take a 
more anterior path in the canal, resulting in axial tension 
and, potentially, ischemia.14 In the presence of anterior 
osteophytes, the spinal cord can be stretched over rhe 
anterior bars.54 Chronic changes have been documented 
at the sites of these areas of compression in au-
topsy studies.14 
As the neck extends, the ligamentum flavum buckles 
inward,55 which results in the greatest decrease in cross-
sectional area of the cervical canal. Moreover, in exten-
sion, the spinal cord shortens, and its cross-sectional area 
increases.14 The combination of a maximum reduction 
in canal area along with an increase in spinal cord trans-
verse area, places the cord at significant risk in extension 
in CSM. A pincer effect is seen in this condition, in which 
the spinal cord is compressed in extension between the 
posteroinferior margin of one vertebral body and the 
lamina or ligamentum flavum of the next cau-
dal level.58'70'72 
Role of Ischemia 
There is considerable evidence to indicate that interrup-
tion of the vascular supply to the spinal cord, caused by 
several factors, may be a significant component in the 
origin and pathophysiology of CSM. Histopathologic 
observations support the concept of ischemic injury to 
gray matter and medial white matter tracts in patients 
with CSM.l4'40 Spinal cord ischemia as a potential mech-
anism in the pathophysiology of CSM was first proposed 
by Brain in 19488'12 and later supported by Mair and 
Druckman*48 who observed hyalinization and thicken-
ing of the walls of the anterior spinal artery and the 
parenchymal arterioles: by Taylor.oS who suggested that 
radicular arteries to the cervical spinal cord were inter-
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rupted by fibrosis in the intervertebral foramina; and by 
Nurick52 in his classic treatise. 
Several experimental observations support the vascu-
lar hypothesis of CSM. For example, several investiga-
tors have reported evidence of ischemia in animal models 
of CSM based on microangiography,38 autoradiogra-
phy,33 and hydrogen clearance.4 In other studies, inves-
tigators have examined the additive effects of ischemia 
and compression on spinal cord dysfunction and disease. 
Gooding et al32 published an experimental study in dogs 
in which the combined effects of anterior spinal cord 
compression and ligation of segmental arteries was ex-
amined. Ischemia clearly exacerbated the pathologic ef-
fects of compression on the spinal cord. Moreover, the 
corticospinal tracts were the most vulnerable to injury, a 
finding that correlates well with clinicopathologic obser-
vations in patients with CSM.53 Similarly, Shimomura*1 
studied the effect of ischemia in conjunction with com-
pression of the cervical cord in dogs and demonstrated 
that obstruction of the peripial arterial plexus could 
cause intramedullary cavitation. 
Doppman et al23 studied compression of the spinal 
cord using a Fogerty balloon catheter to compress the 
anterior, posterior, and lateral cord. Anterior compres-
sion compromises perfusion through the transverse arte-
rioles arising from the anterior sulcal arteries. When the 
cord is compressed posteriorly, perfusion is reduced to 
the intramedullary branches in the central gray matter. 
Accordingly, stretching of the cord laterally or flattening 
of the cord causes interruption of the transversely placed 
intramedullary arteries by elongation and narrowing, 
with inadequate perfusion of the gray matter in adjacent 
lateral columns. 
There is evidence that oligodendroglia may be partic-
ularly vulnerable to ischemic injury and that this mech-
anism may particularly account for the demyelination 
that occurs in chronic CSM.31 This observation is of 
particular relevance, given more recent evidence that ol-
igodendroglia undergo delayed programmed cell death 
or apoptosis after traumatic spinal cord injury.62 Ac-
cordingly, the effects of chronic ischemia may account 
for the observation that demyelination of the corticospi-
nal tracts is one of the first pathologic changes in CSM.53 
• Novel Mechanisms of Spinal Cord Injury of Potential 
Significance in Cervical Spondylotic Myelopathy 
The pathophysiology of spinal cord injury involves a 
primary mechanical injury caused by dynamic and static 
forces including compression, shear, and distraction fol-
lowed by a secondary injury involving several mecha-
nisms including ischemia, glutamatergic toxicity, free 
radical activation, peroxidative injury to cell mem-
branes, and programmed cell death or apopto-
^2,3,21,22,26.27,35,44.67.74
 T h e f e a f e s uff i c i e n t his-
topathologic and pathophysiologic similarities between 
cervical spondylotic myelopathy and traumatic spinal 
cord injury15 to warrant a brief discussion of novel 
mechanisms of traumatic central nervous system (CNS) 
injury that may be of relevance in CSM. 
Glutamatergic Toxicity 
Excitotoxicity caused by increases in extracellular levels 
of glutamate has been proposed as a mechanism of neu-
ronal death in acute and chronic neurologic diseases in-
cluding stroke, traumatic CNS injury, and prolonged sei-
zure activity.8,25 The potential sources of glutamate 
include neurons, the terminals of descending and ascend-
ing tracts, and glia.3,66 As summarized in Table 3, gluta-
mate receptors are classified into those that gate entry of 
Na + and Ca+* (ionotropicj3 and those coupled to 
guanosine triphosphate-binding proteins and secondary 
messenger systems (metabotropic).20 Ionotropic recep-
tors are further sub classified into those gated by a-ami-
no-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazplepropionate 
(AMPA), kainate, and N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA). 
In the spinal cord, NMDA receptors are expressed in 
gray matter, whereas AMPA/kainate receptors are 
present in white and gray matter.3 
Increasing evidence suggests that impairment of intra-
cellular energy metabolism increases neuronal vulnera-
bility to glutamate which, even when present at physio-
logic concentrations, can damage neurons.18 This 
mechanism of slow excitotoxicity may be involved in 
neuronal death in chronic neurodegenerative diseases 
such as the mitochondrial encephalomyopathies, Hun-
tington's disease, spinocerebellar degeneration syn-
dromes, motor neuron diseases such as amyotrophic lat-
eral sclerosis (ALS), and accordingly, CSM.28,34 In 
addition, there is increasing evidence that blocking of 
AMPA/kainate receptors by compounds such as 2,3-
dihydroxy-6-nitro-7-sulfamyol-benzo(F)quinoxaline 
may be of therapeutic value in traumatic spinal cord 
axonal injury.3'73,74 This is of particular importance, 
given the absence of NMDA receptors in spinal cord 
white matter.3 
Free Radical-Mediated Cell Injury 
There is considerable evidence to support a role for free 
radical and lipid peroxidation reactions in the patho-. 
physiology of traumatic and ischemic injury to the 
CNS.13 Moreover, the use of antioxidants and free rad-
ical scavengers in the treatment of experimental and clin-
ical CNS trauma and ischemia has provided convincing 
support for the involvement of oxygen radicals and lipid 
peroxidation in these conditions. The most clinically 
relevant example of this is the improvement, albeit mod-
est, in neurologic function with high-dose methylpred-
nisolone after traumatic spinal cord injury.11,10 
The discovery of mutations in the human SOD1 gene 
encoding copper-zinc superoxide dismutase (Cu,Zn 
SOD) in patients with familial ALS strongly implicates 
free radical-mediated cell injury in this condition.39 In 
particular, there is evidence that familial ALS mutations 
cause a functional enhancement in Cu,Zn SOD that pro-
motes the generation of deleterious oxygen radicals/4 
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This may render motor neurons sensitive to the excito-
toxic effects of glutamate and is further supported by 
evidence that riluzole, a glutamate antagonist, has ther-
apeutic efficacy in human ALS.7 These studies suggest the 
possibility that the pathophysiology of CSM, which is 
also characterized by delayed anterior horn cell loss, may 
partially involve free radical-mediated cell injury. 
Cationh-Mediated Cell Injury 
Traumatic or ischemic injury to the CNS, including 
white matter, is associated with rapid energy depletion, 
failure of the Na+-K+-adenosine triphosphatase pump, 
and accumulation of axonal Na4" through noninactivat-
ing Na+ channels.2'2*'65 In certain pathologic states 
characterized by membrane depolarization, in particular 
ischemia, reverse Na+-Ca2"f exchange and axonal Ca2+ 
overload occurs.65 Some intracellular Ca2+ entry may 
also occur directly through Na+ channels.59 The abnor-
mal increases in intracellular Ca2+ activate several Ca2+-
dependent enzymes including calpain, phospholipases, 
and protein kinase C, resulting in cytoskeletal inju-
ry.43,63 Although glia are relatively resistant to ischemia, 
oligodendrocytes and the myelin sheath may be damaged 
by glutamate released by reverse Na+-glutamate trans-
port65 or alternatively by calcium entry through AMP A/ 
kainate receptors,3 Given that CSM involves both com-
pressive and ischemic injury, it is possible that cation-
mediated cell injury plays a role in the pathophysiology 
of this condition, in particular in the destruction of my-
elinated tracts. 
Apoptosis 
Apoptosis or programmed cell death is a distinct form of 
controlled cellular degeneration that is distinguished 
from necrosis by the absence of inflammation, interim-
cleosomal cleavage of DNA, and regulation by specific 
genes.46 In the CNS, genes have been identified that pro-
mote apoptosis: Bax, Bcl-xS, c-/bs, c-jun, p75NGFR, 
and ICE-like proteases;71'46 or block apoptosis: Bcl-2 
and Bcl-xL.30 Apoptosis serves several physiologic func-
tions, such as the control of cell numbers during devel-
opment, the maintenance of tissue homeostasis, and the 
deletion of abnormal cells.16 Apoptosis of neurons and 
glia has been reported after spinal cord injury62'45,21 and 
ischemia41'47 and in certain neurodegenerative condi-
tions associated with anterior horn cell loss, including 
the hereditary form of infantile spinal muscular atro-
phy60 and ALS.50 It is possible that the delayed degener-
ation of anterior horn cells that occurs in cervical spon-
dyiotic myelopathy may reflect the effects of apoptosis. 
This is of particular relevance, given recent evidence that 
pharmacologic blockers of the calcium-activated pro-
tease calpain** and inhibitors of the c-Jun N-terminal 
kinase tJNK) signaling pathway can inhibit the develop-
ment of apoptosis in the CNS.49 
• Conclusion 
In conclusion, the pathophysiology of CSM involves the 
combination of static and dynamic factors and progres-
sive ischemia. Further research is required to elucidate 
more fundamental mechanisms at a cellular and molec-
ular level including the potential roles of glutamatergic 
toxicity, free radical- and cation-mediated cell injury 
and delayed programmed cell death or apoptosis. Im-
proved treatment strategies for CSM may evolve from a 
more detailed understanding of pathophysio-
logic mechanisms. 
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